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Abstract 
Detailed Monte-Carlo simulation of a complex system is the benchmark method used in probabilistic analysis 
of engineering systems under multiple uncertain sources of failure modes; such simulations typically involve a 
large amount of CPU time. This makes the probabilistic failure analysis of complex systems, having a large 
number of components and highly nonlinear interrelationships, computationally intractable and challenging. 
The objective of this thesis is to synthesize existing methods to analyze multifactorial failure of complex 
systems which includes predicting the probability of the systems failure and finding its main causes under 
different situations/scenarios. Bayesian Networks (BNs) have potentials in probabilistically representing 
complex systems, which is beneficial to predicting the systems failure probability and diagnosing its causes 
using limited data, logic inference, expert knowledge or simulation of system operations. Compared to other 
graphical representation techniques such as Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), BNs 
can deal with complex networks that have multiple initiating events and different types of variables in one 
graphical representation with the ability to predict the effects, or diagnose the causes leading to a certain 
effect. This thesis proposes a multifactor failure analysis of complex systems using a number of BN-based 
approaches. In order to overcome limitations of traditional BNs in dealing with computationally intensive 
systems simulation and the systems having cyclic interrelationships (or feedbacks) among components, 
Simulation Supported Bayesian Networks (SSBNs) and Markov Chain Simulation Supported Bayesian 
Networks (MCSSBNs) are respectively proposed. In the latter, Markov Chains and BNs are integrated to 
acquire analysis for systems with cyclic behavior when needed. Both SSBNs and MCSSBNs have the 
distinction of decomposing a complex system to many sub-systems, which makes the system easier to 
understand and faster to be simulated. The efficiency of these techniques is demonstrated first through their 
application to a pilot system of two dam reservoirs, where the results of SSBNs and MCSSBNs are compared 
with those of the entire system operations simulation. Subsequently, two real-world problems including failure 
analysis of hydropower dams and nuclear waste systems are studied. For such complex networks, a bag of 
tools that depend on logically inferred data and expert knowledge and judgement are proposed for efficiently 
predicting failure probabilities in cases where limited operational and historical data are available. Results 
demonstrate that using the proposed SSBN method for estimating the failure probability of a two dam 
reservoir system of different connections/topologies results in probability estimates in the range of 3%, which 
are close to those coming from detailed simulation for the same system. Increasing the number of states per 
BN variables in the states’ discretization stage makes the SSBN results converge to the simulation results. 
When Markov chains are integrated with SSBN (i.e. MCSSBN), the results depend on the MCSSBN approach 
that is used according to the scenarios of interest that need to be included in the BN representation. Evidence 
of system failure can be used to diagnose the main contributors to the failure (i.e. inflow, reservoir level, or 
defected gates). This posterior diagnostic capability of the BN is distinctive for the real world case studies 
presented in this thesis. In Mountain Chute Dam that is operated by Ontario Power Generation, the main 
contributors to system failure, according to the logically inferred data and expert knowledge, are inadequate 
discharge capacity of the sluiceway, electromechanical equipment failure, head gates failure, non-safe ice 
loading, high inflow, high rain/precipitation, sluice gate failure, and high water pressure. While for the 
Nuclear Waste Management system, the main contributors to system failure according to the known and 
assumed data are due to high pressures and bentonite failures. In summary, modelling, validating, and 
developing appropriate modifications of the BN method for applications in complex systems failure analysis is 
the major contribution of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction, Problem Definition, and Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Failure analysis is an important and challenging aspect of the study of complex systems. A 
system is defined to be consisting of components, sub-systems, inputs and outputs within system 
boundaries. The inputs provide physical resources and information to the sub-systems, which are 
interacting among each other to produce some outputs. All interactions are assumed to take place 
within system boundaries. A complex system can be defined as a system structure that is 
composed of many components that have complex interactions, [1]. Any failure in performing 
the required interactions among system components or any failure in getting the expected 
output/result is considered to be contributing to system failure, [2]. Thus, analysis of a system 
with its components is a crucial step in determining the difficulties and complexities that the 
system will experience at any stage. However, in the real world, performance of both inputs and 
sub-systems is affected by probabilistic uncertainty, and hence a failure may come with an 
associated probability. Probabilistic uncertainty due to randomness of events or values and 
limited knowledge are considered main sources of uncertainty in systems introduced in this 
thesis, [3, 4]. The main goal of this research is to evaluate the probability of failure of complex 
systems, while finding the failure causes, and hence the analysis is called the probabilistic failure 
analysis (PFA). For any given system with its inputs and sub-systems, probabilistic failure 
analysis depends on finding the probability of not getting the required or estimated output of that 
system. The required output may be the effect that is produced from certain causes (i.e. 
prediction reasoning), or the determination of the cause responsible for certain results and effects 
(i.e. diagnostic reasoning). Thus, determining the cause-effect relation is an important first step 
in the probabilistic failure analysis, which allows for better understanding to enhance the system 
reliability and take decisions for mitigating the negative effects or better enhancing the causes.   
In this research, the concept of probabilistic failure analysis is applied to two main real-world 
case studies: 1- Nuclear Waste Management (NWM), and 2- Safety of Hydropower Dams 
(SHPD). The type and complexity level varies in these two case studies; however, both can be 
analysed as “Complex Systems”. For each case study, relevant literature is reviewed to 
understand the problem, study existing solutions, and determine system factors, parameters, and 
variables. As a result, the system can be represented graphically. Lastly, probability measures are 
applied to each system’s graphical network to estimate the probability of failure for given 
scenarios/situations. In this thesis, the graph representation of both systems is conducted using 
Bayesian Networks (BNs) which allow for representing marginal, conditional, and joint 
probability measures affecting system components. Representing systems of engineering 
applications using BNs is affected by multiple factors that affect the probabilistic quantification 
process. The aim of this thesis is to develop approaches that facilitate the probabilistic 
quantification of BNs, and hence, facilitate prediction of system failures, as follows: 
1- Incorporating simulation of the entire system with the BN representation, given that 
simulation may be challenging especially for very complex systems that include a huge 
number of system variables. This approach is named “Simulation Supported Bayesian 
Network (SSBN)” in this thesis. In this approach, simulation is used as a source of 
probabilistic information that is used to quantify the basic nodes and conditional relations 
among system nodes/variables, and  
2- Incorporating Markov Chains to the SSBN approach, named “Markov Chain Simulation 
Supported Bayesian Network (MCSSBN)” in this thesis. This approach is supposed to 
overcome the limitation of being acyclic in the BN representation of the system. This 
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allows for cyclic system analysis for different system scenarios/situations, and easy 
update for the system in case any new data becomes available. 
 
 
1.2 Problem Definition 
Failure analysis of complex engineering systems is challenging for different reasons. Most of the 
complex systems include multiple factors and variables of different natures (i.e. technical and 
non-technical). These factors are mostly associated with probabilistic measures which lead to the 
requirement to represent marginal, joint, and conditional probabilities of the events contributing 
to any system failure, resulting in probabilistic uncertainty. Current practices use exhaustive 
simulation models, which may be computationally intensive when dealing with any complex 
system of a huge number of system components, complex interrelations, and/or nonlinear 
governing equations. This makes the probabilistic representation for system failure analysis not 
easy to interpret. Failure analysis of these systems is important in the sense that how likely they 
will reach a failure state (probability of failure) and what will be the consequences of failure in 
terms of expected loss or other probabilistic measures quantifying those consequences, e.g. 
vulnerability, reliability and resilience. Estimating the probability of failure in such systems 
could be hard because the state of the systems is a vector of multiple stochastic variables having 
a huge number of possible values in a multidimensional state space. Particularly, when a failure 
state results from multiple factors, this means that the probability of failure would be a joint 
probability function of multiple variables and events. Knowing that the relationships between 
input and output vectors of variables is complex, it would be practically impossible to determine 
the joint probability function of output vector analytically even if the probability function of 
input vectors are simply Gaussian and statistically independent, whereas in general the 
distributions are non-Gaussian and dependent. Hydropower dams and nuclear waste management 
using deep geological repository systems may be good examples of complex systems that have 
multiple interrelated factors. Dam systems are complex systems having a huge number of 
interacting factors and components. The deep geological repository system is also complex in 
terms of the interactions among system components and the lack of operational data for such 
future projects. In such systems, exhaustive simulations are challenging while predicting any 
system failure, and while diagnosing the causes of such failure.  Decision makers in charge of 
such systems need a multifactor representation to overcome the challenges of current practices 
and to facilitate interpreting the interrelations among system components while predicting the 
failures or diagnosing the failure causes in terms of probability estimates during different 
situations/scenarios. Data scarcity is one major factor that makes the risk analysis of such 
systems challenging. A rational framework to analyze failures and risks of these systems is 
crucial in both the short terms and the long terms and BN provides the foundation for such 
framework. It is shown later in this thesis that Bayesian Networks (BNs) have potentials that 
help solving such problems. Bayesian Network provides a graphical representation of any system 
using basic probabilities, for system inputs, and conditional (transition) probabilities, for sub-
systems and their mutual interactions. There are some advantages and limitations in using BNs. 
One of the main advantages is that BNs can integrate all types of data (e.g. social, environmental, 
technical, etc.) because of the probabilistic nature of the BNs, as everything is represented as a 
probability. Data must also be available to be able to estimate probabilities. This is not feasible 
for systems which are still under research or will be applied in the future. However, BN analysis 
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allows for integrating subjective probabilistic information and/or simulations, which can be 
improved with additional data updates, when available. The main limitation is the acyclic 
behaviour of the BN that doesn’t allow for analysis of systems with cyclic behavior that is 
needed in some applications. When the system is fully represented by BN, the failure probability 
could be estimated using Bayesian inference. Alternatively, BNs may be used to evaluate the 
performance of the system components and their interactions to get some information about the 
failure causes. If the post failure analysis stage is taken into consideration, determination of 
causes and mitigation or treatment actions should be considered in order to improve the 
performance and limit the overall system failure that the system may experience in the future. In 
this research, two case studies are used to develop Probabilistic Failure Analysis (PFA) for 
complex systems: 1- is for high level radioactive Nuclear Waste Management (NWM), which is 
still a future project under development, and 2- is to analyse Safety of Hydropower Dams 
(SHPD), whose risks of failure include failure probability, and consequences of failure. For the 
purpose of this thesis, we are focussing mainly on the first part (i.e. failure probability) with 
some extensions to be provided for the second part (i.e. consequences) in the future. The two 
case studies are totally different in terms of application, but they are both complex systems and 
can be represented probabilistically, but the main challenge is the data type. In NWM, which is 
still a blue print, only partial data for this system or its components are available and requires 
detailed simulations, which are outside of the scope of this thesis. On the other hand, SHPD is a 
known problem with known technical databases but with a significantly larger number of 
components than NWM, thus having large data requirements. In this thesis, the BN is used as a 
multifactor representation for complex systems in order to predict system failures and diagnose 
failure causes. In case of data scarcity, BN representation may integrate simulation and/or 
subjective probabilistic information to facilitate the failure analysis. This research presents 
methodologies utilizing Simulation and Bayesian and Markovian Networks for predicting 
probabilities of failures of complex systems, using information of system components and their 
interconnections. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis and Proposed Methodology 
In this research, failure is analyzed for two complex systems: 
1- NWM (Nuclear Waste Management) using deep geological repository for high level 
radioactive waste (spent nuclear fuel) management, and 
2- SHPD (Safety of Hydro Power Dams), a pilot study of a two dam reservoir system is 
identified for applying the proposed methodologies. Then, a real-world case study for one 
of the dams operated by Ontario Power Generation (OPG) is used to apply the proposed 
methodology, with the restriction of availability of operational data. 
Firstly, in Chapter 2, the literature explaining both systems and their problems are reviewed. 
Then, the different factors affecting the system failure in both of them are illustrated. Knowing 
the different components, factors, parameters, and sub-systems for any system will facilitate the 
task of constructing a graphical representation for the specified system. As Bayesian Networks 
(BNs) have shown some advantages in representing any system as a probabilistic graphical 
network, BNs are used extensively in this research. Chapter 3 uses the data available for the 
different components of NWM case study to build the system’s BN. Once the graph of the 
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system is constructed, the data available are used to quantify the probabilities of the BN nodes 
and their interactions (basic and conditional probabilities). Depending on different scenarios, or 
change in data from location to another (in case of the deep geological repository), or from time 
to time (for the operation of dams in different seasonal conditions), the probabilities may change 
resulting in increasing or decreasing the failure probability. Thus, there is a need to compile the 
BN of such systems to obtain the joint and marginal probabilities related to certain situations or 
events. To facilitate this task, Hugin Lite software was found to help in the representation of the 
BN and its compilation [5, 6, 7]. So, the BN is constructed and all the data and scenarios are 
inserted in order to start the compilation of cause-effect probabilistic analysis, resulting from 
interrelating system components, and affecting the failure. While the BN representation for 
failure prediction is dependent on available data in both applications, it is shown that failure 
prediction is challenging. Probabilistic quantification relies on different sources of data, i.e. 
expert judgement, logic inference, elicitation, empirical models, and simulation, which result in 
different levels of inaccuracy in the estimated failure probability, which may be used for decision 
making. In Chapter 4, the approach of incorporating simulation to the BN (SSBN) is introduced 
and applied to a pilot two reservoir system. The decompositional approach used for simulating 
complex systems – proposed in this thesis – is introduced as a part of the SSBN method. SSBN 
is expected to reduce the limitation of exhaustive simulation that may be computationally 
expensive in some applications. In Chapter 5, another approach that uses Markov Chains to be 
incorporated with simulation and BNs to better quantify the probabilities of the system nodes and 
their conditional relationships is introduced and applied to the same two reservoir system. 
Markov Chain Simulation Supported Bayesian Networks (MCSSBNs) are proposed to make the 
analysis cyclic and more dynamic while introducing different system scenarios/situations, and 
allow for seamless update of the system with any new available information/data that could 
affect the prediction process of system failure. As data and mathematical models are not fully 
available for the real-world case study, as may be expected in most cases today, Chapter 6 
illustrates how the elicitation of expert judgement and logic inference is used for quantifying the 
BN of Mountain Chute Dam and Generating Station, operated by OPG, to predict its probability 
of failure. Finally, in Chapter 7, conclusions are presented regarding the proposed 
methodologies and their potentials and limitations in representing complex systems and 
predicting their failure probabilities. Some recommendations are also suggested. The main focus 
of the proposed research in this thesis is on the stage of failure prediction. In addition, the work 
proposed in this research may help in identifying causes of failures by using diagnostic 
capabilities of BN analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of literature for the case studies used in this research. For the first 
case study-Nuclear Waste Management (NWM) system, different factors that affect the system 
are discussed. A brief description is also provided for the second case study of this research-
Safety of Hydropower Dams (SHPD) system. This chapter also provides an introduction to risk, 
reliability, and uncertainty. The concept of Bayesian Networks is explained in details. Then a 
comparison between BNs and other techniques, used for representing systems, is conducted.  
 
2.2 Nuclear Waste Management (NWM)  
Disposal is the final stage of the radioactive waste management by which the wastes are isolated 
from biosphere in the repositories. For the disposal of radioactive solid wastes, multi-barrier 
approach may be followed. If suitable engineered barriers, backfill materials and the 
characteristics of the geo-environment of the repository site are properly selected, safety against 
radionuclide migration will be achieved. Disposal of radioactive solid wastes depends on the 
nature and type of radionuclide present in the wastes (longevity) and its concentration. Thus, the 
repository can be near-surface or in deep geological formations. For long lived high level 
radioactive wastes, deep geological repository (DGR) is the option, for disposal of used nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste, which has received world-wide attention and may be the 
best known method to do that permanently without putting a burden of continued care on future 
generations. The option of Near Surface Disposal Facilities (NSDF) is preferred for low and 
intermediate level radioactive wastes with comparatively large volumes, which arise during 
nuclear power plant operation, and from radionuclide applications in hospitals and research 
establishments. At NSDF, wastes are normally disposed in a depth around 50 meters 
(intermediate depth). In NSDF, sub-surface evaluation is carried out systematically by geological 
and geo-hydrological investigations. Testing of full scale engineered barriers should be 
conducted for bentonite clay buffers and clay sand as backfill materials in both deep geological 
repositories and near surface disposal facilities. It is believed that setting up dependency 
relationships among the geological, hydrological, and ecological aspects will reduce the sources 
of uncertainty in this area of research [8, 9, 10, 11]. 
Canada, like many nuclear nations, has been investigating geological disposal of nuclear waste, 
which is the approach that offers the best passive safety system for permanent disposal, since the 
early 1970s. The internationally accepted design of a deep geologic repository (DGR) involves 
the following [12], see Fig.1: 
1. At depth of 500 meters below ground surface in a suitable location of dense intact rock, 
used fuel will be disposed. 
2. Nuclear spent fuel will be sealed in a corrosion resistant used fuel container (UFC). This 
container should withstand anticipated hydrostatic, lithostatic and glaciation loads. The 
original Canadian UFC, which is dual-walled with an inner iron (or steel) vessel to 
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provide strength, and a separately fabricated 3 mm-thick copper coated outer shell 
corrosion barrier, was designed to contain about 48 CANDU fuel bundles.  
3. As an additional barrier, compacted bentonite clay will be surrounding the UFC. 
Compacted bentonite clay swells on contact with moisture. This will tightly seal the 
system with allowing very little chemical diffusion to occur. 
In [10], a full explanation of the definitions and decrees (by Finnish government), regarding the 
disposal of nuclear waste, is discussed. Spent nuclear fuel (which is considered high level 
radioactive waste), along with low and intermediate level wastes are accumulated during the 
operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Spent nuclear fuel is intended to be 
disposed in deep geological repositories, inside the bedrock, after being encapsulated. Selecting 
and characterising the disposal site, developing disposal technology, collecting necessary data 
for long term safety, excavation works, packaging the wastes and transferring the packages to 
emplacement rooms, and the engineered barriers installation, are required stages in the disposal 
process. According to Finnish government decrees, disposal facility shall be designed to have the 
average annual dose to the most exposed individuals of the population not to exceed 0.01 mSv 
during normal operation of the facility, with maximum of 5 mSv in the event of certain 
accidents. Also in [10], exact and detailed definitions are given to: Low level waste (activity 
concentration not more than 1 MBq/kg.), Intermediate level waste (1 MBq/kg –10 GBq/kg), 
High level waste (>10 GBq/kg), Short-lived waste (less than 100 MBq/kg after 500 years), 
Long-lived waste (more than 100 MBq/kg after 500 years), disposal facility, disposal site, and 
barrier (engineered or natural). In [13], some definitions and management actions regarding 
radioactive wastes are provided. The radioactive properties of radioactive wastes contains the 
type of radionuclides, the radiation emitted (alpha, beta, gamma), the activity level (number of 
atomic nuclei disintegrating per unit time, expressed in becquerels), and the radioactive half-life 
(i.e. time taken by a radioactive sample to lose half of its activity). Short-lived radioactive waste 
contains radionuclides with a half-life of less than 31 years, while long-lived radioactive waste 
contains radionuclides with a half-life of over 31 years. See Table1. 
 
Radionuclide Half-life 
Cobalt-60 5.2 years 
Tritium 12.2 years 
Strontium-90 28.1 years 
Caesium-137 30 years 
Americium-241 432 years 
Radium-226 1,600 years 
Carbon-14 5,730 years 
Plutonium-239 24,110 years 
Neptunium-237 2,140,000 years 
Iodine-129 15,700,000 years 
Uranium-238 4,470,000,000 years 
Table 1: Different types of radionuclide with their half-lives [13] 
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The following engineered barriers should be considered in planning the waste disposal [10]: 
1- The waste matrix; 
2- The waste package; 
3- The buffer surrounding the waste packages; 
4- The backfilling of emplacement rooms; and 
5- The closing structures of the disposal facility. 
 
The bedrock of the disposal site is considered to be a natural barrier that lends support to safety 
functions, but, there are also some factors that indicate the unsuitability of a disposal site [10]: 
1- Proximity to natural resources; 
2- High rock stresses; 
3- High seismic or tectonic activity; and 
4- Adverse groundwater characteristics,  
 
 
Fig.1: Final Disposal Facility for spent nuclear fuel (High Level Waste HLW) [14] 
 
In Canada, Nuclear Safety and Control Act (2000) created the Canadian Nuclear Safety 
Commission (CNSC), Canada’s single nuclear regulator to regulate all nuclear-related facilities 
and activities, from cradle to grave. CNSC, which is an independent commission, makes 
continuous updates for its regulations regarding nuclear activities including regulations of safe 
spent fuel and radioactive waste management. Nuclear Fuel Waste Act (2002), which established 
a framework for national long-term management solution respecting Canada’s spent fuel, created 
the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) as a not-for-profit corporation funded 
by waste producers. In the Government of Canada Radioactive Waste Policy Framework (1996), 
both the federal government and waste producers and owners have responsibilities towards the 
radioactive waste problem, [15]. Full details for nuclear waste management program in Canada 
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are provided in [16], with understanding the fact that high level radioactive waste can stay in the 
wet storage (in pools) for 7-10 years, and in dry storage for up to 70 years before being disposed 
into deep geological repository (DGR). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides 
all the safety standards, in the disposal of radioactive waste, for protecting people and the 
environment. Emplacing radioactive waste in a facility or location with no intention to retrieve 
the waste is called “disposal” of radioactive waste. The lack of intention to retrieve wastes 
doesn’t mean that retrieval is not possible. This is different than the term “storage”, which means 
the retention of the radioactive waste with having retrieval intention. Both, disposal and storage, 
aim at containing the waste and isolating it from accessible biosphere. Thus, waste storage is 
considered a temporary stage followed by future actions of conditioning, packaging, and final 
disposal [17]. 
 
 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 give a representation for the problem under study. The used fuel bundle 
(Fig.2) is placed in the container shown in Fig. 3. The container should contain an assembly of 
48 fuel bundles. These bundles generate both radioactive heat and mass that can be transferred to 
the surrounding and needs to be shielded. For that reason, the used fuel container is made of 
steel, with an outer corrosion barrier of copper. Then, the container is placed in a buffer box 
made of bentonite clay as another barrier. Many buffer boxes are placed in placement room 
(Fig.4) in the repository, which is 500 meters deep, and separated by backfill material as an 
additional barrier. Then the whole placement room is filled with gap fill material to fill the gap 
with the rocks of the placement room. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2: ACR-1000 FUEL Bundle (~ 20 kg) [16] 
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     Fig.3: The conceptual container design                                                             Fig.4: Schematic representation of the proposed          
     for the disposal of Canadian high level                                                           Canadian Deep Geological Repository (DGR) [12] 
                         nuclear waste [12]                    
 
Failure in nuclear systems is related to the emissions of radioactive nuclides, or possible 
accidental releases of radioactivity, like the ones described in ref [18]. From the nuclear aspect, 
risk can be defined to be an exceeding expectation of the magnitude of undesirable radioactive 
releases (i.e. the product of probability of an accident/failure, and the consequence of this 
accident). In probabilistic risk assessments, uncertainty measures arise due to both, lack of the 
knowledge and stochastic features of system components. So, complex uncertainty propagation 
may result in future potential risks. In the next sections, Bayesian Network is shown to be a 
concept for reasoning complex uncertain problems, where network means a graphical model [9, 
18]. In [19] and [20], different and effective waste management policies are investigated with 
giving detailed explanation of the radioactive waste management process. An overview is given 
in [21] of the nuclear data required to make a correct prediction of the source of radioactive 
wastes, and the radiation doses in the different activities of: manufacturing, production, handling, 
transport, recycling, transmuting, and storing of radioactive, or fissionable, materials.  
 
 
2.3 Factors Affecting the NWM System Failure 
The operation of NWM Deep Geological Repository system is to keep the used nuclear fuel 
away from interacting with the surrounding environment by encapsulating the fuel bundles in 
used fuel containers. The system is considered to fail when the used fuel container fails to 
prevent any interaction between the nuclear bundles and the surrounding environment. In this 
section, the different factors that affect the NWM system operation and failure are explained in 
details. 
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2.3.1 Temperature Effect (Geothermal Gradient) 
Variation of surface air temperature, with the seasons and regional variations according to local 
weather conditions, is a known fact. Thus, ventilation of current temperature in underground 
openings may affect temperature variation [22]. In [23], the surface average temperatures in the 
Canadian cities all over the year are demonstrated, with giving the maximum and minimum 
annual temperatures based on weather data collected from 1981 to 2010. The numbers allow 
comparing the average daily high and low temperatures for the 33 largest Canadian cities. 
Temperature is known to increase with depth in the Earth influenced by the heat generated at 
depth and transferred through rocks and sediment layers. This is called terrestrial heat flow 
which is described by the following equation [24]: 
 
                                                               𝑸𝒛 =  
∆ 𝑻
𝛌 ∆𝐃
           Eqn. 2.1 
 
Where: 
Qz = Heat flow per unit area in the vertical direction, 
λ = Thermal conductivity, and 
∆T/∆D = Geothermal gradient (difference in temperature / difference in depth). 
 
Because of some data constraints in both heat flow and thermal conductivity, the principal basis 
for calculating geothermal gradients depends on bottom-hole temperatures measured in 
boreholes [24]:  
 
𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ
 
 
In Canada, geothermal favourability ranking, in areas with geothermal gradient data, is given in 
[25]. It can be concluded that geothermal gradient falls in the range between 30 – 55 (°C / km). 
In [26], Government of Canada (Environment Canada) provides Historical Climate Data for 
different Canadian Provinces by which monthly data reports for Canadian provinces and cities 
can be easily gotten. While [27] provides geothermal maps of Canada at different depths in 
different locations within the Canadian geological regions. Globally, the average geothermal 
gradient ranges between 25 – 29°C / km depth, with actual value of more than 55 °C / km depth 
in some regions. According to the above mentioned information, the surface temperature will 
affect the final temperature at the deep geological repository according to the average geothermal 
gradient. Accordingly, and because the average seasonal surface temperature data is available, in 
this research, the year is divided into three seasons: Winter (W), Spring Summer (SS), and Fall 
(F). Each season is assumed to have average weather conditions within its period. The maximum 
geothermal gradient that will be used in this study will be the 29
°
C / km depth (assuming that the 
repository will not be built in any of the regions that have extreme temperature and geothermal 
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conditions). However, for the post-closure processes in the repository, the surface temperature is 
not showing significant effect or significant change in the temperature of the repository from 
season to season. The reason behind that is because the radioactive decay coming from the used 
fuel will be much higher than the change in the surface temperature. The radioactive heat decay 
will be the most dominant temperature changing factor after closure of the repository. According 
to NWMO, there are studies for five locations (three crystalline rocks, and two sedimentary 
rocks) where the repository is supposed to be placed in one of them. The location that will be 
selected should have an average surface temperature of 5
°
C, with 16
°
C/km geothermal gradient; 
in order to have about 12
°
C temperature at the repository (500 m depth) resulted from the surface 
temperature. From another side, the maximum temperature at the surface of the used fuel 
container should be at maximum of 100
°
C at any time during the radioactive decay. This means 
that the radioactive decay may be responsible for more than 80
°
C of the temperature in the 
repository, or at least at the surface of used fuel container. 
 
2.3.2 Pressure Effect (Geostatic and Lithostatic Gradient) 
Pressure increases with depth in the earth due to the increasing mass of the rock overburden. The 
geostatic pressure at a given depth is the vertical pressure due to the weight of a column of rock 
and the fluids contained in the rock above that depth. Lithostatic pressure is the vertical pressure 
due to the weight of the rock only. Computing the pressure as a function of depth in a 
homogeneous crust is a straightforward calculation: 
 
                                                              𝐏 =  
𝛒 𝐕 𝐠
𝐀
=  𝛒 𝐠 𝐇 Eqn. 2.2 
Where: 
A (m
2
): surface area of the repository  
ρ (Mass (M) /Volume (V) = kg/m3): the density of rocks (in case of lithostatic pressure), or the 
summation of rock and water densities (in case of geostatic pressure), and M (kg) is the rock 
mass (in case of lithostatic pressure), or the summation of rock and water masses (in case of 
geostatic pressure), 
V (m
3
): volume of the repository = A (surface area) * H (depth),
 
g (9.81 m/s
2
): gravitational acceleration, and 
P (N/m
2
 = Pascal Pa): Lithostatic Pressure (in case of just rocks), or Geostatic Pressure (in case 
of both rocks and fluids). 
 
Higher rock densities will yield higher pressure gradients. The geostatic gradient changes with 
depth as the density increases. This is called crustal geostatic gradient. In that order, to calculate 
the pressure in the deep geological repository, it is important to know the densities of all the rock 
types all over the country. According to [28], Canada can be divided into six geological regions: 
The Canadian Shield, Interior Platform (Canadian Interior Plains including Hudson Bay Low 
Lands), Appalachian Orogen (East), Eastern Continental Margin (St. Lawrence Low Lands), 
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Innuitian Orogen (North Arctic Lands), and Cordilleran Orogen (Western Sedimentary Basin). 
Each geological region has specific characteristics and different mineral resources (see Fig.5 and 
Table 2). 
 
 
Fig.5: Geological Regions of Canada [28] 
 
 
Geological Region 
Percentage of 
Canada’s Area 
The Canadian Shield ~50% 
Interior Platform (Canadian Interior Plains including Hudson Bay Low Lands) ~22.5% 
Appalachian Orogen (East) ~3.6% 
Eastern Continental Margin (St. Lawrence Low Lands) ~1.8% 
Innuitian Orogen (North Arctic Lands) ~5.4% 
Cordilleran Orogen (Western Sedimentary Basin) ~16% 
Table 2: Geological Regions in Canada 
 
So, if the decision is not taken yet about the location of the repository, it will be impossible to 
calculate the maximum effect that comes from the pressure factor. Thus, this led to considering 
something else. The Earth crust contains both continental and oceanic parts. The oceanic crust 
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counts for the seas, oceans, rivers, and lakes, while the continental crust accounts for the rest. In 
Canada (9,984,000 km
2
), the continental crust counts for 92% of the Canadian Land, while the 
oceanic counts for about 8%. The average density of continental crust is known to range between 
2500-3000 kg/m
3
 (2.5-3 g/cm
3
) according to the rock type. While the oceanic crust average 
density ranges between 3-3.3 g/cm
3
 [29]. Accordingly, more realistic data can be estimated about 
the maximum pressure that could be faced in case of building the repository beneath rocks or 
under (or near) oceans and seas. Moreover, if there is ice accumulation at the location where the 
repository is built, ice pressure should be taken into account (ice loading). Another factor, that 
will affect the pressure in the repository, is the bentonite swelling pressure. The used fuel 
container will be emplaced in a Highly Compacted Bentonite (HCB) buffer box. If the bentonite 
is hydrated or gets wet at any time, it will swell to seal the buffer box and prevents any diffusion, 
form inside to the outside or vice versa, from taking place. The swelling pressure of the bentonite 
should be taken into consideration for calculating pressure on both the used fuel container, and 
the walls of the emplacement room. In the five location that are being tested by NWMO, the total 
of geostatic pressure and the bentonite swelling pressure should count for 15 MPa, while the ice 
loading will count for at most 30 MPa. That is 45 MPa in total maximum pressure in the 
repository.   
 
2.3.3 Relative Humidity and Water Saturation 
Relative humidity is the ratio of vapor pressure (mixing ratio) to the saturation vapor pressure 
(saturation mixing ratio). Given by another definition, Relative Humidity is the ratio of the actual 
amount of water vapor in a given volume of air to the amount which could be present if the air 
was saturated at the same temperature. It is expressed as a percentage (percentage of saturation 
humidity), and reaches 100% when the air is saturated with respect to water (the case of ice).  
                               𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 =  
𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒑𝒐𝒓 𝑫𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝑺𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑽𝒂𝒑𝒐𝒓 𝑫𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚
 × 𝟏𝟎𝟎%      Eqn. 2.3 
 
 
At a given vapor pressure (or mixing ratio), relative humidity with respect to ice is higher than 
that with respect to water. For unsaturated air, relative humidity is inversely proportional to the 
temperature. Since warm air will hold more moisture than cold air, the percentage of relative 
humidity must change with changes in air temperature. In that order, relative humidity doubles 
with each 20 degree (Fahrenheit) decrease, or halves with each 20 degree increase in 
temperature. Generally, as temperature goes up, relative humidity goes down and vice versa. Ref 
[23] also demonstrates the average relative humidity in the Canadian cities all over the year, and 
gives the morning and afternoon annual relative humidity averages based on weather data 
collected from 1981 to 2010. The numbers allow comparing the average daily high and low 
relative humidity for the 33 largest Canadian cities. It is obvious that the relative humidity 
average never exceeds 95% at the surface, with having most of the big cities below the 88%. 
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Relative humidity measures the actual amount of moisture in the air as a percentage of the 
maximum amount of moisture the air can hold (saturation). Accordingly, at the repository, while 
the temperature increases with going down in depth, the relative humidity should decrease. In the 
post-closure conditions, the changes in surface temperature will not have significant effect on the 
repository temperature, so, changes in surface relative humidity will not have significant effect 
on the repository conditions as well. From the humidity saturation point of view, the dominant 
factor in the post-closure case will not be the relative humidity, but rather, it will be the water 
saturation in the repository. Having wet, humid, or hydrated contents of the repository will affect 
the swelling conditions of the bentonite clay used to cover the used fuel containers, and may be 
considered a water diffusion in the repository. Water diffusion may be taking place because of 
the surrounding environment at the repository location, and may lead to corrosion factors for the 
used fuel container. One example for the water diffusion and water saturation is the groundwater 
in case it is present at any stage in the repository post-closure life time. The salinity level of the 
groundwater may affect the bacterial activity, and the corrosion factors of the used fuel 
containers. In summary, the water diffusion, which leads to swelling pressure, will affect the 
bentonite clay surrounding the containers (according to its density or compaction factors), and is 
affecting the bacterial activity levels around the containers. If bacterial activity is present in the 
repository, this leads to increasing sulphide levels, which is considered the main corrodent for 
the used fuel containers. Thus, proximity to hydrological resources is another measure that 
should be taken into consideration, means, how far the repository is from hydrological 
resources?  
Proximity to hydrological resources means that the probability of having water diffusion from 
outside the repository to its inside may take place because of the underground water resources 
(that is generated from sea, ocean, or precipitation infiltration). Groundwater flows through 
aquifers, which are geological formations made up of granular or fractured material from which 
a sufficient quantity of water can be extracted to serve as a water supply. According to [30], the 
first sub-question that should be asked in this case is “What current knowledge gaps limit our 
ability to evaluate the quantity of the resource, its locations and the uncertainties associated with 
these evaluations?”. Accurate estimates of the volume of groundwater in Canada were 
impossible to be identified. The Geological Survey of Canada (GSC) stated that, according to 
[30], “the amount of groundwater stored in Canadian aquifers and their sustainable yield and role 
in ecosystem functioning are virtually unknown”. In another meaning, the groundwater 
consumption in Canada is known, but the actual volume is unknown. Because of that, the 
proximity to hydrological resources will be determined from being located in or near to the 
regions having oceanic crust (which is about 8% of Canada). As a result, if the repository is 
located in a continental crust region, it may be assumed to be far away from underground 
hydrological resources. However, for the locations that are being tested by NWMO, precautions 
will be taken to locate the repository in an area that is known for low groundwater amounts, or to 
be far away from the groundwater aquifers. If the repository is chosen to be in a groundwater 
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existing location, it should be of low salinity levels and low concentration of potentially 
corrosive agents. 
 
2.3.4 Bacterial (Microbial) activity 
The sulfide content and salinity level of the bedrock, in which the repository will be located, 
represent a crucial factor. Sulfides and salinity are influencing the corrosion process of metals 
contained in the repository (spent fuel waste metal containers). Salinity level is different for 
every rock type, and may exist because of the water diffusion coming from groundwater, which 
have different salinity levels depending on the aquifers. Bacterial (or microbial) activity is 
affected by salinity, as with the salinity increases, the bacterial activity decreases, and vice versa. 
If bacteria are active, this will result in sulphide content, and sulphide is considered a corrodent 
to metals. Thus, in the bedrock, in which the repository will be located, the existence of 
microbial or bacterial activity affects the corrosion level of the metal containers. Moreover, if the 
salinity increases, the tendency of metals to corrode also increases. So, care should be taken 
when deciding which rock type and bedrock in which the repository will be built, as choosing a 
saline rock type will decrease the bacterial activity in the repository, but will increase the salinity 
level in the repository, and then, increases the metal tendency to corrode, and vice versa. 
Moreover, regular measures and field data should be available in order to realize the amount of 
activity of the microbes and bacteria, as the microorganisms’ life transform from phase to phase 
over time. In that order, the locations, which are being tested by NWMO, should be chosen to 
have low salinity levels and low concentration of potentially corrosive agents. And in order to 
achieve that, locations of low salinity levels will be chosen, along with limiting the bacterial 
activity with maintaining high pressure values in the repository in order to prevent the bacteria 
from being active, and thus, not producing sulphides. For that reason, the compacted bentonite 
clay used to surround the container should have high dry density, in order to reduce the bacterial 
activity in the dry phase. While in the wet case, when having humidity, water diffusion, or water 
saturation, the swelling pressure of the bentonite, of high dry density, will do the job of 
preventing the bacteria from being active, and limit the existence of free water (bacterial growth 
increases in free water). This will lower the sulphide contents in the repository, and thus, 
reducing the tendency of metal corrosion of the used fuel containers.  
 
2.3.5 Corrosion and Welding Corrosion of the Used Fuel Containers (UFCs) 
Corrosion of the containers, in which the spent fuel assemblies (which assemble the fuel 
bundles) are emplaced, is an important factor that may affect the diffusion analysis in case the 
failure happens. According to [12] and [31], at a depth of about 500 m in bedrock, where the 
spent fuel will be deposited in the repository, the waste canister provides safety during handling 
and emplacement of the waste in the repository. It also ensures complete isolation of the waste 
for a desired period of time (minimum of 500-1000 years) during which most of the important 
fission products will decay, and the heat generation (by radioactive decay) of the waste is most 
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important. This temperature rise will result in a low humidity environment in the vicinity of the 
container (lowering expectation of corrosion). After emplacing the canister in the emplacement 
room, the room will be sealed with bentonite clay mixture. The dimensions and waste load of 
each canister, which is double walled with thickness that acts as a radiation shield, have been 
chosen such that the temperature on the outer surface of the canister never exceeds 100° C. The 
external pressure in the repository may reach the value of 15 MPa resulting from a 5 MPa 
hydrostatic pressure and maximum of 10 MPa bentonite swelling pressure. In [31], corrosion is 
discussed deeply: corrosion by oxygen (aerobic corrosion), corrosion by sulfides (anaerobic 
corrosion), and other types of corrosion and how they may affect the canister and its welding 
over time. The sulphides, which act as the main corrodents, can be supplied from the buffer 
mass/backfill in deposition holes and tunnels as well as from the groundwater. In addition to 
these sources, it can also be produced from sulphates through microbial activity.  In order to face 
all these types of corrosion, copper was chosen to be the coating material of the canister, and 
presented as a reference canister material, because of its thermodynamic stability in pure water. 
In the Canadian repository, corrosion conditions will be taken initially to be aggressive and 
extreme until reaching a benign state [12]. Another aspect to be determined, what if the container 
is emplaced in the repository with a through-coating defect (in the copper coating or welding)? 
Obviously, this situation can be avoided by proper inspection of the container prior to 
emplacement, but failure to detect defects will be considered [12]. So, this arouses the need to 
know the factors influencing the corrosion of weldments, which may be one or more of the 
following [32]: weldment design, fabrication technique, welding practice, welding sequence, 
moisture contamination, organic or inorganic chemical species, oxide film and scale, weld slag 
and spatter, incomplete weld penetration or fusion, porosity, cracks (crevices), high residual 
stresses, improper choice of filler metal, or final surface finish. This means that if the welding 
technology has any of the above problems, there may be some weak points present in the weld, 
which will definitely be followed by a failure in the canister. Fig.6 shows the UFC coating. 
 
 
 
Fig.6: Spent fuel container and its coating [33] 
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2.3.6 Bentonite Clay (Buffer Boxes, Gap Fills, and Back Fills) 
Canada, China, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and many other countries have 
considered deep geological repository for high-level radioactive waste (HLW). In present design 
concepts, compacted bentonite-based materials are supposed to be used as sealing/buffer 
materials in the emplacement rooms of the deep geological repository of the high level 
radioactive wastes (nuclear spent fuel) due to their low permeability, high swelling capacity, and 
high radionuclide retardation capacity [34]. It is also supposed to use bentonite clay as a back fill 
material in the repository. A fundamental property of bentonite is that when it absorbs water, it 
expands. However, not all bentonites have the same absorption capacity. According to [35], 
thermal treatment of bentonite (up to 400°C) drastically reduces its swelling behavior. In [36], 
bentonite clay is evaluated as an alternative sealing material in oil and gas wells. As compared to 
cement, which has the tendency to shrink, bentonite shows superior sealing ability during 
hydration (as it swells and expands). Along with that, it has lower permeability, than cement, 
during hydration, with the ability to reshape itself and heal any cracks which may occur during 
subsurface movements. In [37], swelling test (swelling pressure test) and hydraulic conductivity 
test are performed for bentonite clay under the same conditions of deep geological repository. 
This work was conducted because the bentonite clay showed high swelling capacity, and good 
durability under disposal environment, so that the penetration of groundwater from the host 
environment can be minimized. After closing the emplacement rooms, under hydration 
conditions, bentonite will swell to fill the gaps among the bentonite bricks (i.e. buffer boxes), 
between the canister and the buffer box, between buffer box and the host rock, and fills the 
fractures in the host rock due to excavation. After that, the subsequent swelling is restrained by 
the host rock and swelling pressure is developed (this pressure must be lower than certain limits). 
Fig.7, Fig.8, and Fig.9 show the bentonite buffer box and the placement room. Thus, proper 
understanding of the behaviour of compacted bentonite-based materials during hydration is vital 
for determining short and long term performance of the deep geological repository, [34]. 
 
            Fig.7: Bentonite Buffer box [33]                                     Fig.8: Placement Room Concept [33] 
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Fig.9: Placement Room (side view) 
 
 
2.4 Safety of Hydropower Dams (SHPD) 
Dams are of different types and techniques of operation. In this research, many types of dams 
can be considered for the application of the proposed failure prediction approaches that are 
explained in the next chapters. However, embankment dams, which include both earthen and 
rockfill dams, are the main type that is reviewed in this section.  
In [38], a procedure for incorporating the risk of catastrophic failure in project evaluation is 
presented. The evaluation of risk depends mainly on estimating the probability of failure. So, the 
main challenge is how to determine the probability of failure of dams or dam systems. The 
different factors affecting the failure of dams are briefly explained in the next section. 
 
2.4.1 Factors Affecting the SHPD System Failure 
Dams are complex engineering structures that incorporate huge number of interacting system 
components. Failure in dam systems depends on failure in performing the required interactions 
among system components, and/or failure to achieve at least one of the required system 
outputs/results. In this section, the different factors, related to the SHPD system operation and 
failure, are reviewed. 
 
2.4.1.1 Hydrological Factors 
Dams are used for controlling and/or storing water for different purposes, which mean that water 
is the main factor affecting dams’ operation. The hydrological factors are mainly the inflow to 
the dam, the water storage, and the outflow from the dam. The water inflow to any dam is 
affected by upstream events, i.e. precipitation, flood, or connection to any upstream dams. 
Depending on the inflow rate to the dam, water is stored in the dam reservoir and/or released to 
the downstream of the dam by water management techniques (i.e. gates). If the water inflow 
results in exceeding the maximum capacity that the reservoir can hold, there is a requirement to 
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spill, and the extra amounts of water should be released using spillway gates. In hydropower 
dams, water is also released from the hydropower turbines after generating electric power using 
the head difference between upstream and downstream water levels. Failure in dam reservoir 
operations is considered a failure of the dam system. 
 
2.4.1.2 Structural and Design Factors 
Dams are of different types like embankment dams, arch dams, gravity dams, saddle dams, 
buttress dams, coffer dams, and diversion dams, amongst other types. In every type, there are 
different designs and different operating conditions. The type of the dam, its design, and the 
structural aspects play an important role in dam failure. This section presents a review of some 
literature on structural and design aspects that affect the failure of dams, especially embankment 
dams, as they are the most widely used dams in the world involved in the most historical dam 
failure events, including breaching.   
For dam failures, the input breaching characteristics, which are dependent on breach formation 
mechanisms, are presented in references [39] and [40]. 
In general, amounts of data reported for dam failures are minimum, which limits the assessment 
studies (qualitative and quantitative) for dam breaches and failures. One type of the important 
data is the embankment dam characteristics, which includes size and shape of the embankment, 
cohesion of embankment material,  embankment zoning (zones’ type, size, and number), and 
foundation geology [39, 41]. Availability, or prediction, of this data about dam breach 
characteristics, dam characteristics, and reservoir geometry, is crucial in evacuation planning and 
safe management of reservoir operations. In [40], analytical models for dam breach erosion are 
developed, with discussing their advantages and disadvantages, and evaluating their 
applicability. Ref [42] tries to quantify the factors leading to breach and erodibility of dam 
materials based on historical data put in a database. In [43], existing prediction models for 
estimating embankment dam breaching parameters are summarized. 
For an earthen dam, breaching process often has two phases ([43], see Fig.10): 
 Breach initiation phase, with breach initiation time defined as the time spent from the 
first flow over the dam (in case of overtopping), or the first erosion to form a seepage 
pipe (in case of piping), and starting the erosion in the downstream face of the dam, to the 
point of lowering of the upstream embankment crest of the dam or forming a seepage 
pipe. Breach initiation time is important in determining downstream hazard, warning 
time, and evacuation planning. 
 Breach formation phase, with breach formation time defined as the time spent from the 
point of lowering of the upstream embankment crest of the dam, or forming a seepage 
pipe, until the breach is fully formed (the point at which the upstream slope of the dam is 
fully eroded to the entire depth of the dam).  
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Fig.10: Progressive headcutting breach of a cohesive soil embankment [43] 
 
 
Dam overtopping, which is one of the major causes of dam failures, is also reviewed in [44]. 
Reservoir overtops the dam if the inflow exceeds the capacity of the reservoir storage and 
spillway outflow system. The main challenge is how to predict the performance of the dam in 
advance of any failure.  
 
Failure of dams can be attributed to a large hydrologic event and the combination of several 
factors, not only breaching, like [45]: 
 Inadequate spillway design,  
 Lack of emergency spillway gates,  
 Loss of permanent reservoir capacity due to long time of sedimentation, 
 Seepage piping failure due to poor dam maintenance, and 
 Human factors such as failure to act, wrong procedures, among others. 
 
The most widely used dams in the world, involved in the most historical dam failures, are 
earthen and rockfill dams. Failure of noncohesive dams, in which materials are removed in layers 
by tractive stresses, is different than that of cohesive ones, where breaching takes place by 
headcutting that initiates at the toe of the downstream slope and migrates to the upstream face of 
the dam. Cohesive embankments rarely have seepage pipes because of the low permeability. On 
the contrary, seepage pipes take place in granular embankments on the downstream slope 
resulting in surface slips. Seepage piping is the progressive erosion of particles by percolating 
water, leading to the development of seepage channels that allow water to flow through the 
embankment or its foundation, [46].  
In the absence of sediment management in many dams, storage capacity loss, which is a long-
term progressive process, makes the dam increasingly vulnerable to failure during large flood 
events. This results in terminating the usefulness of dams and reservoirs, and converting a dam 
from an asset to a flood control liability [45]. Study of dam failures and flash floods requires 
modelling the loss of life (LOL), which depends on the time taken by the population at risk 
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(PAR) to evacuate, that may result due to number of reasons. Ref [47] recommends the 
following: 
 To estimate the benefits of structural modifications and designs that would prevent an 
existing dam from failure, 
 Costs of potential dam failures should be considered in construction decisions, 
 To consider the benefits of warning systems that may be installed at dams, and to 
calculate the expected reduction in fatalities due to these warning systems. 
In [41], results of a statistical analysis of failures and accidents of embankment dams are 
described based on the historic performance of dams.  According to [41], the International 
Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) has carried out extensive surveys of dam incidents 
(ICOLD 1974, 1983, 1995).  
Management procedures related to safe operation of dams has significant, complex and uncertain 
social, economic, and environmental factors. The increasing risk posed by failure of dams 
aroused the need for rehabilitation of current dams. Changes to hydrological safety requirements, 
changes in downstream of rivers after building dams, and the modified priorities of watershed 
management are all parts of the risk and should be taken into consideration. Moreover, lack of 
knowledge of the effects of dams on floods downstream and the worldwide dam accidents puts 
an additional factor of uncertainty. As a result, and with increasing population and greater 
development downstream, the overall number of high-hazard dams is increasing. Thus, 
rehabilitation and/or re-design of aged dams is a must, [48].  
Prevention and mitigation processes of dam failures depend on dam risk analysis. So, a 
quantitative analysis of the dam failures must be conducted.  
 
2.4.1.3 Climatic Factors 
Climate conditions affect the dam operation. Winds, precipitation, tornados, and winter ice 
loading may affect the inflow rates, the reservoir water level, and the operation of different dam 
components. In [49], the safety of current dams is assessed according to whether or not the effect 
of the future possible climate changes was taken into account while building them. Climate 
change may provide increased precipitation and river flows that exceed the capacity of existing 
reservoirs. Thus, there is a current need in some countries to update the design flood calculations, 
required for safety assessments which are done every 15-20 years, for their dams. In order to 
classify dams according to their damage potentials, dams have five classes on a 0 – 4 measure 
where Class 0 is for dams with minor failure consequences, and Class 4 is for dams with the 
highest consequences. The design flood is the factor that dams should pass without failure. 
Design flood for class 2 – 4 dams is required to have a return period of at least 1,000 years, and 
is 500-year for class 1 dams. Class 0 dams have no specific requirement for design flood, but it is 
recommended to have a 200 year return period of flood. The dams are also required to withstand 
a safety check flood, which must be bypassed without causing failure, while some damage may 
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be accepted. The safety check flood for class 1 and class 2 dams is given to be 1.5 of the design 
flood, [49].  
 
 
2.4.1.4 Mechanical and Electromechanical Factors 
Dams include number of gates for different purposes. Gates are considered mechanical 
equipment in any dam. Spillway gates, head gates, and service gates are different types of gates 
that are used in dams. Spillway gates are responsible for releasing water if there is a requirement 
to spill and in order to prevent overtopping failures. Head gates are used in hydropower dams for 
generating electrical power from the hydropower turbines by letting the water to flow through 
penstocks. Service gates are used during maintenance actions. Any failure in operating the gates 
may result in a failure in the dam operation. Failure may happen due to different reasons, 
including electric supply problems, ice loading during winter periods, remote control 
connectivity issues, or manual control problems.  
Hydropower turbines are considered electromechanical equipment responsible for generating 
electric power for different purposes. 
Mechanical and electromechanical equipment should have efficient monitoring and maintenance 
plans in order to reduce their tendency to fail, because this may be responsible for the entire 
system failure. 
 
2.4.1.5 Economic and Human Factors 
The global boom in dam construction reveals that dams are important economic assets that affect 
people’s lives. These assets are supposed to be operated, monitored, and maintained properly in 
order not to be a liability and a risk for people’s lives. Successful operation and maintenance of 
dams depends on affording economic funds. And if calculating the risk depends of the failure of 
the system and its consequences, the consequences here are not only economic, but they are 
about lives of hundreds, if not thousands, of people. Economics are crucial in maintaining proper 
operation and limiting the failures which may lead to more expensive effects, beside the 
expected loss of lives.  
In the same direction, human factors are important in limiting the failures of dam projects. The 
humans are operating the dams on site or remotely. They are taking decisions regarding 
management of dam components (i.e. electric power generation, gates management, and water 
storage, amongst others). If the human operators of any dam failed to take the right decisions at 
any time, the dam will have a higher possibility to fail in performing at least one of its 
operations. 
It is also important to mention the economic, social, and societal impacts on people. The aim of 
[50] is to unify scholarly understanding of dams' social impacts using the analysis of various 
frameworks. References [51], [52], and [53] present the average need for electric power per 
person globally, and how some countries are investing in dams to provide economic and societal 
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development and environmental improvement inside and outside their borders. Although the 
public opposition to hydropower projects because of the risks resulted from the reservoirs 
impounded by large dams, these projects may play an important role in the future world energy. 
In [54], break down/failure of the engineering process (which includes planning, design, 
construction, and operation) is discussed. Three causes are identified: absence of data or 
theoretical knowledge, ignorance of prevailing practice, and rejection of current technology. It is 
obvious that the human factor is part of these causes. In [55], two modes of hydropower dams 
are explained:  1- Reservoir based dams, and 2- Run of the River (RoR) mode. In storage or 
reservoir based project, the dam may be capable of holding water for sufficient time, in case of 
flooding, to use it in power generation or other water demands. This also gives some time for 
people on the downstream side to evacuate before any disaster may take place (warning time). 
From another point of view, huge reservoirs act like “water bombs” in case of any dam failure, 
affecting human lives and properties on the downstream side. RoR projects lack the storage 
advantage, and in case of any emergency due to floods or breakdowns, less time will be available 
for warning on the downstream side. The strength of RoR projects lies in the fact that they have 
small reservoirs (or don’t have reservoirs at all), which prevents people from water bombs, [55]. 
 
 
2.4.1.6 Safety Management Factors 
A statistical analysis of dam failures from 43 countries in [56] indicated that earth-rock dam 
failures included 49% due overtopping, 28% due to seepage in dam body, and 29% due to 
seepage in foundation. Modern dam safety management (DSM) system involves regulations, 
guidance system, and risk analysis system, safety monitoring system, danger control and 
reinforcement system, early warning system, and emergency plan system. Two main methods for 
studies of dam-break process are dam-break experiments and mathematical modeling, [56]. 
Typically, reasons for dam failures are of two types [56]: 
 Natural causes, like heavy rains, hurricanes, and earthquakes, as external natural causes. 
And aging of materials, dam body defects, and foundation defects, as internal natural 
causes. 
 Human attributes, like global warming (increased precipitation rates), terroristic attacks, 
inappropriate design (like putting large number of dams on the same river to form system 
of dams or a flood control system), construction problem, or operational problem.  
The purpose of the study in [57] is to investigate the primary causes of the dam failures and the 
effect of failure of one or several dams on the safety of other dams in a flood control system. 
Important lesson to be understood from this failure is that powerful warning and emergency 
response system must be available. Moreover, although flood control system of dams enhances 
the control mechanism, it poses higher risk during extreme events (e.g. if a dam on the upstream 
fails). Small dam safety assurance policy benchmarks, that are available from international 
literature, are reviewed and synthesised in [58] to determine their applicability in developing 
countries. In [59], the formation and failure of natural dams is discussed. Natural dams are 
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formed from landslides, glacial ice, and late neoglacial moraines after an excessive rainfall, 
snowmelt, or earthquake. Landslide dams are formed due to mass movements of rock and debris 
avalanches; rock and soil slumps and slides; and mud, debris, and earth flows. Many landslide 
dams fail shortly after formation, which should be taken into consideration while designing 
safety monitoring systems and danger control systems. 
 
2.4.2 Dependability Approaches for Representation of Dam Failures 
Dam failures incorporate many different factors. Technical problems in dam construction or 
operation may lead to environmental and societal problems from one side, or catastrophic events 
of dam failures from another side. The main concern in this research is to better predict dam 
failures according to different types of causes, and how to reduce the probability of that failure. 
Generally, the primary causes of dam failures come from structural failures, inoperable gates, 
control system errors, operator errors, mechanical failures, or power supply failure. Representing 
the dam system as cause-effect relation representation is crucial in this case. 
Failure prediction is related to the problem of dam aging in the dam safety dilemma, ref [60] 
mentioned that while dam systems involve multiple failure modes, conventional assessment and 
prediction models often neglect the correlations among failure modes. Accordingly, the 
remaining service life of dams predicted by these methods is relatively approximate and could be 
overestimates. So, there is a certain need for a better method in predicting the remaining service 
life time for dams, with taking the correlations of different system components and modes of 
operation into consideration, to predict the risks that might exist. Ref [60] proposes a prediction 
model of remaining service life for gravity dam systems based on the illustrated correlation 
analysis and time-varying theory. As an example, in Fig.11, the failure of a dam is viewed as a 
system and analysed based on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) technique. FTA is one of many types 
of dependability analysis techniques that are used for dependency modelling of system 
components. Ref [61] explains the different types of dependability analysis techniques. 
Generally, all these techniques share the distinction of being able to represent the cause – to – 
effect relationships among system components. The principal dependability approaches that are 
widely used in similar dam studies are: failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), event tree 
analysis (ETA), and fault tree analysis (FTA). Ref [7] has provided list of advantages and 
disadvantages of the three typical methods versus the Bayesian network analysis (BNA). 
Although still a new approach for engineering applications, Bayesian Networks are found to be 
suitable for studying complex systems with multiple elements and their interrelationships. 
Disadvantages of other methods can be overcome by applying the Bayesian network technique, 
[7]. 
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Fig.11: An example of FTA with different dam failure modes [56] 
 
 
The BN may be considered as a multidisciplinary approach that includes the probability of 
failure of the geotechnical, hydrological, and structural sub-systems of a dam. Therefore, it 
provides a promising framework for an integrated system failure analysis in a more global and 
holistic way, [62] and [63]. 
 
 
2.5 Risk, Reliability, and Uncertainty 
There are many definitions of risk. Two common definitions of risk are: (i) probability of failure 
and (ii) the product of the probability of an undesired outcome (failure) and the consequences of 
that outcome [3, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, and 72]. Here in this thesis we generally refer to 
(i) and occasionally to (ii) depending upon the context. The development of risk estimates or the 
determination of risks in a given context is called Risk Analysis, while Risk Assessment is the 
process of evaluating the risks and determining the best course of action. Uncertainty of 
outcomes is a common concept in all definitions of risk. Uncertainty may be defined as the state 
of having limited knowledge surrounding existing events and future outcomes, or imperfect 
ability to assign a character state to a process that forms a source of doubt, [3]. Thus, uncertainty 
is an intrinsic property of risk and is present in all aspects of risk management (see Fig.12) 
including risk analysis and risk assessment. Generally, risk analysis is a systematic tool that 
facilitates the identification of the weak elements of a complex system and the hazards that 
mainly contribute to the risk. In [73], hazard analysis is described as “investigating an accident 
before it occurs”, with the aim of identifying potential causes of accidents that can lead to losses.  
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Fig.12: Risk management process [64] 
 
 
According to [61, 71, 72, and 74], availability is the ability of a component or system to function 
at a specified interval of time. This is closely related to what is called “Reliability”, which 
describes the ability of a system or component to function under stated conditions for a specified 
period of time. Reliability engineering is a sub-discipline of systems engineering that emphasizes 
dependability in the lifecycle management of a product. In reliability engineering programs - 
where reliability plays a key role in the cost effectiveness of systems - testability, 
maintainability, and maintenance are parts of these programs. In reliability engineering, 
estimation, prevention, and management of high levels of lifetime engineering uncertainty and 
risks of failure are common areas to be dealt with.  Theoretically, reliability is defined as the 
probability of success (Probability of success =1-Probability of failure). Sometimes, probabilistic 
stability analysis is referred to as “reliability analysis”. During failure probability estimation, 
reliability analysis cannot be used solely, and the results of such analysis must be moderated 
using engineering judgment and appropriate models as useful tools in estimating conditional 
probabilities.  
Generally, according to [4, 66, 72, and 75], uncertainty – which is a common concept for 
expressing inaccuracies - means that a number of different values can exist for a quantity, while 
risk means the possibility of loss as a result of uncertainties. Accordingly, any uncertain variable, 
which can take various values over a range, should be provided with an uncertainty analysis that 
is used to assess output uncertainty and to identify the most efficient ways to reduce that 
uncertainty according to the contributing variables. Hence, in terms of statistical concepts, 
uncertainty can be thought about as a statistical variable and can be calculated using well verified 
statistical procedures. In a broad sense, the value reported for a measurement describes the 
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central tendency (mean); while the uncertainty describes the standard deviation (deviation from 
the mean). Ideally, this measure of uncertainty is calculated from repeated trials, or to be taken 
from estimates in whole or part in many engineering tests or research experiments. Thus, risk 
analysis forces the engineer to confront uncertainties directly and to use best estimates and 
predictions, especially, while taking decisions regarding the safety of large technological 
(complex) systems. Increasingly, such decisions are being based on the results of probabilistic 
risk assessments (PRAs), which must be associated with adequate quantification of the 
uncertainties. Uncertain parameters can be treated as random variables with appropriate 
probability distributions. Such distributions are assigned on the basis of available data (which is 
often scarce), combined with the judgement of experts (which can vary widely), adding another 
element of uncertainty into the uncertainty analysis itself. This means that there might be 
different sources of uncertainty due to data available, limited knowledge, and subjective 
judgement, and uncertainty here is assumed to be available in probabilistic terms either from data 
or from expert judgement or logical inference, [3, 4].  
For any given system including inputs and sub-systems, probabilistic failure analysis depends on 
finding the probability of not getting the required or estimated output of that system. The 
required output may be the effect that is produced from the system causes (i.e. prediction 
reasoning), or the determination of causes responsible for certain results and effects (i.e. 
diagnostic reasoning). Thus, determining the cause-effect relation is an important first step in the 
probabilistic failure analysis, which allows for better understanding to enhance the system 
reliability, and take decisions for mitigating the negative effects, or better enhancing the causes. 
A complex system can be defined as a system structure that is composed of a many components 
that have complex interactions, and may be represented as a network where the nodes represent 
system components and the edges (links) are their interactions. Given any complex system that 
includes inputs, outputs, sub-systems, and boundaries, it is reasonable to assume that all of these 
system components are interacting either directly with one another, or indirectly. In order to 
estimate the probability of failure for such system, the interactions should be represented 
mathematically including any probability measures. A full representation of the system facilitates 
its analysis from the failure point of view. The main obstacle in failure analysis of complex 
systems is how to represent the system components and their basic and conditional probabilities. 
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are found to solve this problem. Bayesian Network provides a 
graphical representation of any system using basic probabilities, for system inputs, and 
conditional probabilities, for sub-systems and their interactions. One of the main advantages of 
using BNs is the ability of integrating all types of data (social, environmental, technical, etc.) 
seamlessly in one representation. This is because of the probabilistic nature of the BNs, as 
everything is represented as a probability. The main challenge in BNs is that data must be 
available in order to estimate probabilities. When the system is fully represented, the failure 
probability could be estimated using Bayesian equations. An alternative use of the BN is to 
evaluate the performance of the system components and their interactions to get some 
information about the failure causes. If the post failure analysis stage is taken into consideration, 
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determination of causes and mitigation or treatment actions should be considered in order to 
improve the performance and limit the overall system failure. In the next section, Bayesian 
Networks are defined, with introducing their different types and their probabilistic calculations. 
 
  
2.6 Bayesian Networks (BNs) 
According to [5, 7, 9, 76, and 77], Bayesian networks (BNs), or belief networks, are probabilistic 
graphical models used to represent knowledge about an uncertain domain using a combination of 
principles from graph theory, probability theory, computer science, and statistics. In the graph, 
nodes (vertices) are representing random variables, and the edges (arcs) represent the 
interrelationships (conditional probabilistic dependencies) among these variables, which can be 
estimated using known statistical and computational methods. BNs can model the quantitative 
strength of the interrelationships among variables (nodes), allowing their probabilities to be 
updated using any new available data and information. BN is a graphical structure known as a 
directed acyclic graph (DAG), which is popular in some fields of learning (statistics, machine 
learning, and artificial intelligence). This means that a set of directed edges are used to connect 
the set of nodes, where these edges represent direct statistical dependencies among variables, 
with the constraint of not having any directed cycles (i.e. cannot return to any node by following 
directed arcs). Thus, the definition of parent nodes and child nodes is obvious. The directed edge 
is often directed from a parent node to a child node, which means that any child node depends on 
its parent node(s). BNs are mathematically rigorous, understandable, and efficient in computing 
joint probability distribution over a set of random variables, along with being useful in risk 
analysis. In BNs, there are two main types of reasoning (inference support): 1- Predictive 
reasoning (top-down or forward reasoning), in which evidence nodes are connected through 
parent nodes (cause to effect), and 2- Diagnostic reasoning (bottom-up or backward reasoning), 
in which evidence nodes are connected through child nodes (effect to cause). Firstly, the 
topology of the BN should be specified (structuring of graphical causality model), then, the 
interrelationships among connected nodes should be quantified, i.e. conditional probability 
distributions using conditional probability tables (CPTs). Also, the basic probabilities of basic 
(evidence) nodes should be determined using basic probability tables (BPTs). As the number of 
parent nodes, and/or their states, increases, the CPTs get very large. Fig.13 introduces the 
different types of reasoning in BNs. Nodes without any arrows directed into them are called root 
nodes and they have prior (basic) probability tables, while nodes without children are called leaf 
nodes. Nodes with arrows directed into them are called child nodes, while nodes with arrows 
directed from them are called parent nodes. The prior basic probability tables, for the root nodes, 
and the conditional probability tables, for the parent and child relationships, may be obtained 
from historical database currently available, which can be updated in case of having any new 
data or information. Generally, quantifying BNs depends on four sources of data: statistical and 
historical data, judgment based on experience (i.e. expert judgement), existing physical models 
(or empirical models), and logic inference. Where no such sufficient data exist, either subjective 
31 
 
probabilities from experts or detailed simulation models can be used to estimate conditional 
probabilities, which is discussed in details later in this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
Fig.13: Types of reasoning in BNs [77] 
 
 
 
 
An example of BN with seven variables is shown in Fig.14. The joint probability function of 
random variables in a Bayesian network can be expressed as shown in equation 2.4: 
 
 
𝑃(𝑥₁, … … , 𝑥𝑛) =  ∏ 𝑃[𝑥ᵢ|𝑃𝑎 (𝑥ᵢ)]
𝑛
𝑖=1                        Eqn. 2.4 
           
 
Where 𝑃(𝑥₁, … … , 𝑥𝑛) is the joint probability of variables x1, x2, x3,.. xn, and Pa (xi) is the parent 
set of xi. If xi has no parents, then the function reduces to the unconditional probability of P(xi). 
For more illustration of BNs and their applications, including mathematical relations and 
equations, see [5, 7, 9, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, and 81]. 
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Fig.14: An example of BN with seven variables [78] 
 
In [79], another simple Bayesian network of earthquake-triggered landslides of five nodes (with 
their possible states) and five arcs is illustrated in Fig.15.  
 
 
 
Fig.15: Bayesian network of earthquake-triggered landslides [79] 
 
 
The marginal prior probability of B having no damage, P(B = B1) can be calculated through 
marginalization of equation 2.4 by equation 2.5: 
 
 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝐵₁) =  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝐵₁, 𝑀 = 𝑀ᵢ, 𝐷 = 𝐷𝑗 , 𝑆 = 𝑆𝑘, 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑚)
2
𝑚=1
2
𝑘=1
2
𝑗=1
2
𝑖=1    
 Eqn. 2.5 
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The joint probability can be derived according to equation 2.4, with the conditional probabilities 
are quantified using available information (e.g., statistical and historical data, expert judgement, 
and physical and empirical models), [79]. One of the features that BN allows is entering 
evidence as input, resulting in updating probabilities in the network when new information is 
available. This information will propagate through the network and the posterior probabilities 
can be estimated. An example of the posterior probability of B=B1, given that the evidence 
M=M1 and D=D2 already took place, is shown by equation 2.6: 
 
𝑃(𝐵 = 𝐵1| 𝑀 = 𝑀1, 𝐷 = 𝐷2) =  
𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑀1, 𝐷 = 𝐷2| 𝐵 = 𝐵1) 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝐵1) 
𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑀1, 𝐷 = 𝐷2)
 
=
𝑃( 𝐵 = 𝐵1, 𝑀 = 𝑀1, 𝐷 = 𝐷2) 
𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑀1, 𝐷 = 𝐷2)
 
=
∑ ∑ 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝐵₁, 𝑀 = 𝑀₁, 𝐷 = 𝐷2, 𝑆 = 𝑆𝑘, 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑚)
2
𝑚=1
2
𝑘=1   
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝐵ᵢ, 𝑀 = 𝑀₁, 𝐷 = 𝐷2, 𝑆 = 𝑆𝑘, 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑚)
2
𝑚=1
2
𝑘=1
2
𝑖=1
 
Eqn. 2.6 
 
 
 
 
    
                 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚  =  
𝑳𝒊𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒅 ∗  𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝑬𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆
 
 
 
 
 
The concept of posterior probability allows for identifying the events which have higher 
contributing impacts on the undesired/failure event, and then the decision maker may pay more 
attention to these important factors, [82]. In BNs, the main concern is the cause-effect 
relationships, and deriving causal inferences from a combination of diverse assumptions. 
Generally, the use of Bayesian networks helps to answer queries even when no experimental data 
is available. 
 
The structure of a relatively complex BN of the IEEE-RTS system is shown in Fig.16. This 
shows how complicated the system interrelationships could be when represented as a BN, 
especially when large number of system components/nodes need to be represented. This also 
reveals that BN may be used to represent different applications due to its probabilistic nature. 
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Fig.16: The BN structure of the IEEE-RTS system [83] 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7 Advantages of BN Over Other Network Representation Techniques 
 
Network representation using sequence diagrams may not be an easy task for complex 
engineering applications. The two most commonly used sequence diagrams, for representing 
engineering applications, are Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). This 
research proposes using Bayesian Networks (BNs) for representing complex systems. Detailed 
Simulation is another way of representing the engineering system when appropriate amount of 
data and models are available.  
Table 3 shows a detailed comparison, with the advantages and disadvantages of four techniques 
(methods) that can be used in representing systems. These four techniques are Simulation, 
Bayesian Network (BN), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), [7]. 
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Technique 
 
Advantages 
 
 
Disadvantages 
 
Simulation 
 
 Can represent any system with 
any number of variables, with 
detailed states’ definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sampling problem (depends on 
the sample nature and its size). 
Sampling mainly depends on 
randomly generated data 
 Too complex with multiple 
number of system variables and 
their corresponding states. 
Relations among variables are 
complicated to be obtained. This 
may lead to misleading results 
 Takes much more time to 
estimate the results in case of 
huge number of system variables 
(good for estimation not for risky 
decision making) 
 Probability estimation may be 
computationally complicated  
 
 
BN 
 
 Depends on historical data and 
statistics, not on sampling 
 Can integrate different types of 
data due to probabilistic nature 
 It can represent a huge number of 
variables and states 
 Estimating probabilities in 
shorter times 
 Simplify any system to a number 
of nodes having 
interrelationships among each 
other (nodes and arcs) 
 Represents basic and conditional 
probabilities using basic and 
conditional probability tables 
(BPTs and CBTs), which 
facilitates the representation and 
makes it easier to interpret 
 Being acyclic makes it faster in 
solving problems that do not 
require cyclic representation 
 
 
 Results depend on connections 
and topologies used for 
representing the system as a BN. 
That is why relying on expert 
and domain knowledge in 
representing any system is 
required. If such knowledge is 
not available, estimating 
different configurations that 
define different scenarios (worst 
case, best case, and other cases) 
will be beneficial 
 Has acyclic behaviour, which is 
not suitable for dynamic 
situations which may include 
cycles 
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ETA 
 
 Simplifies the system in terms of 
“yes/no” steps to follow the 
events that the system may 
experience 
 Each step can be represented 
using probability (conditional 
probability) if there is a relation 
between the parent state and the 
child state 
 
 
 Not suitable for describing and 
representing multiple initiating 
events 
 Not suitable to represent 
dependency among different 
events with multiple number of 
states, or between any event and 
a new initiating event.  
 
FTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Simple to understand and easy to 
implement 
 Qualitative descriptions of 
potential problems and 
combinations of events causing 
specific problems of interest 
 Lists recommendations for 
reducing risks 
 Displays information in a 
structured, graphic way that 
makes it easy to interpret and 
communicate 
 
 
 Risk of inaccurate information, 
which compromises the accuracy 
of the results (because it is 
mainly based on judgement and 
subjective opinions) 
 Can be a relatively time-
intensive and complex technique, 
especially with very large 
systems 
 Correlations between basic 
events are difficult to be 
modelled 
Table 3: Comparison of BN, ETA, FTA, and Simulation 
 
 
 
To show the difference between BN and ETA representations, an example of a two reservoir 
system is represented. Using BNs to represent two dams in series and in parallel, with dependent 
inflows, is shown in Fig.17 and Fig.18, respectively: 
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Fig.17: BN of two series dependent dams/reservoirs  
 
 
 
Fig.18: BN of two parallel dependent dams/reservoirs 
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Both dams in this case are represented by their inflows, reservoir levels, and the event of having 
excess water more than the reservoir capacity (named spill). If spill took place, and the spillway 
gates failed to open, the dam will fail due to overtopping. Then, the failures of both dams will 
represent the system failure probability. 
ETA, for example, can also be used to represent the same system of two dams, in series or in 
parallel, having two dependent inflows (see Fig.19). Both cases, series and parallel, will have the 
same representation using ETA, which is misleading in terms of the form of representation of the 
system under study. Moreover, if the two dams are in series, there should be an effect of the 
outflow and the failure of the first dam on the second one, which is hard to represent in this case. 
Similarly, for the parallel case, the outflows of both dams should be added to represent the total 
outflow of the system, which cannot also be represented while using ETA as a representation 
technique. 
 
 
Fig.19: ETA of two dependent dams/reservoirs 
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Accordingly, when the BN is used to represent the system, the network is found to be more 
readable and understandable than other representation methods. This facilitates the analysis part 
of the system, which leads to easier system quantification. Quantifying the sequence diagram 
depends on available data, expert judgement, logic inference, empirical models, or detailed 
simulation of the system. BNs need probabilistic quantification for the basic and conditional 
probability tables of the network, which allows for using the Bayesian inference in predicting the 
failure probability of any system under study. 
 
2.8 Summary 
In this chapter, the different factors affecting the Deep Geological Repository (DGR) disposal 
system have been reviewed. The diversity of the system’s different components needs to be 
unified in a single representation that includes all the interrelationships among these components. 
This research focuses mainly on the failure of the Used Fuel Container (UFC) that contains the 
nuclear fuel bundles. It is shown that there are different causes that may affect the failure of the 
UFC. The main goal is to limit the failure for such systems, which are not yet applied and don’t 
have any kind of historical databases. As the main purpose of this research is to predict the 
probability of failure, the way of representation should be probabilistic. BNs have the distinction 
to represent the different components of the system with their interrelationships, along with 
defining the different causes leading to certain effect(s) in a probabilistic representation. One of 
the main advantages of BNs is that they can incorporate any kind of data (pressure, temperature, 
relative humidity, etc.) because all of them are represented in terms of their probabilities of 
occurrence, not their values. Similarly, as dams incorporate a huge number of factors of different 
natures and characteristics (more than that of the NWM case); it would be crucial to have a 
simplified representation that includes all these factors. Like the NWM case, the different factors 
affecting dam failures are of different types (technical, man-made, economical, societal, etc.), 
and for that reason a probabilistic representation like the BN is useful. In the case of dams, BNs 
are supposed to use the historical databases to determine the different probabilities of the 
interacting system components and factors.  
Probabilistic uncertainty is one of the main sources of inaccuracy in probabilistic results. In 
complex systems’ representations that depend on probabilistic quantification, like BNs, 
uncertainty propagation is one of the main challenges. While BN is having more advantages over 
other sequence diagrams and dependability analysis techniques, it is still not mature in 
representing complex engineering networks having huge number of system variables. In BN 
representation, uncertainty comes from quantification sources, like expert judgement, logic 
inference, or empirical models. With that, BNs, as Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), still have 
the ability to represent any network quantitatively (using probability measures), and 
qualitatively (using simple representation and dependency structure). The next chapters 
introduce different approaches of using BNs when dealing with different types of complex 
networks, i.e. NWM and SHPD. These proposed approaches try to make the BNs more mature in 
dealing with such complex networks. 
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3.1 Introduction  
This chapter applies the BN to study the Nuclear Waste Management (NWM) system. This 
future application includes a number of system components that have complex interrelations. 
According to the literature that has been reviewed, studies and analyses for system components 
and factors of this application are mostly done for each separate component/ factor. This thesis 
tries to address an analysis for the combination of most of the interrelated components/ factors of 
this system in order to predict/ estimate a combined outcome for system failure. 
In order to better analyze the system of Nuclear Waste Management (NWM) using Deep 
Geological Repository (DGR), BNs are used to represent the interrelationships among different 
system components. Due to the nature of this system as a future project, limited data available 
and lack of knowledge are the main obstacles in representing the system and its interacting 
components, which adds some complexity to the system. This chapter focuses on analysing the 
system, explaining the underlying assumptions, and studying all the related variables and 
components of the DGR system that will help in predicting the system failure. Moreover, the 
main contributors to system failure can be estimated in order to better design the project.  
 
3.2 System Assumptions 
In the NWM case study, the following key attributes are assumed for the hypothetical site [84, 
85]: 
1- High- level (HL), long-lived nuclear waste. 
2- High volume of spent fuel wastes. Thus, a deep geological repository (DGR) concept is 
applied (500 m depth). 
3- The repository is located at a depth of 500 m, with sufficient volume of rock and depth to 
host the repository. 
4- Groundwater at repository depth provides a chemically reducing environment and a low 
concentration of potentially corrosive agents. 
5- The host rock is capable of withstanding mechanical and thermal stresses. 
6- Seismic activity and the risk of volcanism are low. 
7- Host rock formation does not contain economically exploitable natural resources at 
repository depth. 
8- Designs are according to the Canadian standards (CANDU fuel bundles, waste container, 
and bentonite clay buffer boxes). 
9- The repository contains a network of placement rooms that are assumed to hold 4.6 
million used fuel bundles encapsulated in about 100,000 long-lived used fuel containers, 
which is the total reference used fuel inventory projected over the expected lifetime of the 
current fleet of Canadian CANDU power reactors. See Fig.22 and Fig.23 for the layout of 
the repository and the placement room geometry. 
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10- The container design consists of an outer corrosion-resistant material (copper), and an 
inner supporting material (steel), which provides strength for the container to withstand 
expected hydraulic and mechanical loads. See Fig.20 and Fig.21 for the copper coated 
used fuel container and its manufacturing process. 
11- Used fuel bundles are at least 30-years old at time of placement in the repository. 
12- Repository operation (i.e., filling of repository rooms) lasts for 38 years (about 120,000 
fuel bundle per year). 
13- The post-operation monitoring period, with access tunnels open, lasts for 70 years. 
14- Final decommissioning/closure takes up to 30 years. 
15- Main goal is to calculate or to estimate the probability of failure of the spent fuel 
container placed in the repository after the DGR is closed (post closure). This facilitates 
management and improvement actions in the design stage in order to minimize the 
failure, and to estimate the main contributors to system failure. 
16- Different scenarios are taken into consideration regarding groundwater at repository 
depth to be of either high or low salinity. 
17- Extreme conditions of causal factors such as pressure, water, chemical, biological, and 
thermal pollutions, can be taken into consideration in probabilistic modeling. 
18- The copper coated used fuel containers have a design requirement for a minimum 
functional life of not less than 100,000 years. 
19- Future impacts are assessed over a one-million-year baseline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.20: Used Fuel Container Manufacturing Process [85] 
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Fig.21: Copper Coated Used Fuel Container [85] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.22: Underground Repository Layout [85] 
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Fig.23: Placement Room Geometry (Vertical Section) [85] 
 
 
 
 
As of June 30, 2017, a total of approximately 2.8 million used CANDU fuel bundles were in 
storage at the reactor sites (see Fig.24 for major storage locations in Canada). The Nuclear Waste 
Management Organization (NWMO) has a legal obligation to manage all of Canada’s used 
nuclear fuel, which exists now and that will be produced in the future. The NWMO continually 
monitors new developments to be prepared to assume its legal responsibility to manage used 
nuclear fuel, [86]. 
 
 
 
Fig.24: Current Nuclear Fuel Waste Major Storage Locations in Canada [86] 
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3.2.1 Pressure 
The used fuel containers (UFCs) are designed to be corrosion resistant and robust, with an inner 
steel vessel that is designed to sustain a maximum external isotropic pressure of 45 MPa 
(including the pressure of a 3 km thick ice sheet above the repository site). Thus, the containers 
are expected to have a long lifetime. However, there is still a possibility of having unexpected 
events in the future that could lead multiple containers to fail in the repository, [84]. The UFC 
incorporates a steel core for structural strength (46 mm thickness to sustain a maximum external 
isotropic pressure of 45 MPa) and an exterior copper coating for corrosion protection (3 mm 
thickness), with a capacity of 48 used CANDU fuel bundles for a fuel mass of about 1200 kg. 
Under repository conditions, corrosion of the copper barrier is predicted to be much less than 2 
mm over a period of one million years, which is approximately the time required for the 
radioactivity of the used CANDU fuel to decay to levels comparable to those of natural uranium 
deposits, [85]. The total external pressure in the repository accounts for three components: 
hydrostatic pressure, ice glacial load pressure, and bentonite swelling pressure. The swelling 
pressure of bentonite backfill is expected to be about 7.1 MPa (maximum of 10 MPa). Major 
increases in the pressure on the UFC arise during the glaciation period. The bounding limit of the 
ice sheet loading is the pressure of a 3 km ice sheet thickness above the repository, which counts 
for about 30 MPa. The UFC will also be exposed to an initial hydrostatic pressure of 5 MPa (at 
500m depth). While glaciation will be a significant load, the earliest site coverage due to an ice 
sheet would be thousands of years in the future (at least another 60,000 years from present), [85]. 
The basics of calculating the pressure in the repository has been introduced by Eqn. 2.2, where 
(H) is 500 m depth, and (g) is assumed to still be 9.81 m/s
2
 at that depth. It is obvious that the 
probability of having oceanic pressure in Canada is 8%, with a maximum density of 3300 kg/m
3
 
of oceanic crust, which leads to a maximum pressure of 16,186,500 N/m
2
 or Pa (161.865 bar) at 
500 m deep in the repository. It is also understood that the probability of having continental 
pressure in Canada is 92%, with a maximum density of 3000 kg/m
3
 of continental crust, which 
leads to a maximum pressure of 14,715,000 N/m
2
 (147.15 bar) at 500 m deep in the repository. 
According to NWMO, the bentonite swelling pressure may result in maximum of 10 MPa (100 
bar), it means that the total maximum external pressure, without glacial load pressure (maximum 
of 30 MPa), in the repository may reach 262 bars (26.2 MPa) in oceanic case, or 248 bars (24.8 
MPa) in continental crust. And according to NWMO [33], with having the external pressure test 
on the containers, there was no evidence of damage in the container at 450 bars (design pressure 
is 45 MPa), and the container started to buckle at 57 MPa. So, with an ice glacial load pressure of 
30 MPa, that is supposed to take place in 60,000 years from present, the total maximum external 
pressure exerted on the container will result in maximum of 56.2 MPa (worst case scenario). For 
the locations that are being tested by NWMO, the repository is supposed to be built in a saturated 
rock mass that exerts a maximum of 5 MPa hydrostatic pressure on the repository. One of the 
main problems is that pressure in the repository may result in increasing the diffusion rate from 
outside the container to its inside in case of any failure or damage took place in the container. 
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3.2.2 Temperature 
While dealing with temperature, there are two separate temperature factors affecting the DGR:  
1- Surface temperature: that may affect the repository through the geothermal gradient in the 
pre-closure processes, and 
2- Radioactive decay temperature: that results from the nuclear radioactive heat decay 
coming from the used fuel bundles in the containers. This one is dominant during the 
post-closure conditions. 
This research is focusing on the post-closure conditions of the repository. So, the temperature 
coming from radioactive decay will be the most dominant one in the repository, and the effect of 
surface temperature should be neglected. However, all the temperature calculations for surface 
temperatures in Canada - for worst case scenarios - are included in this section. This is to give a 
general idea about the geothermal gradient concept in the pre-closure conditions, which may also 
affect the bacterial impacts. In [84, 85], the repository layout is designed such that the 
temperature remains less than 100ºC at the exterior surface of the UFCs, or in a minimum of 30 
cm layer of the buffer surrounding the container. The container surface temperature is expected 
to initially increase to a peak value of about 120ºC  in less than 100 years, decreases relatively 
rapidly to about 80ºC, moving  to 70ºC over about 10,000 years, and then decreases to reach 
ambient temperatures (~14°C) at about 100,000 years after closure. These values of temperature 
are determined by thermal modelling, which includes thermal properties of the rock, engineered 
barrier materials and the heat generated by the fuel, [84]. Thus, temperatures within the 
repository are anticipated to range from ambient (10 - 20°C) to about 100°C (adjacent to a 
container). This temperature range will have impact on the culturability (activity) of the 
microbes, as the microbial activity is reducing with higher temperatures (close to container). 
Besides, the dry density of the buffer material affects the microbial activity, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter, [85]. According to NWMO, the outer surface of the fuel container 
should be kept at a temperature less than 100°C.  
To model and quantify the temperature basic probabilities in the BN in the post-closure 
conditions, three states for the temperature node are considered: 1- Higher than 100°C (low 
probability in the first 100 years), 2- Lower than 100°C and higher than ambient (within the first 
100,000 years), 3- Ambient temperature (starting 100,000 years after closure and lasts until 
1,000,000 years). For surface temperature calculation (during pre-closure conditions), it is 
assumed that the year is split into three seasons:  
1- Winter (W) from December – March (12, 1, 2, 3) = 4 months (4/12 = 0.333333) 
2- Fall (F) from September – November (9, 10, 11) = 3 months (3/12 = 0.25) 
3- SpringSummer (SS) from April – August (4, 5, 6, 7, 8) = 5 months (5/12 = 0.416667) 
From [23], historical data of average annual temperatures are given for the largest 33 cities in 
Canada until 2010. To determine the worst case and getting the extreme conditions, our concern 
is the morning higher temperatures not the lower ones. According to section 2.3.1, the average 
geothermal gradient ranges between 25 – 29°C / km depth, with actual value of more than 55 °C / 
km depth in some regions. Generally, in this research, the higher average value of geothermal 
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gradient (i.e. 29
°
C / km = 14.5°C / 500 m) is used. The average monthly surface temperatures, 
their corresponding average seasonal surface temperatures, and the average seasonal 
temperatures in the repository at 500 m depth, are given in Table 4 (calculated from [23]): 
 
Average Monthly surface 
temperature 
(°C) 
Average seasonal surface 
temperature 
(°C) 
Average seasonal temperature 
in the repository 500 m deep 
(°C) 
Avg. December ≈ -0.4  
 
(W) = -0.6 
 
 
(W) = -0.6 + 14.5 = 13.9 
Avg. January ≈ -3 
Avg. February ≈ -1.2 
Avg. March ≈ 2.3 
Avg. April ≈ 11  
(SS) = 20.24 
 
 
(SS) = 20.24 + 14.5 = 34.74 
 
Avg. May ≈ 17.6 
Avg. June ≈ 22.4 
Avg. July ≈ 25.2 
Avg. August ≈ 25 
Avg. September ≈ 19.7  
(F) = 12.8 
 
(F) = 12.8 + 14.5 = 27.3 Avg. October ≈ 13.2 
Avg. November ≈ 5.4 
Table 4: Average seasonal temperature difference between surface and 500m depth 
 
According to NWMO site selection criteria, the repository will be built in a location with an 
average of 5°C surface temperature, and about 16°C/km geothermal gradient. 
 
3.2.3 Relative Humidity (RH), Water Saturation, Salinity, and Microbial Activity 
In sedimentary and crystalline shield environments, the fluid (groundwater) density/salinity can 
vary by more than 25%. Fluid density and viscosity are functions of groundwater total dissolved 
solids (TDS) concentrations, which typically increase with depth, [84]. In the repository 
introduced in [84], microbial activity is suppressed by the presence of very saline groundwater. 
In [85], three groundwater systems are considered: shallow, intermediate, and deep, where the 
depth is affecting the TDS concentrations, which affect the density /salinity. The nutrients 
required for microbial/bacterial growth include N, P, S, K, Mg, Na, Ca and Fe. The dominant 
species in a given environment tend to be those bacteria that generate the most energy from the 
available nutrient sources. Acetogens, iron-reducing bacteria (IRB), sulphate-reducing bacteria 
(SRB), and methanogens, are often the dominant components of the population in Canadian 
Shield groundwater. In crystalline rock environments, oxygen concentrations have been shown 
to decrease with depth due to microbial processes, [85]. Another factor affecting the microbial 
activity is the dry density of the bentonite buffer. The higher the density of the bentonite, the 
lower the activity of the bacteria. High dry density will prevent the bacteria from being free to 
grow or move, even if nutrients are available in the host rock, or the bentonite, or carried by 
groundwater. Jorge Garcia (PhD candidate at the University of Waterloo, Design Optimization 
under Uncertainty Group, March 2018) has estimated the probability of bacterial activity (SRB) 
as a function of the dry density of the bentonite buffer in Fig.25 and Table 5. The higher the 
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compaction of the bentonite (i.e. higher dry density), the lower the bacterial activity (i.e. lower 
sulphide concentrations, and longer container life time). 
Fig.25: Probability of having active SRB as a function of dry density [87] 
 
 
 
 
Dry density ρD in 
[g/cm
3
] 
P(SRB) 
1 1 
1.1 0.477420198 
1.2 0.227929436 
1.3 0.108817216 
1.4 0.051950497 
1.5 0.024801111 
1.6 0.011839414 
1.7 0.005651223 
1.8 0.002696848 
1.9 0.001286367 
2 0.000612973 
2.1 0.00029148 
2.2 0.000137992 
2.3 6.47142E-05 
2.4 2.97296E-05 
2.5 1.30272E-05 
2.6 5.05312E-06 
2.7 1.24613E-06 
2.76 0 
Table 5: Selected values of bentonite dry density versus probability of bacterial activity [87] 
 
 
With any water diffusion and saturation in the repository at any time, the bentonite buffer will 
swell, resulting in a swelling pressure that should suppress the microbial activity more and more 
(compared to the initial dry density before water saturation). But, the amount of nutrient sources, 
carried by the water diffused, and salinity level of water, are other factors in affecting the 
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microbial growth and activity in the repository. Thus, the relative humidity, in pre-closure 
conditions, or water diffusion and saturation, in post-closure conditions, is related to the activity 
of bacteria/microbes in the repository environment. Since the focus in this research is on the 
post-closure conditions, the relative humidity should not be taken into consideration while 
quantifying the BN. However, calculations of the relative humidity values in Canada, which are 
related to the surface temperatures, are discussed in this section in order to provide a general idea 
about the concept of relative humidity and its relation to surface temperatures. The historical data 
in [23] is used to estimate the average annual surface relative humidity (RH) over the largest 33 
Canadian cities until 2010. In order to take the extreme conditions into account, the main focus 
should be on the early morning RH, which is higher than that in the afternoon. The average 
annual surface relative humidity (RH), over the 33 cities, is about 68.3% in the morning, and 
51.2% in the afternoon, with maximum of 95% in some cities during sometimes in the year. If 
the temperature increases according to the average geothermal gradient, which is taken to be 
29
°
C / km = 14.5°C / 500 m, then RH is supposed to decrease with temperature increase when 
going deeper. As explained previously, relative humidity doubles with each 20 degree 
(Fahrenheit) decrease, or halves with each 20 degree increase in temperature. Table 6 
determines the change in RH from surface to 500 m depth according to the temperature 
differences illustrated in section 3.2.2. 
 
Change in temperature in 
Winter (W) 
From surface to 500 deep 
 
Change in temperature in 
Fall (F) 
From surface to 500 deep 
Change in temperature in 
SpringSummer (SS) 
From surface to 500 deep 
 
-0.6°C to 13.9°C 
 
 
12.8°C to 27.3°C 
 
 
20.24°C to 34.74°C 
 
 
Increase of 27°F, then RH almost 
halves 
 
 
Increase of 26°F, then RH almost 
halves 
 
Increase of 26°F, then RH almost 
halves 
Table 6: Change in RH from surface to 500 m depth in different seasons 
 
Accordingly, if the maximum RH (95%) is reached at the surface, this means that RH will never 
exceed 47.5% (<50%) at a depth of 500 meters with the temperature increase due to geothermal 
gradient. In the NWMO site selection process, it is recommended to choose the site, where the 
repository will be built, to have a lower average value of surface relative humidity in order to 
have minimal effect in the repository during the operation, monitoring, and decommissioning 
time (about 150 years to repository closure). 
 
3.2.4 BN Representation 
The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) is responsible for the implementation 
of plans for safe long-term management of Canada’s used nuclear fuel, which depends on 
placing the nuclear fuel within a deep geological repository in a suitable rock formation. A deep 
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geological repository is a multi-barrier system designed to protect people and the environment in 
the long term. Even though the total radioactivity will increase with placing more used fuel in the 
repository, it will start to decrease due to radioactive decay with the help of the durable barriers 
(i.e. corrosion resistant containers, engineered sealing materials, and the surrounding geosphere). 
After the decommissioning period of the repository, the post-closure period, which may last for 
1,000,000 years, starts. In [85], the post-closure period is described in four main timeframes: 
1- Up to 1,000 years 
2- 1,000 - 60,000 years 
3- 60,000 - 1,000,000 years 
4- 1,000,000 years and beyond 
 
 
According to the analysis in the above sections, the proposed Bayesian Network for the NWM 
case study is shown in Fig.26. Hugin software (www.hugin.com) can be used to help in 
representing systems as Bayesian Networks, and quantifying their probability tables according to 
data available in order to use the Bayesian inference in determining the required probability (i.e. 
probability of failure in this research). 
 
 
 
 
Fig.26: Proposed BN of NWM systems 
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This BN consists of 8 nodes, which is relatively not complex in terms of representation. But one 
source of complexity is that each node may include many other internal factors that may act like 
a nodal sub-network. Another complexity issue is the interrelationships among these nodes. It is 
not just a series of events that happen consecutively to predict the failure, but rather, it needs a 
better understanding of the dependability of each node over the others. Every node has states for 
the event occurrence; the more states the network has, the more accurate the results are. In order 
to better understand this BN, a description of the BN nodes/events, and their possible states, is 
provided as follows: 
 
1- Temperature at Container Surface: the temperature resulted from the radioactive heat 
decay from the nuclear bundles inside the container. This is the most dominant 
temperature factor when dealing with post-closure conditions. The temperature node 
affects two other nodes: Bacterial Activity and Sulphide Generation, and Corrosion and 
Welding Corrosion of the container. When the temperature increases, the culturability of 
microbes/bacteria tends to decrease, so, the bacterial activity decreases, and thus, less 
sulphide is generated. Moreover, if the temperature increases above design limit (100
o
C 
at container surface), the welding of the container may be affected in case of any cracks 
or defects in the welding, and the whole container may fail due to the new 
unexpected/undesigned high temperature factors. This node includes three states: higher 
than 100
o
C, less than 100
o
C but higher than ambient temperature, and ambient 
temperature (starting 100,000 years after closure). 
2- Hydration and Water Saturation: during the post-closure conditions, there might be 
sometimes that hydration or water diffusion takes place in the repository. This will affect 
mainly four other factors: Bacterial Activity, Corrosion and Welding Corrosion, Pressure, 
and Bentonite Failure. The water diffused in the repository, with a certain salinity level, 
may be a carrier of bacterial nutrients. In this case, this may help the bacteria to be more 
active and generate sulphides that help in corroding the container. Moreover, with the 
high temperature from radioactive decay, the oxygen in the water may contribute in 
maintaining an oxic condition that contributes in corroding the container. For the 
bentonite buffer, whenever it is hydrated, it swells and resulting in high swelling pressure 
(of about 10 MPa). So, hydration, if happens, is a main contributor to the amount of 
pressure that will be present in the repository, and applied mainly on the UFC. Along 
with that, the dry density of the bentonite plays an important role in bentonite failure (i.e. 
failure to perform the operation that it is designed for). The dry density has also an effect 
on the bacterial activity. If the bentonite is of lower dry density, the bacterial activity is 
higher, and vice versa. But here, only the bentonite failure is considered. If the bentonite 
buffer is of low dry density, which means not compacted with the correct process, it will 
have sealing problems in case of hydration/ water saturation. This may cause water 
seepage, and water could reach the container resulting in a new corroding factor, besides, 
being in contact with groundwater of the surrounding environment (i.e. possible nuclear 
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contamination). If hydration took place, the bentonite will swell trying to seal all the gaps 
and protect the UFC. With low dry density, along with water diffusion, the bacteria could 
be more active, generating more sulphides to be carried with the water diffused, and the 
bentonite may fail to perform the desired task (i.e. failure to safely surround the container 
and limit its contact with surrounding environment). This node includes two states: 
hydrated (saturated), and dry. 
3- Salinity Level: is a property of the intact rock and the groundwater in the surrounding 
environment of the repository. It may be seen that the groundwater is a carrier of the rock 
salinity. This depends on the geological region and the rock type. In the DGR, salinity 
affects both Bacterial Activity, and Container Corrosion and Welding Corrosion. With 
the salinity goes higher, the bacterial activity is lower, and thus, reducing corrosion 
possibilities, and vice versa. But in the opposite side, salinity- coming from groundwater 
if water diffusion and seepage found their way to the container, or found in the host rock 
or the bentonite buffer - will be one the main contributors in the container corrosion and 
welding corrosion. In the BN, Salinity node includes three states: High Salinity, 
Intermediate Salinity, and Low Salinity. 
4- Pressure: pressure in the repository accounts for three components; ice/glacial load, 
hydrostatic/geostatic pressure, and bentonite swelling pressure (in case of hydration). 
With the pressure increase in the repository, the bacteria/microbes will also be subjected 
to that pressure. This will limit the activity of the microbes and reduce their culturabilty 
(in addition to the other factors). Hence, more pressure in the repository results in lower 
bacterial activity (i.e. sulphide generation). The second node to be affected, by pressure, 
is the bentonite. The bentonite will fail to perform its operation (i.e. sealing the gaps, and 
limiting water seepage and bacterial activity) if it has low dry density. If more pressure is 
present in the repository, with having lower dry density of the bentonite (less compacted), 
bentonite buffer box may tend to have cracks or weak points that may be the path for 
water diffusion to the container. Moreover, if the pressure on the container reached a 
certain limit (57 MPa), the container will buckle and fail to safely encapsulate the used 
fuel bundles, and this is considered a container failure. The UFC is designed to sustain 45 
MPa, and it starts to buckle at 57 MPa. For that reason, the pressure node in the BN 
includes three states: Less than 45 MPa, Higher than or equal 45 MPa (and less than 57 
MPa), Higher than or equal to 57 MPa. 
5- Bacterial Activity and Sulphide Generation: in the BN, all the above parent nodes are 
affecting the bacterial/microbial activity in the repository. Bacterial activity is responsible 
for generating sulphide, which is considered the main corrodent for the UFC in the DGR. 
With the higher pressure, higher temperature, higher salinity levels in the groundwater, 
non-existence of nutrients carried by groundwater (in case of hydration), and higher dry 
density in the bentonite buffer, the microbial culturability is reduced, and the activity of 
microbes/bacteria tends to decrease, and thus, sulphide generation is lower. This will also 
lower the tendency of the UFC, and its welding, to corrode. Bacterial Activity node 
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includes three possible states: Lower Activity (lower sulphide generation), Intermediate 
Activity, and Higher Activity (higher sulphide generation). 
6- Bentonite Failure: bentonite failure, mainly due to lower dry density, is affected by two 
parent nodes/events: the pressure, and water diffusion/saturation. With lower dry density 
(less compaction), and with water diffusion to the emplacement rooms, the bentonite 
buffer tends to swell (i.e. swelling pressure) trying to seal the gaps in order to protect the 
UFC from any possible contact with the surrounding environment. Thus, if the dry 
density of the bentonite is low, with the increasing pressure from swelling, cracks and 
weak points may appear in the bentonite buffer, resulting in water seepage and water 
contact to the UFC. If this happens, the water may be of high salinity, and may contain 
sulphides (from microbial activity), which may result – with high radioactive heat decay 
temperatures – in corrosion of the container and the welding. Eventually, this may lead to 
container failure. There is another limited possibility that may affect the container failure 
in the case when the bentonite has higher dry density. In case of hydration, seismic, 
and/or volcanic events, the pressure on the buffer box, and container, may exceed the 
limit of 57 MPa, resulting in UFC buckling and failure, even with no failure in the 
bentonite. For these reasons, the possible states of the Bentonite Failure node are: Low 
Dry Density (Failure), and High Dry Density (No Failure). 
7- Container Corrosion and Welding Corrosion: Container corrosion takes place affected 
by hydration (water saturation) with high salinity levels, and bacterial/microbial activity 
that results in sulphide generation, in the case of having bentonite buffer of low dry 
density at high temperature (due to radioactive decay). Container corrosion will affect the 
failure of the container, which means a failure for the whole system (i.e. failure to keep 
the used fuel not in contact with the surrounding environment). This node includes two 
possible states: Corroded, and Not Corroded. 
8- Container Failure: UFC will fail to safely encapsulate the used fuel bundles in case 1- 
the pressure reaches 57 MPa, with bentonite buffer of high dry density when unexpected 
events take place (i.e. volcanic and/or seismic conditions), or due to 2- continuous 
corrosion of the container because of lower dry density of bentonite during water 
diffusion with high salinity levels and bacterial activity. This may be considered a failure 
for the entire system. This node contains two possible states: Failure, or No Failure. 
 
 
In the next section, the numerical quantification for this BN is presented, with possible scenarios 
that may take place in the repository in the post-closure conditions. 
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3.2.5 Numerical Evaluations 
The Basic Probability Tables (BPTs) and Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) of the proposed 
BN are shown in Table 7. These are the probabilistic estimates that are logically inferred, or 
according to reviewed literature and the data available for the DGR system. 
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Table 7: BPTs and CPTs for the proposed BN 
 
 
For the nodes in the Bayesian network, the probabilistic quantification is estimated for a 
repository life time of 1,000,000 years. The probabilities in both BPTs and CPTs are quantified 
according to logic inference, and limited data available from literature and from NWMO experts. 
If the site selection procedure, lab tests, or simulation models (performed by NWMO and/or their 
partners) resulted in updated data and probability estimates, the BN tables can be updated by new 
probabilistic quantification values, which will help in better estimating the system failure. 
 
 
3.2.6 Numerical Results and Conclusions 
According to the probability tables in the proposed BN, the probability of container failure 
(system failure) is estimated using Bayesian inference to be 26.48% over 1,000,000 year life 
time of the repository. 
Other scenarios, probability estimates, or network connections may be proposed for different 
purposes. It is important to state that Bayesian inference can lead to the factors which are more 
contributing in the container failure (i.e. posterior probability of diagnostic inference). Given the 
evidence that system failure took place, it can be seen in Fig.27 that pressure of more than 45 
MPa, hydration (water saturation), and bentonite failure (of low dry density), are the three main 
contributors to system failure.  
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Using the concept of posterior probability in Bayesian inference, which can be compiled in 
Hugin software, the probabilities can be updated regularly whenever there are new available 
data, information, or knowledge, which is called evidence in this case. It is shown in Fig.28 that 
with the evidence of pressure of less than 45 MPa, and the bentonite is of high density and didn’t 
fail, the posterior probability of failure (container failure) [i.e. P(failure | Pressure < 45 MPa, 
Bentonite = High density with no failure)] is 0% over 1,000,000 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.27: BN determining the main factors contributing in a failure, given a failure took place 
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Fig.28: Posterior probability of failure given the evidence of pressure less than 45 MPa and high density bentonite 
 
 
Thus, all precautions should be taken into consideration during design, site selection, and 
construction to keep the pressure in the repository less than 45 MPa, and to use high dry density 
bentonite buffer that will sustain mechanical stresses and limit the diffusion of corrosive 
materials. This will keep the probability of system failure at its lowest values. 
 
It must be noted that the BN nodes can be represented in many different ways, and the 
interactions among system components may be re-connected (re-formulated) for different 
purposes in order to perform prediction or diagnosis for any event of interest. The nodes (i.e. 
system components) of the BN may also be decomposed to their sub-component nodes in order 
to represent more states in the network. The previous analysis may also be used to generate some 
scenarios that reflect different operating conditions of the Deep Geological Repository leading to 
the failure of the Used Fuel Container (UFC). Each scenario should be described by basic and 
conditional probabilities for different states.  
The results here are reflecting known and assumed input values and hence are only for 
demonstration purposes and not to be taken literally as representing the current design. 
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3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, related factors, parameters, and variables to NWM case study are explained in 
details. The BN of the NWM system is then represented and quantified with the currently 
available data, and with logic inference. The approach of using BNs in predicting system failure 
is illustrated. The diagnostic capability in the BN is used to diagnose the main contributors to 
NWM system failure in order to take precautions and mitigation actions into account in the 
design stage. 
 
In the next chapter, a proposed BN approach supported by simulation and decompositional 
capabilities is illustrated. Simulation Supported Bayesian Network (SSBN) method is used to aid 
the quantification of BNs in representing complex systems. SSBN is then applied to systems of 
dam reservoirs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Simulation Supported Bayesian Networks (SSBNs) for 
Failure Prediction of Hydropower Dams 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter illustrates the proposed decompositional approach for failure prediction of complex 
systems using BN-Simulation integration, with some examples to demonstrate how to determine 
the complexity of engineering networks.  Then, Simulation Supported Bayesian Network 
(SSBN) method is applied to a simple two reservoir system of different configurations.  
 
4.2 Probabilistic Failure Analysis of Hydropower Dams  
Dams and reservoir systems are more complex than many civil engineering systems [88]. 
Studying safety of dams needs a comprehensive multidisciplinary analysis that should consider 
all the relevant factors and their interrelationships. It is shown in [88] and [89] how complex the 
decision making process is while dealing with the challenging problem of dam safety. Although 
past cases of dam failures are taken to diagnose the causes of failure; this is not enough for 
predicting other dams' failure probabilities as every dam is different in terms of human, 
environmental, design and technical influential factors. Some of the shortcomings associated 
with traditional risk analysis and assessment approaches are listed in [89].  The current available 
approaches such as Monte-Carlo simulation are computationally expensive as they require 
detailed exhaustive system simulations. Therefore, they are inefficient for complex systems 
having a large number of elements and highly nonlinear relationships, and any improved 
practical approach to dam safety analysis and prediction, not just diagnosis, is of significant 
value. In this line, a paradigm shift has been suggested in [90] and [91] to deal with disaster 
management by quantifying disaster resilience instead of the traditional risk-based techniques. 
With these new approaches, system analysis will continue to be a primary approach to 
understanding the system behaviour under uncertainty and other measures that need to be taken 
into consideration. This research attempts to address some of these shortcomings, especially in 
enhancing the way of predicting the probability of system failure using systems analysis while 
dealing with data scarcity in some engineering applications.  
It can be shown in Fig.29 that dam operation and control system models incorporate multiple 
interrelated sub-systems. High level decision makers may have difficulty in understanding such 
representations. Decision makers, as humans, focus on “what is important” when facing such 
complex systems in the case of lack of sureness [88]. They need a simplified system 
representation to include all the system components, variables, and sub-systems while 
accounting for different interactions. When they try to evaluate the risk situation and take a 
control/mitigation action, they become aware of the situation of other system components. This 
kind of system representation should be at high level, which allows for analysing the system to 
sub-networks having less number of states instead of dealing with the entire network 
components. And if needed, these sub-networks should have the ability to be disaggregated to its 
elemental components. BNs have shown potentials in this direction. 
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Fig.29: Example of a Dam System Model [88] 
 
A human risk analysis model is presented in [5] using BNs in order to estimate risks to people 
due to floods from dam-breaks, with the ability to take a large number of parameters and their 
interrelationships into account, along with their uncertainties. Thus, a BN predicting loss-of-life 
is constructed, along with using historical data, physical analyses, and existing models, in order 
to quantify the nodes and their interrelationships (arcs). The network proposed in [5] consists of 
four main sub-networks: evacuation, sheltering inside buildings, flood severity, and loss-of-life 
(LOL). The human risk analysis model presented in [5] is applied to evaluate the human risk in 
the landslide dam failure in [6]. In such studies, it is necessary to divide a flooded area into 
several subareas of similar parameters. At both the global level (multiple sources of 
information), and the local level (updating the prior probabilities), the uncertainties of the 
parameters and their interrelationships are studied. Moreover, there are some differences in the 
physical models between man-made dams and landslide dams. These differences are taken into 
consideration in [6]. In [7], dams are classified as follows: 
1- First-class dams, that are safe and function normally, 
2- Second-class dams, that are safe under controlling conditions and function almost 
normally, and 
3- Third-class dams, which are unsafe with various distresses and cannot function normally 
as designed (called distressed dams). 
As explained earlier, in dam safety studies, three principal approaches are widely used: failure 
modes and effects analysis (FMEA), event tree analysis (ETA), and fault tree analysis (FTA). 
Recently, BN analysis has drawn attention as another alternative for dam safety studies. Based 
on the information in [7], ref [92] attempts to extend the technique of BNs to the diagnosis of a 
specific distressed dam. The main objective of [7] is to develop a probability-based tool using 
BNs for the diagnosis of embankment dam distresses at the global level based on past dam 
distress data. Historical data for dam distresses is used to quantify the interrelations among 
system parameters. Dam distress is related to the increased potential of structural deterioration, 
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inadequate design, poor construction, poor operation and maintenance practices, or changing 
hydrological and environmental conditions as shown in Fig.30, Fig.31, and Fig.32. In Fig.31 and 
Fig.32, the proposed causal network for diagnosing distresses associated with seepage erosion–
piping of homogeneous–composite dams include the following nodes [7]: ARS: Abutment rocks 
or soils, ASS: Abutment seepage situation, CF: Cutoff at foundation, DEW: Designed 
embankment width, EBI: Embankment–abutment interface, EC: Embankment cracking, EM: 
Embankment materials, ESS: Embankment seepage situation, FD: Filtered drainage, FSS: 
Foundation seepage situation, SCF: Sludge cleaning at foundation, SEP: Seepage erosion or 
piping, SSC: Seepage situation around embedded culverts, and TB: Termite burrows.  
 
 
 
Fig.30: Variables involved in diagnosing distresses associated with overtopping of dams [7] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.31: Causal network for diagnosing distresses associated with seepage erosion–piping of dams [7] 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
 
Fig.32: Probability calculation for diagnosing distresses of dams using Hugin Lite program [7] 
 
 
It is obvious from the networks represented in [7] that only technical failures or causes are 
incorporated in these representations. The critical step in dealing with safety of dams is that the 
representation must include the technical factors besides, at least, the human factors. A lot of 
different environmental, economic, and operational factors are still remaining to be included in 
the representation. One huge example is what happened in Oroville dam, California in February 
2017, [93]. The dam suffered from some economic and operational problems which put the dam 
structure in a critical situation, and put lives of hundreds of thousands on the edge. It wasn’t a 
pure technical problem in the dam design, but rather, the operation plan and strategy performed 
by humans was part of the disaster. To better present such cases for future prevention, more than 
just technical factors should be considered in the failure analysis. 
A simple example for applying the BN representation on the safety of hydropower dams, to 
predict the failure probability, is what was illustrated in Fig.17 and Fig.18 (section 2.7). Two 
dams are connected in series or in parallel, and the inflows of both dams are statistically 
dependent (and can be independent in other configurations). The inflow and the reservoir level of 
each dam are affecting the spill event (i.e. to have excess water more than the reservoir capacity), 
and if the spillway gates failed to open at the spill event (due to any electromechanical failures), 
the dam will experience an overtopping failure, and affect the system failure according to the 
connection between both dams (serial or parallel). For this kind of systems, it is supposed to have 
the basic and conditional relations among system components/nodes from historical and 
operational data, if available, in order to feed the basic and conditional probability tables (i.e. 
BPTs and CPTs) of the BN to predict the failure probability. This can be used for the sake of 
prevention of any future failure that may affect the dams or the population at risk (PAR) living 
around dams. The two dam reservoir example is the main pilot case study for the purposes of this 
thesis. Different approaches that use BNs to represent engineering systems and predict their 
failure probabilities will be applied to this system with its different connections/topologies. The 
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two dam reservoir system will be used to provide a general case study that is used to demonstrate 
the methodologies developed in this thesis.  
The next section explains a novel approach that uses simulation to support BNs in probabilistic 
quantification and failure prediction, i.e. Simulation Supported Bayesian Network. 
 
 
4.3 Simulation Supported Bayesian Network (SSBN) 
This section introduces the Simulation Supported Bayesian Network (SSBN) decompositional 
approach for probabilistic failure analysis and quantifying risks of complex systems. Complex 
systems are reviewed to have different interacting factors and components. These interactions 
can be in the form of cause – to – effect relations, which defines all the causes and evidences that 
may lead to certain effects. The complexity of a system is determined by the number of 
interacting components and the interrelationships among causes and effects. Two case studies in 
nuclear and hydropower industries were explained. Both case studies are of complex systems, 
but with different complexity measures. The complexity in the nuclear waste management 
system lies in being a new project which is not yet applied in reality, while the hydropower dams 
are well-defined systems with a huge number of inputs. The aim of this research is to simplify 
the representation of such complex systems, to predict the failure probabilities of the systems, 
and to estimate the factors that are responsible for limiting the probability of failure in both 
systems. To simplify the representation of complex systems and their components, Bayesian 
Networks (BNs) are found to be useful in defining the interrelationships among system 
components depending on evidence basic probabilities, and conditional probabilities among 
system components (nodes). BNs are found distinctive in representing any kind of information as 
the representation is being done in a probability form. This section aims to build a probabilistic 
methodology for any complex system, whether pre-existing or to be constructed. As the network 
representation needs to be quantified, running system simulations is integrated to the 
quantification process. 
 
4.3.1 Simulation 
Simulation is defined in [94] as “the process of designing a model of a real-world process or 
system and conducting experiments with this model for the purpose either of understanding the 
behavior of the system or of evaluating various strategies (within the limits imposed by a 
criterion or set of criteria, e.g. time) for the operation of the system”. Any real-world process 
studied by simulation techniques is viewed as a system, which is, in general, a collection of 
entities that are logically related and are of interest to a particular application. While 
investigating a real-world system, detailed simulation model should include the entire system. 
This may be computationally expensive especially in systems having large number of variables. 
During simulation, system variables are sorted into two groups: 1- uncontrollable variables: 
which are considered as givens, and 2- controllable variables: that can be manipulated to find a 
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solution, [95]. In general, simulation enables the study of internal interaction of sub-systems 
within a complex system. A simulation model helps to gain knowledge about improvement of a 
system. Simulating different capabilities can help determining the requirements. These 
capabilities allow analysis and understanding of how individual elements interact and affect the 
simulated environment. In conclusion, simulation is a representation of the functioning of a 
system or process. Through simulation, a model may be implanted with unlimited variations, 
producing complex scenarios. However, simulation results may be – sometimes – difficult to 
interpret. 
 
4.3.2 Integration of BN and Simulation for Uncertain Complex Systems 
Complex systems in Engineering include unlimited disciplines, like hydropower dams, electric 
networks, nuclear power generation, nuclear waste management, water distribution networks 
(shown in Fig.33 as a dynamic Bayesian Network), and waste water management, among others. 
 
Fig.33: Dynamic Bayesian network for predicting water availability in a water distribution network [96] 
 
While BN represents the interrelationships among system components qualitatively through 
nodes and arcs (i.e. dependency structure), there is a quantitative part of the BN which is 
responsible for defining the probabilistic, uncertain, values. Quantifying the arcs of the BN with 
probability measures is the main challenge in this kind of system analysis. For some blue print 
projects (systems) like the one of nuclear waste disposal, there are no data for operations or any 
historical and statistical data. For this kind of systems, the decision makers may rely on expert 
judgement and logically inferred data, along with mathematically accepted empirical models. On 
the contrary, there are pre-existing complex systems that are operating for decades like 
hydropower dams, waste water sewage systems, or water supply piping systems. In this kind of 
systems, there are lots of operational, historical, and statistical data that can be estimated to 
quantify the BNs that represent these systems. The question is, can the simulation be used as 
another source of information to quantify the complex systems represented by BNs? 
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In [97], reassessment of dam safety events using BNs is illustrated. The BNs are built based on 
the event tree analysis, and were supplemented with Monte Carlo simulations. This combination, 
BN-Simulation, with enough number of sample runs, can be an effective tool to narrow down the 
range of probabilities, and may cover a wide range of uncertain events leading to failures. 
However, it can be seen in the approach of [97] that simulation is performed for relatively small 
networks (not that complex). Moreover, the basic data and statistics are known from the 
beginning for the system under study. So, if we are updating (reassessing) the network using 
simulation models, why not we provide the network with the probability estimates using 
simulation from the beginning? 
If sufficient historical and statistical data are available, there should be no need for simulation. 
Such data is not available in two cases: in future systems (i.e. blue print projects), or for 
networks that don’t have an efficient monitoring system to save the operational data with time. In 
both cases, relying on the logic inferencing, expert judgement, or empirical models may be 
misleading and may add another source of uncertainty, especially in very complex systems. That 
is why simulation may be integrated as a useful source of data. But the challenge is that 
simulating a very complex system may be computationally expensive for the purpose of 
identifying the probabilistic interrelationships among systems’ variables and sub-components. 
On the other hand, simulation results of decomposed sub-systems may provide the BN with 
probability estimates that are used to estimate probabilities of whole systems. The proposed 
methodology of this section - Simulation Supported BN (SSBN) for a complex system - is 
summarized in Fig.34. The simulation will be computationally complicated if performed for the 
entire network, especially in complex networks with huge number of states. For that reason, 
SSBN proposes to have the network decomposed to smaller sub-networks (sub-trees). Each sub-
network will have its own simulation according to the data available, or from random sampling 
in case only basic data are available (e.g. lower and upper bounds). For every sub-network, 
simulation results are all about probabilistic quantification of this sub-network’s BN. Thus, 
probability values are estimated from simulation and fed into the BN of the sub-network.  
 
 
Fig.34: Proposed Methodology of SSBN 
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Once all Bayesian sub-networks are probabilistically quantified with their basic and conditional 
probability values, the sub-networks are ready to be re-combined as one whole network 
representation. SSBN makes the complex system more readable for both the operators and 
decision makers. SSBN overcomes the following obstacles: 
 Complex, time consuming simulation models, 
 Complex representation of systems, 
 Propagation of uncertainty measures in a complex network, and 
 The integration among different sources of data, including simulation.  
 
As an example, in Fig.35a and Fig.35b, a 23 node BN is represented to show how complex 
system components can be interrelated. Each node includes at least two states, which means at 
least 2
23 
states in that system. The more states the nodes have, the more complex the system is. 
When the analysis of the system is enhanced using the SSBN method, rather than simulating the 
entire system (in Fig.35a), smaller sub-systems may be simulated instead. In Fig.35b, the BN is 
decomposed to six different sub-entities (sub-systems, sub-networks, or sub-trees). Each sub-
system is less complex than the whole system, which means less number of states. In general, a 
system of N nodes/components, two states each (i.e. 2
N
 possible states) can be decomposed to n 
sub-systems and the number of possible states becomes n*(2
N/n
), which is less than 2
N 
[i.e. if 
N=12, n=4, 2
N 
= 4096, and n*(2
N/n
) = 32]. The sub-system components are interrelated, and the 
sub-systems may also have interrelations among each other. By applying the SSBN concept, 
every sub-system is simulated separately, using the appropriate methods, to get the probability 
estimates needed for quantifying the BN.  
 
Fig.35a: A 23 node BN using Hugin software 
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Fig.35b: A 23 node BN decomposed to 6 sub-entities ready to be simulated 
 
In order to quantify the conditional interactions among sub-system decompositions, domain 
knowledge and expert judgement may be required. If this kind of judgement is not available, 
assuming different scenarios/states can be used instead. This means that different interactions 
among sub-system decomposition are quantified by assuming worst case scenarios, best case 
scenarios, and normal case scenarios in order to estimate the system failure probabilities in 
different situations.  
According to [93], in 2009, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) issued a report 
titled “Guiding Principles for the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure.” Risk management of critical 
infrastructure depends on four interrelated guiding principles, identified as follows: 
1. To quantify and communicate risk, 
2. To employ an integrated systems approach, 
3. To exercise leadership, management, and stewardship in decision-making processes, 
4. To adapt critical infrastructure in response to dynamic conditions and practices. 
This thesis focuses mainly on the first two guiding principles, which is of how to represent all 
interrelated system components in a combined representation (integrated systems approach), 
while enhancing the ability to quantify this kind of system representation in order to better 
predict the failures for many purposes (risk management, risk reduction, etc.).  
71 
 
Bayes-Markov chains introduced in [98], along with reassessment of safety events using BNs 
and supplemented with Monte Carlo simulations illustrated in [97], which are both proposed for 
relatively small networks, may assist in conceptualizing a new methodology. Fig.36 shows an 
overview of a Bayes-Markov chain, which integrates Markov Chains and decomposed BNs to 
acquire cyclic behaviour of the BNs. In Fig.36, the clear circles represent Markov states; and 
grey circles represent nodes of a BN.  
 
 
Fig.36: Bayes-Markov chain [98] 
 
BN-simulation integration (i.e. Simulation Supported Bayesian Networks (SSBNs)), presented in 
this chapter, has a distinction of being able to deal with large systems of large number of system 
components, unlike the relatively simple network presented in [97]. The sub-system 
decompositions are interrelated through conditional probabilities, unlike the one presented in 
[98], which deals with one BN decomposition, instead of a large BN, through Markov states. 
SSBN may also be integrated with Markov Chains to acquire cyclic behaviour of the BN. This is 
presented in details in Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
An example of a real-world case study is shown in Fig.37a and Fig.37b by representing the 
proposed BN for probabilistic failure analysis of Mountain Chute hydropower dam in Ontario, 
Canada, operated by Ontario Power Generation (OPG). In this network, there are 21 nodes 
representing system components for the purpose of analyzing the failure of this system. This 
includes Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP), ice loading, earthquake and seismic actions, 
water pressure, geology and rock type, flood severity, adequacy of discharge capacity, sluice 
gates, drainage, vegetation control, seepage, and other components. If more than two states are 
defined for every node, the system will turn to be a huge complex network to analyze. However, 
the more states the system components have, the more accurate the results are. But, the main 
problem faced is having limited historical, operational, and monitoring data. Only basic data of 
lower and upper bounds of inflows, outflows, and flooding events may be available, along with 
expert opinions and logic inferencing, with using some accepted empirical models of reservoir 
system analysis. In such cases, mathematical modeling and simulation may be a first step to get 
probabilistic estimates. The distinction of the decompositional approach is obvious when dealing 
with such networks. Decomposing the system to new entities is shown in Fig.37b, and SSBN 
method can be applied. Accordingly, simulation results, logic inference, and expert judgement, 
may provide probabilistic data that can be fed to the re-composition of the entire network (in 
Fig.37a) to estimate/predict the probability of failure for the entire system. 
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Fig.37a: BN for probabilistic failure analysis of Mountain Chute Dam  
 
 
 
Fig.37b: BN of Mountain Chute Dam decomposed to sub-entities ready to be simulated 
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Mountain Chute main dam is 55 meters high (above its foundation), and almost 50 years old, 
having an electric power generation capacity of 150 MVA coming from two hydropower 
turbines. It doesn’t have an emergency spillway, and its inflow is controlled by another dam of 
Madawaska River System in its upstream. Although the sluiceway discharge capacity of 
Mountain Chute main dam covers less than 50% of its peak outflow, which should be considered 
a risk, the inflow is controlled by upstream dams in Madawaska River System of dams, which 
decreases the probability of failure. In this dam, there is leakage in the drainage gallery 
(inspection tunnel) of the main dam (which is a concrete dam). The Inflow Design Flood (IDF) 
for Mountain Chute dam may result in the Loss of Life (LOL) of 381 persons. IDF can’t be 
passed through sluice gates with the current deficiency and inadequacy in its discharge capacity.  
Fig.38 and Fig.39 are site pictures for the downstream and the penstock and power house of 
Mountain Chute dam, ON, Canada, taken in October 2017. Fig.40 also shows a proposed BN for 
probabilistic analysis of the safety of Mountain Chute dam [Population at Risk (PAR), & Loss of 
Life (LOL)]. 
 
 
Fig.38: Downstream of the Mountain Chute Dam (including roads, a bridge, and electric transmission lines) 
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Fig.39: Penstock and Power House of Mountain Chute Dam 
 
 
 
Fig.40: Probabilistic Analysis for Safety of Mountain Chute Dam  
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4.4 SSBN: Application, Methods, and Results 
 
In order to apply the concept of SSBN, a two dam reservoir system analysis is conducted. This 
system is a less complex system, which means that exhaustive simulation can be performed to 
the entire system without having any concerns regarding the random sampling problems, 
uncertainty propagation problems, or spending too much time to perform the simulation. This is 
because the system is relatively having a lower number of nodes/variables. The main purpose of 
using the two dam reservoir system is to compare the results from detailed simulation with the 
results that come from the BN when supported by simulation. If both results are similar or close 
to each other with no huge difference, it means that BN may use the simulation as a useful 
quantification source for less complex networks, and for large complex networks while applying 
decompositions. Using the SSBN concept, the complex system may be decomposed to smaller 
less complex networks; each is having a separate simulation in order to feed the BN with 
probability estimates, and in order to predict the failure probability for the entire BN of the 
complex system. This is expected to reduce the number of possible states to deal with while 
representing the system using BN. The specifications, characteristics, and underlying 
assumptions of the two reservoir system, being simulated, are as follows (see Appendix 1): 
 
 For each dam, dead (minimum) storage capacity, and maximum storage capacity of the 
reservoir are known. 
 The designed outflow from the dam is assumed to be the mean of the inflow in each year. 
 The inflow to the dam reservoir in each season is a uniformly distributed sampled random 
value using known lower and upper bounds. Of course, any other distribution can be 
used. 
 The dam is assumed to have a spillway gate that is to be opened or closed. If there is a 
spill (excess water more than the reservoir capacity) at any time, the gate should be 
opened, and there will be a spill release from the dam that can go to the same channel of 
the outflow, or to be diverted to any other channel. If there is a requirement to spill and 
the gate is closed (failed to open or to operate), the dam will fail due to overtopping over 
the dam crest. The state of the gate is a randomly generated value (0 or 1). 
 The dam failure is assumed to happen if the inflow is higher than certain limit, the 
storage state in the reservoir is high, which will result in having excess water more than 
the reservoir capacity (spill), and the gate is closed (failed to open) at the spill event. 
 The aim is to estimate the probability of failure of each dam (i.e. the probability that all 
the above events happen at the same time).  
 Then, each dam can be connected in series or in parallel with another same dam with the 
same characteristics and operational conditions, but with its inflow is dependent or 
independent on the inflow of the first dam. The outflow and spill release that are released 
from the first dam may also be added to the inflow of the second dam (according to the 
way of connection between the two dams).  
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 The system is assumed to fail if any dam fails or both dams fail at any time (in case of 
series connection), or if both dams fail (in case of parallel connection). 
The reservoir operation simulation model (mass balance and governing equations) used for 
simulating each dam operation/management, are presented and explained below: 
 
𝑈 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐼)    Eqn. 4.1 
 
𝑆(𝑡 + 1, 𝑚) =  𝑆(𝑡, 𝑚) + 𝐼(𝑡, 𝑚) − 𝑈(𝑚)     Eqn. 4.2 
Such That: 
𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤  𝑆(𝑡 + 1, 𝑚)  ≤  𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 
 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑡, 𝑚) = 𝑆(𝑡, 𝑚) + 𝐼(𝑡, 𝑚)    Eqn. 4.3 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒(𝑡, 𝑚) ≤  𝑈(𝑚)
= {
𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑡, 𝑚) − 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛            , 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑡, 𝑚) − 𝑈(𝑚) < 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑈(𝑚)                                                                                      , 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 
Eqn. 4.4 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙(𝑡, 𝑚) =  𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑡, 𝑚) −  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒(𝑡, 𝑚) − 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥  Eqn. 4.5 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙_𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒(𝑡, 𝑚) = {      
𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙(𝑡, 𝑚)                        , 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙(𝑡, 𝑚) > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑡, 𝑚) = 1, 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠
           0                                      , 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙(𝑡, 𝑚) > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑡, 𝑚) = 0, 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒         
 
         Eqn. 4.6 
Where: 
t: season of the year {1,2,3,4}. The unit time in this simulation is one season. 
m: year {1,2,3,4,……..,1000} 
I: randomly generated inflow of the dam according to the lower and upper bounds known from 
historical data (uniformly distributed) [units of water volume/time]. 
I(t,m): inflow of the dam at a certain year (m) and season (t) [units of water volume/time]. 
U, U(m): designed outflow from the dam for steady river flow regulation. It is assumed that the 
designed outflow equals the mean of the dam inflow throughout one year (m) [units of water 
volume/time]. 
S: storage of the reservoir in a unit time [units of water volume] 
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S(t,m): storage of the reservoir in a unit time in the current season of the year [units of water 
volume] 
S(t+1,m): storage of the reservoir in a unit time in the next season [units of water volume] 
Smin: minimum storage limit of the dam reservoir (dead storage) [units of water volume] 
Smax: maximum storage limit of the dam reservoir [units of water volume] 
Water_Available: the water available at the reservoir at a unit time. This is the inflow at a unit 
time plus the stored amount of water at the reservoir [units of water volume]. 
Water_Available (t,m): the water available at the reservoir at a unit time in every season of the 
year. 
Controlled_Release: the actual release from the dam with gates control/management, to keep 
the storage levels of the dam reservoir above the minimum value (Smin) and in order not to go 
lower than this value. Controlled release should be less than or equal the designed value of the 
outflow (U) [units of water volume/time]. 
Controlled_Release (t,m): the controlled release at every season and year. 
Spill: the amount of water that exceeds the maximum storage level of the reservoir (Smax) at a 
unit time (one season) after releasing all the required release (controlled release) [units of water 
volume]. 
Spill (t,m): the spill amount at a certain season and year. 
Spill_Release: if the spillway gates are opened, the spill release will equal the amount of spill 
over the time (per unit time or season). If the gates are closed (failed to open), the spill release 
will equal to zero and an overtopping failure is taking place [units of water volume/time]. 
 
In simulation, more samples give more stable results. So, it is important to check different 
number of samples (years) in order to check at which number of samples the results will stabilize 
and reach steady state. Matlab simulations, for the two reservoir system, have shown more 
stabilized results at 1000 years sampling period. Thus, in order to get the steady state estimates, 
the simulations are conducted for 1000 years, four seasons each. 
 
Using the connection of both dams to each other (series or parallel), with the inflow dependency 
on each other (dependent or independent inflows), the simulation results for different 
configurations are shown in Table 8. Failure probability of the system of dams depends on the 
connection topology. In case of series connection, the failure is assumed to happen if any of the 
dams fail (dam1 fails or dam2 fails or both of them fail). In the parallel connection, the failure 
happens if both dams fail at the same time (dam1 fails and dam2 fails). It is also assumed that the 
inflows are highly correlated in the configurations having dependent inflows for both dams. 
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Simulation Results Dam 1 Probability 
of Failure 
Dam 2 Probability 
of Failure 
Probability of System 
Failure 
Series Connection , 
Dependent Inflows 
 
 
0.0123  
 
0.001  
 
0.013 
Series Connection, 
Independent Inflows 
 
 
0.0123  
 
0.0147  
 
0.027 
Parallel Connection, 
Dependent Inflows 
 
 
0.0123  
 
0.0022  
 
0.0018 
Parallel connection, 
Independent Inflows 
 
0.0123  
 
0.0112  
 
0.00025 
Table 8: Simulation results for two reservoir system with different configurations 
 
 
 
Different results may be obtained with different inflow rates, different initial conditions of the 
reservoirs (initial water levels in the reservoirs), and different spillway gates’ 
operation/management. 
  
 
It was important to make sure that our code in Matlab produced results that are comparable to a 
software that OPG and many others use. For that reason, the software focusing on the reservoir 
systems and their management/control was used “GoldSim simulation software”. While 
processing the same simulation using the same equations 4.1- 4.6, Matlab and GoldSim had 
exactly the same results for 1000 years, 4 seasons each. 
 
Fig.41 shows the simulations used to estimate the probability of having spill from the system of 
dams (two dams in this case) using GoldSim simulator software for all four configurations a) in 
series with dependent inflows, b) in series with independent inflows, c) in parallel with 
dependent inflows, and d) in parallel with independent inflows. Matlab software was also used to 
conduct the same simulation. Matlab and GoldSim had exactly the same results. See Appendix 2 
for more clear figures of GoldSim system representation. 
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Fig.41: GoldSim simulations of two reservoirs of different configurations for estimating the probability of 
spill 
 
 
 
To represent the two dam reservoir system using BN, Fig.42 shows the BN representations of 
different configurations of the two dam reservoirs used in the simulation, a) in series with 
dependent inflows, b) in series with independent inflows, c) in parallel with dependent inflows, 
and d) in parallel with independent inflows. This representation is conducted using Hugin 
software for BN representation and calculations. 
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Fig.42: BNs of two reservoirs having different configurations  
 
 
In these BNs, each dam is represented using five nodes/variables that include different states. 
These nodes and their states are explained as follows: 
 Flow node: the inflow of the reservoir. It includes two states, high inflow, or low inflow. 
The inflow, with the reservoir level, affects the spill event (excess water more than 
reservoir capacity) of each dam. The probability values of each state (high and low 
inflows) are defined and estimated from the simulation according to the proper system 
analysis. 
 Reservoir Level node: The level of water in the reservoir in every time step. It contains 
two states, high level, or low level. Definition of high state or low state depends on the 
system analysis, and the probability of each state can then be obtained from simulation. 
 Spill node: affected by the inflow and the reservoir level nodes, there would be a spill or 
deficit in the reservoir. But because the water level in the reservoir is governed/regulated 
to be higher than or equal the minimum value (Smin), the states for this node will be 
taken as spill, or no spill. This node determines the probability of having excess water 
more than the reservoir capacity, which needs to be released from behind the dam in 
order not to result in an overtopping failure. Given the states of both the inflow and the 
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reservoir level in every time step, the spill state depends on both parent nodes with 
conditional probabilities that can be determined from the simulation process. 
 Spillway Gate node: the spillway gates are supposed to open during the spill event in 
order to release the spill amount from behind the dam to avoid overtopping failures. If 
these gates fail to open for any reason during the spill event, a failure is assumed to 
happen. So, this node includes two states, open, or failed to open. According to the 
spillway gates maintenance schedules, there should be an estimate for the percentage of 
time during the year that the gates tend to fail or not operate, which may be conditioned 
on other conditions, for example,  reservoir water level. In simulation, random generation 
of 1’s and 0’s indicating the gates to be opened or closed, respectively, at every time step 
is helpful in determining the probability of dam failure according to the state of the gates 
during spill events. 
 Dam Failure: at the spill events, if the spillway gates failed to open, dam failure occurs. 
The two different states of this node are failure or no failure. 
Another node called “Dam System Failure” is added to the BN to predict the probability that 
the system of dams will fail according to the way of connection (series or parallel). Fig.43, 
Fig.44, Fig.45, and Fig.46, show the BN representations for different connections/topologies of 
the two dam reservoir system under study using Hugin software. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.43: BN of two reservoirs in series with dependent inflows 
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Fig.44: BN of two reservoirs in series with independent inflows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.45: BN of two reservoirs in parallel with dependent inflows 
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Fig.46: BN of two reservoirs in parallel with independent inflows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the probability estimates obtained from simulation are fed to the BNs represented in 
Fig.43, Fig.44, Fig.45, and Fig.46 through their probability tables, the probabilities of failure can 
be estimated using the Bayesian equations (i.e. equations 2.4 – 2.6). According to the work 
presented in this chapter, the simulation for this system, which is relatively of low complexity, 
resulted in failure probabilities that were close to those estimated from BNs when supported by 
simulation. Table 9 shows the Basic Probability Tables (BPTs) and Conditional Probability 
Tables (CPTs) for the BN representation of two reservoirs in series with dependent inflows using 
the probability estimates from the simulation stage. The results of failure probabilities, using 
BN-simulation integration (i.e. SSBN), are shown in Table 10 and Fig.47. 
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Table 9: BPTs and CPTs for the BN representation of two reservoirs in series with dependent inflows, using 
probability estimates from simulation 
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BN Results Dam 1 Probability 
of Failure 
Dam 2 Probability 
of Failure 
Probability of System 
Failure 
Series Connection , 
Dependent Inflows 
 
 
0.0105 
 
0.0032 
 
0.011 
Series Connection, 
Independent Inflows 
 
 
0.0105 
 
0.0162 
 
0.024 
Parallel Connection, 
Dependent Inflows 
 
 
0.0105 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
Parallel connection, 
Independent Inflows 
 
0.0105 
 
0.0097 
 
0.0001 
Table 10: BN results for a two reservoir system with different configurations, fed from simulation (SSBN) 
 
 
 
Fig.47: Probabilistic data and results of the BN of two reservoirs in series with dependent inflows 
 
 
The difference in the probabilistic results is coming from the estimated definition of states’ 
margins in the BN (i.e. discretization of states). The detailed simulation is supposed to give the 
exact results. In simulation, for example, the inflow rate may be of intermediate value (neither 
very high nor low), and with a high storage level in the reservoir, spill may be taking place, and 
with the gates closed, failure occurs. But, when the states were defined in the BN, the 
intermediate state of the inflow was not considered (i.e. only high inflow and low inflow were 
considered). Accordingly, the probability of high inflow was obtained from simulation and fed 
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into the BN. However, there is another state called “intermediate inflow” that was not defined 
from the beginning because of the states’ discretization. This also applies to the storage reservoir 
level (High, Intermediate, and Low). In simulation, the more the number of random samples, the 
higher the accuracy of the simulation results. Similarly, for a better accuracy of BN results, a 
higher number of states for every event is expected to provide a higher accuracy of the BN 
results. So, the number of defined states per event/variable should be increased, and the 
probability of every state is estimated from the simulation stage. Then, the probabilities are fed 
to the basic and conditional probability tables of the BN for prediction of system failures. 
 
To test the effect of states’ discretization on the probability estimates from SSBN, the SSBN is 
conducted for both cases of independent inflows (i.e. parallel dams of independent inflows, and 
series dams of independent inflows). Three states are used for inflow of the first dam (i.e. high, 
intermediate, low) instead of two. The second inflow is of three states, in the parallel case, and 
four states, in the series case (i.e. low, intermediate, high, and very high). In the series 
connection, the outflow of the first reservoir affects the inflow of the second one, and this is why 
there is a fourth state called “very high”. For both reservoirs, the reservoir level has three states 
instead of two (i.e. full level, half level, and low level). Table 11 compares the probability 
estimates of system failure from Simulation, SSBN of two states per event, and SSBN of more 
number of states per event (i.e. 3-4 states). 
 
  
Probability of System 
Failure 
(Simulation) 
 
 
Probability of System 
Failure 
(SSBN, 2 states) 
 
Probability of System 
Failure 
(SSBN, 3-4 states) 
 
Series Connection, 
Independent Inflows 
 
 
0.027 
 
0.024 
 
0.025 
 
Parallel connection, 
Independent Inflows 
 
 
0.00025 
 
0.0001 
 
0.00014 
Table 11: Effect of increased number of states on the SSBN results for a system of two dams 
 
It is obvious from Table 11 that increasing the number of states affected the system failure 
probability. In the series connection, it is clear that the increased number of states led to an 
increase in the failure probability and reduced the difference between the results of simulation 
(i.e. exact results) and the SSBN results. In the parallel case, the probability of failure from 
simulation is 0.00025 over 4000 seasons (the system failure happens only in one season). This 
kind of low estimate makes it hard for the SSBN to converge to the simulation results unless a 
large number of discretized sates are used in the BN representation. However, the results are 
better with the increased number of states illustrated in Table 11. Accordingly, to have more 
accurate estimates from the SSBN, more number of states for every variable should be defined. 
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Here, the advantage of simulation over BN is clear, that is, there is no discretization error in 
simulation unlike in BN. 
The SSBN concept starts with decomposing the complex system/network to smaller less 
complex networks, like the one proposed in the two dam reservoir system. Once all the smaller 
networks are simulated and represented probabilistically, they are ready to be re-
composed/aggregated to the whole network for prediction of the system failure. And in worst 
cases, which is the one considered in this section, with defining only two states for every BN 
node (i.e. less accurate), the results of the simulation versus the SSBN are close.  
 
It must be noted that the probabilistic estimates from simulation or SSBN (in Table 8 and Table 
10) are steady state estimates that can be used in predicting failure probabilities in future time 
periods (e.g. 20, 50, 100, or 200 years). The following equation 4.7, which depends on binomial 
distribution, can be used for that purpose: 
  
                              P(failure)in n years
 
= 1 – [(1- P(failure)s.s)
n
]            Eqn. 4.7 
 
Table 12 shows the results of using the above equation to predict the probabilities of system 
failure in different future time periods using the steady state probability estimates of SSBN in 
Table 10. 
 Probability of 
System Failure 
(S.S) 
Probability of 
System Failure 
(20 years) 
Probability of 
System Failure 
(50 years) 
Probability of 
System Failure 
(100 years) 
Series Connection , 
Dependent Inflows 
 
 
0.011 
 
0.1985 
 
0.425 
 
0.6692 
Series Connection, 
Independent Inflows 
 
 
0.024 
 
0.385 
 
0.703 
 
0.912 
Parallel Connection, 
Dependent Inflows 
 
 
0.001 
 
0.0198 
 
0.0488 
 
0.0952 
Parallel connection, 
Independent Inflows 
 
0.0001 
 
0.001998 
 
0.004988 
 
0.00995 
Table 12: Predicting failure probabilities for future time periods from SSBN steady state estimates 
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4.5 Summary 
A proposed methodology for representing and quantifying complex engineering systems is 
developed based on simulation and BN techniques for the purpose of probabilistic failure 
analysis. The proposed methodology deals with the whole system as sub-entities that are 
analysed using simulation models, with the integration of other different sources of data. This 
methodology adds another potential in facilitating the way by which complex systems are 
represented and probabilistically quantified as BNs. The proposed SSBN concept has been 
applied to a pilot case study of two dam reservoirs, and results are compared to detailed 
simulation results in order to analyse the difference for a relatively small system, that may act or 
be presented as a BN sub-entity. It was shown that performing simulation for this system, which 
was relatively of low complexity, resulted in failure probabilities that were, in worst cases, close 
to those estimated from BN-simulation integration.  
It is also shown how the SSBN can be used to decompose a complex system to a number of less 
complex sub-systems (sub-networks) simulated together in the meantime. The BN of the entire 
system is then fed by the probabilistic information from simulations, resulting in a representation 
that can be used for failure analysis of complex systems (i.e. failure prediction and identification 
of causes).  
The acyclic behaviour is one limitation in the BN representation. Moreover, updating the 
networks when any new data becomes available is challenging especially in the intermediate 
nodes (i.e. neither root nodes nor leaf nodes). The update should be in both directions (i.e. top-
bottom, and bottom-top), which is not possible while using the BN, that only relies on one 
direction. In the next chapter, a novel concept is developed to overcome these obstacles using 
Markov Chains.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Markov Chain Simulation Supported Bayesian Network 
(MCSSBN) Concept for Probabilistic Failure Analysis 
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5.1 Introduction 
Simulation Supported Bayesian Network (SSBN) can help solve complex systems using a 
flexible decompositional method. But the BN has one limitation, that it is an acyclic graphical 
representation. In order to take decisions regarding any complex system that has many 
interrelationships among its components, different scenarios/states of the system should be 
represented. The scenarios/states of the system may be cyclic, and not only acyclic like in BNs. 
For the scenarios/states to be cyclic means having transitions from one scenario/state to a new 
one, with the chance to get to the first scenario/state again creating one cycle. To overcome only 
acyclic limitation of the BN, this chapter adds Markov Chain (Markov Analysis) to the SSBN to 
form the Markov Chain Simulation Supported Bayesian Network (MCSSBN). This is 
considered an approach that develops integration between cyclic (Markov Analysis) and acyclic 
(BN) networks. In this chapter, MCSSBN concept is explained in details by representing its 
different approaches. The MCSSBN will then be applied on a system of two series reservoirs of 
independent inflows, having the same constraints of the system used in the SSBN application 
procedure. There are mainly two approaches to apply MCSSBN, 1- First approach: low level 
BNs and high level Markov Chains, and 2- Second approach: low level Markov Chains and high 
level BNs.  
 
 
5.2 Cyclic and Acyclic Graphical Representations 
An acyclic graph is a graph without cycles, where a cycle is a complete circuit. When following 
the graph from node to node, the same node will never be visited twice, unlike the network in 
Fig.48, which shows a cycle for a number of nodes/vertices. 
 
 
Fig.48: A cycle with n vertices [99] 
 
A path in a directed graph can be described by a sequence of edges having the property that the 
ending vertex of each edge in the sequence is the same as the starting vertex of the next edge in 
the sequence. A path forms a cycle if the starting vertex of its first edge equals the ending vertex 
of its last edge. A directed acyclic graph is a directed graph, through direction of arrows/edges, 
which has no cycles. Bayesian Networks (BNs) are Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). Fig.49 
shows a DAG for a number of nodes. 
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Fig.49: Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) 
 
Accordingly, cyclic graphs are those which have complete cycles, means the same node can be 
visited twice. Fig.50 shows different directed cycles (blue) that are included in an upper layer of 
directed acyclic network (orange). 
 
Fig.50: Directed Acyclic Graph (orange) of Directed Cyclic Graphs (blue) 
 
The graphical representation in Fig.50 shows that for every node in the acyclic network (e.g. BN) 
there might be directed cycles for all the possible states within this node. Markov Chain Analysis 
is a mathematical probabilistic representation that can be used to describe these directed cycles. 
 
 
5.3 Markov Chain Analysis 
The Markov process is a random process in which changes occur continuously over a period of 
time, where the future depends only on the present state, and is independent of the past history. 
Markov Analysis (MA) is a probabilistic technique that provides probabilistic information about 
a decision situation that may help the decision maker, but without providing a recommended 
decision. It can be used to model system performance, dependability, availability, reliability, and 
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safety. So, Markov Analysis is a descriptive technique, not an optimization technique, which 
results in probabilistic information, and is applicable to systems that exhibit probabilistic 
movement from one state/condition to another, over time. MA may also be shown as a 
mathematical abstraction to model simple or complex concepts in a computable form. It is a tool 
for modeling complex system designs involving timing, sequencing, repair, redundancy, and 
fault tolerance, along with determining the system availability in order to identify the flow of the 
system and enumerate the failure rate (forward), repair rate (backward), and the probability of 
failure of the different components. Any Markov model can be graphically represented using 
Markov diagram, which consists of the states and transitions of the model. The transition 
probabilities, and transition rates, among the different states, within the system diagram, are of a 
great importance in the Markov Analysis. Transition rates represent the rate at which the Markov 
chain moves from one state to another. The transition rate from a working state to a failed state is 
represented by the failure rate, whereas the transition from a failed state to working state is 
represented by the repair rate.  The transitions are represented by the connections linking the 
circular states, with arrows indicating the transition direction (directed graph). 
In reliability analysis, MA has the following advantages: 
 The Markov model allows for modelling and investigating the system in terms of model 
parameters, along with assessing the probability of failure (probability of decreased 
performance), 
 Markov graphical representation helps in understanding the system behavior, 
 Modelling systems with their state diagrams, and in terms of the interdependencies of 
states, is more accurate in specific situations, 
 For observation purposes, MA allows for specifying different types of states and state 
groups. 
A Markov chain is a sequence of random variables X1,.., Xn such that, given the present state, the 
future and past are independent. It is formally written as follows in equation 5.1: 
Prob (Xn+1 = x | X1 = x1, X2 = x2,…, Xn = xn) = Prob (Xn+1 = x | Xn = xn)   Eqn. 5.1 
 
In other words, the conditional distribution of Xn+1 in future depends only upon the present state 
Xn. Usually, the chain is defined by specifying the probabilities of transitioning from one state to 
another. The state space may be considered to be continuous and sometimes discrete. For a 
continuous state space where a probability density can be defined, the transition probability can 
be written as P(x, y) = Prob (Xn+1 = y | Xn = x). For a discrete state space, the transition 
probability is a matrix and is written as Pxy, [100]. 
So, if the chain is currently in state si, then it moves to state sj at the next step with a probability 
denoted by pij, then, this probability does not depend upon which states the chain was in before 
the current state. The transitions among different states in the Markov Chain are represented by 
the Transition Probability Matrix (TPM). This matrix is also called the matrix of transition 
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probabilities, or the transition matrix. For a Markov Chain of three states, the Transition 
Probability Matrix (TPM) can be represented as follows (see Fig.51 for a three state Markov 
Chain showing their transition probabilities): 
 
 
TPM = (
𝑃11 𝑃12 𝑃13
𝑃21 𝑃22 𝑃23
𝑃31 𝑃32 𝑃33
) 
 
Where, for example, P22 is the probability that the variable is currently in the second state, and 
will remain in the second state in the next step. While P32 is the probability that the variable is 
currently at the third state and will move to the second state in the next step (moves to second 
state given that it was at the third state).  
 
Fig.51: Markov Chain of three states S1, S2, S3 
 
 
5.4 Markov Chain Simulation Supported Bayesian Network (MCSSBN)  
The decompositional approach conducted in [97] and [98], allowed the researcher in this thesis 
to conceptualize and formulate a new concept and methodology in dealing with BNs of complex 
systems. The concept of Simulation Supported Bayesian Networks (SSBNs), developed in this 
thesis, is expected to be an efficient method of applying decompositions to complex networks. 
Moreover, the Bayes-Markov (Cyclic-Acyclic) combination, proposed in [98], represents a way 
of supplementing Markov chains with additional low-level features taken from multiple sources, 
and are efficiently combined using Bayesian Networks. Since quantification of BNs depends on 
basic and conditional probabilities, and Markov Chains are represented by transition 
(conditional) probabilities among different states, the Markov-Bayesian combination is a 
probabilistically quantified representation. Adding Markov Chains, which may represent 
different scenarios, states, or events in a cyclic representation, to the BNs, of which the acyclic 
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nature may not be suitable for all complex structures, will result in a more generalized approach 
that fits most of the large complex system structures. Such structures, with their complex 
interrelations among system components, usually have slow processing for calculating failure 
probabilities. Bayes-Markov combination is estimated to reduce this problem in such systems.  
Now, with the decompositional approach, represented by SSBNs, the question is how to 
incorporate Markovian analysis to determine different scenarios, states, or events, which may 
take place at different times in the system network. In this section, the concept of Markov Chain 
Simulation Supported Bayesian Network (MCSSBN), cyclic-acyclic approach, is introduced.  
Hidden Markov Chains, and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) models, are not new 
concepts/methods. Hidden Markov Chains are used in different applications to introduce the 
states’ transitions while taking time into consideration. Such models are known to be dynamic 
models because of the time representation. Differently, MCMC models are providing a 
combination of simulation results, and simulation updated results, to the Markov Chain to 
produce more efficient updated output results. See [99], [100], [101], and [102]. 
According to [101], hidden Markov model is a tool for representing probability distributions over 
sequences of observations in which time is incorporated. Fig.52 shows a BN with a hidden 
Markov model depending on output observations. 
 
𝑃(𝑆1:𝑇, 𝑌1:𝑇) = 𝑃(𝑆1)𝑃(𝑌1|𝑆1)ℿ𝑡=2
𝑇  𝑃(𝑆𝑡|𝑆𝑡−1)𝑃(𝑌𝑡|𝑆𝑡) 
 
Fig.52: A BN with a hidden Markov model [101] 
 
The combination of hidden Markov models and BNs may be called Dynamic Bayesian Network 
(DBN), which is simply a BN that models time series data. Fig.53 is for a BN structured hidden 
Markov model depending on input observations (X’s) and output observations (Y’s). It is shown 
that a number of Markov Chains may be required to represent this system. Every system variable 
is supposed to have its own Markov Chain, which makes the system representation more 
complex especially in large system structures. 
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Fig.53: A BN structured hidden Markov model [101] 
 
References [101] and [102] use hidden Markov models with Bayesian Networks to update 
information/data of the system network using any available evidences, with incorporating time 
dependent states into the network. Ref [99] is trying to mathematically prove a generalization for 
Bayesian Networks to allow directed cycles using the case of an isolated cycle. References [103], 
[104], [105], [106], and [107] show different methodologies to solve some problems using 
Markov Chains and/or Bayesian Networks from different perspectives for different engineering 
applications. 
There is a need for a general global methodology to be applied to all engineering applications for 
risk and reliability problems. It can be shown from the reviewed literature that the relation 
between Markov models, representing cyclic networks, and Bayesian Networks, representing 
acyclic networks, is still vague and needs clarification, especially for many complex networks of 
different engineering applications. The missing link between Markov Chains and BNs may be 
the simulation. The distinction of the concept proposed in this research is that it combines the 
three concepts together: BN, Simulation, and Markov Chains in one combination in order to be 
applied to almost all of the engineering applications. This forms the Markov Chain Simulation 
Supported Bayesian Network (MCSSBN) cyclic-acyclic approach in systems analysis. Like 
SSBN, the system is decomposed to smaller sub-networks to be simulated in smaller scale in 
order to estimate their probabilities. Then, they can be re-combined to the unified larger scale 
BN. In this section, combining Markov Analysis to the SSBN is of interest. Within the smaller 
scale sub-networks, that are being simulated, there might be some scenarios of interest, or time 
variant states/variables that need to be considered in the process of failure prediction 
(forecasting), or even in the decision making. The proposed MCSSBN methodology depends, 
theoretically, on two different approaches:  
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5.4.1 First Approach of MCSSBN  
In this approach, the system is represented with high level Markov Chains, and low level BNs, 
for different scenarios. The SSBN concept is the corner stone. Decomposing the BN to lower 
level BN sub-networks, with running simulations for them, according to available data, is the 
first step of this approach. Running the simulation for every sub-network makes it obvious that it 
may experience more than one scenario. Scenario is a combination of states for all the nodes 
included in every sub-network. According to that combination, the scenario is defined. So, the 
results from simulating every BN sub-network are used to define at which scenario the sub-
network is, or to define different scenarios that the sub-network may experience. Then, given the 
scenarios and simulation probabilistic results for all the sub-networks, sub-networks will be re-
combined/aggregated back to the higher level network. The Bayesian inference in the higher 
level, larger scale BN will result in the probabilistic output that is required (for example, the 
probability of failure). While the transition probabilities among different scenarios in every sub-
network are estimated from simulation, the most probable scenario to take place in the next time 
step can be predicted for every sub-network. Then, the probability of failure of the system can be 
predicted in the next time step. Moreover, the scenarios that have more contribution to the failure 
can be obtained, and the scenarios of sub-networks which result in higher failure probability can 
also be identified. Fig.54a and Fig.54b show a 23 node BN before and after being decomposed to 
four BN sub-networks, respectively. In this network, every BN sub-network should be simulated 
using its available data. By running simulations, different scenarios of every BN sub-network 
may be defined or identified with different states of the sub-network nodes. The probabilistic 
results of each scenario should be estimated from the simulation stage. Moreover, the transition 
probabilities among different scenarios should be obtained while simulating the sub-networks. A 
Markov Chain should then be built for every BN sub-network. Fig.55 and Fig.56 show Markov 
Chains having transition probabilities for a three scenario BN sub-network and a two scenario 
BN sub-network, respectively, which are parts of the BN shown in Fig.54b.  
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Fig.54a: A 23 node BN 
 
 
Fig.54b: A 23 node BN being decomposed to 4 BN sub-networks 
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Fig.55: Markov Chain of a three scenario BN sub-network 
 
 
Fig.56: Markov Chain of a two scenario BN sub-network 
 
In conclusion, in this approach, the processing steps for the system network are as follows: 
1- The BN of the system is decomposed to BN sub-networks, 
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2- Every BN sub-network is simulated according to its available data, or with random 
sampling. Simulation results in probabilistic information (basic and conditional 
probabilities) of the nodes and their interrelationships. Simulation is also used to identify 
different scenarios for every sub-network, steady state probability distribution of the 
scenarios, and the transition probabilities among these scenarios. At steady state, the 
relation between steady state probability distribution of Markovian states and the steady 
state transition probability matrix is given by the following equation 5.2: 
                                                                    ℿ TPMs.s = ℿ                                                 Eqn. 5.2 
where:  
TPMs.s is the steady state transition matrix, and ℿ is the row vector of steady state 
probability distribution of the Markovian states. 
3- The BN sub-networks are re-combined back to the entire system BN, and the probability 
of system failure can be predicted using Bayesian inference, 
4- Then, by using the transition probabilities from a scenario to another, for every sub-
network, the probability of failure can be predicted according to the new scenarios, and 
linked probabilistically, through transition probabilities, to the initial scenarios, 
5- With any evidence in the BN of the entire system, the posterior Bayesian inference 
facilitates determining the main contributing scenarios/states to the evidence (failure in 
this research). This will make it easier to determine which BN sub-network had more 
contribution in the failure, and which of its scenarios, represented by Markov Chains, is 
more contributing to the failure.  
In this approach of MCSSBN, the driving force is the BN sub-network simulation. The 
simulation results, according to different data inputs, identify at which scenario the sub-network 
is operating, and also reflect the transitions among different scenarios. In this case, MCSSBN 
can be seen as a clustered SSBN. Every cluster represents a sub-network, which has different 
scenarios linked through sequence of transitions.  
 
 
5.4.2 Second Approach of MCSSBN 
In this approach, the system is represented with low level Markov Chains and a high level BN. In 
this case, Markov states are the driving force for the probabilistic prediction process in the whole 
network. For every node in the BN, there are at least two states. The node’s states may be 
represented as a low level Markov Chain that controls the states every time step within the node. 
For example, in a reservoir problem, if the node of inflow of the dam is represented by three 
states, high, intermediate, or low inflows. The transitions among the three states may be known 
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from the historical data that, for example, the inflow is higher in the spring and fall than winter, 
and the inflow of fall is higher than that of the spring. The data available in this case defines the 
transition probabilities of this sequence. This means that every node takes its state from its own 
lower level Markov Chain. Running simulation is the start point. Decomposing the network to 
smaller sub-networks is used to facilitate the simulation process. Then, simulation is used to 
estimate the steady state probability distribution of the Markov states in every node and the 
transitions among Markov states within every node/variable. Fig.57a shows a 17 node BN, which 
has nodes that include two states each (at least), as shown in Fig.57b. Fig.57c shows the same 
network with a lower level two state Markov Chain (shown in Fig.58 with transition 
probabilities) for the states inside every state variable. At every time step, the state of the lower 
level Markov Chain will be reflected to be the state of the BN node. 
 
 
 
Fig.57a: A 17 node BN 
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Fig.57b: A 17 node BN, with every node includes two states (at least) 
 
 
 
Fig.57c: A 17 node BN, with every node includes a two state Markov Chain 
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Fig.58: Two state Markov Chain for every node 
 
 
In conclusion, in this approach, the processing steps for the system network are as follows: 
1- The states of every node in the BN are defined. A Markov Chain is constructed for the 
states in every node, with defining transition probabilities from available data (or from 
the simulation stage), 
2- The decompositional SSBN approach is applied using available data, or using randomly 
generated samples. The purpose of applying SSBN is to determine the probability 
estimates of all the states in all the nodes included in the BN. In that order, the whole BN 
is decomposed to smaller sub-networks that are simulated separately to estimate the 
required probabilistic information for all possible states, and to identify the transition 
probabilities among states in every node, 
3- Now, every Markov state is defined by its steady state probability, and the transition 
probabilities among different states within the same node, are also identified using 
equation 5.2. 
4- All the probabilistic information are combined to the entire high level network in order to 
estimate the probability of failure (the required probability),  
5- At every time step, the failure probability of the system’s entire BN can be estimated, and 
linked probabilistically, through transition probabilities, to the initial states. For the next 
time step, the most probable state to take place in every node can be predicted using the 
transition probabilities of Markov Chains within system nodes. Then, the required 
probability (i.e. failure probability) of the BN is dynamically estimated at this point. 
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5.5 Methods of Applying MCSSBN to a System of Three Dam Reservoirs 
In this section, the two approaches of MCSSBN are applied, theoretically, on a system of three 
series reservoirs, with three independent inflows. The purpose is to show that the method can be 
expanded to more number of system components. The aim is to estimate the probability of 
failure of the whole system according to the operating conditions/events of the three dams. 
Fig.59 shows a BN for three dam reservoirs connected in series. 
 
Fig.59: A BN of a three reservoir system 
 
The specifications, characteristics, and underlying assumptions of the three reservoir system, are 
similar to those reservoirs defined in section 4.4. The three dam reservoirs, of the same 
characteristics and operational conditions, are connected in series, with their inflows to be 
independent. The controlled outflow (actual outflow) and spill release, which are released from 
the first dam according to the gates management, may also be added to the inflow of the second 
dam, and so forth for the third dam. In this case, the system fails if any of the dams fails at any 
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time (i.e. Dam1 or Dam2 or Dam3 or all fail), as it is a series connection. In the BN of this 
system, each dam is represented using five nodes/variables that include different states. These 
nodes and their states are explained in section 4.4. The node that is named “Dam System 
Failure” is added to the BN to predict the probability that the system of dams will fail according 
to the way of connection (series in this case). The proposed MCSSBN concept can be applied, 
theoretically, on this three reservoir system, using both MCSSBN approaches, in the next 
sections. 
 
5.5.1 MCSSBN First Approach 
By applying the first approach of MCSSBN, the BN of the three dams can be decomposed to 
four BN sub-networks as shown in Fig.60. It can be seen that every dam reservoir is taken as one 
BN sub-network. The last sub-network is for the dams’ failure and the system failure. 
 
 
Fig.60: Three reservoir system BN decomposed to four sub-networks 
 
From Fig.55 and Fig.56, it can be seen that a Markov Chain can be constructed for different 
scenarios of every sub-network. The system shown here, in this section, is for the overtopping 
hazards, so, each scenario is considered a combination of states that results in an overtopping 
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failure with higher or lower probability. For example, the first scenario (i.e. combination of 
states) may be with high inflow, intermediate reservoir level, and the spillway gates are closed, 
while the second scenario is for high inflow and high reservoir level, with the spillway gates 
closed, and so forth. Different scenario for every dam will result in a different scenario for the 
system failure. Then, the BN sub-networks are used to construct a high level BN for the system 
as shown in Fig.61.  
This approach may also be generalized for dam failure events. In a more general BN, the first 
scenario for each dam may be overtopping, the second is sliding, and the third scenario is 
seepage piping, and these scenarios may be represented by a three state Markov Chain as shown 
in Fig.62. 
 
 
 
Fig.61: General three reservoir BN, decomposed to four sub-networks 
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Fig.62: Markov Chain of a three scenario reservoir BN sub-network (Overtopping, Sliding, or Seepage) 
 
 
 
 
5.5.2 MCSSBN Second Approach 
For the three reservoir system in Fig.59, the second approach of MCSSBN can be applied as 
shown in Fig.63, where each node or state variable in the BN may include a lower level Markov 
Chain with at least two states. The Markov Chain takes the decision for the state of every 
node/variable. When the states change at every time step the output results from the BN will also 
change.  
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Fig.63: BN of a three reservoir system, with every node includes a lower level Markov Chain 
 
As an example, assume that at a certain time, the first dam is of low inflow, low reservoir level, 
with open gates, and the second dam is of high inflow, low reservoir level, with closed gates, 
while the third dam is of high inflow, high reservoir level, and open gates. For this case, failure 
probabilities will be totally different than another combination of states of the entire network 
after a number of time steps. It can be seen that this approach takes the combination of states to 
produce a scenario for the entire network, not for just a sub-network like in the first approach. 
The sub-networks here are only used for simulations to identify probabilistic information for the 
nodes and their states.  
In conclusion, the system is decomposed to four sub-networks, shown in Fig.60, to be simulated 
in order to get all the probabilistic information for all the possible states of the nodes. When the 
transition probabilities among states in the lower level Markov Chains are defined, at every time 
(i.e. t-1, t, t+1, etc.) the state of every node can be predicted. Thus, at any time, the states of the 
nodes, their probabilities, and transition probabilities from previous states, are defined. This 
information is combined to the entire network to estimate the probability of failure of the system 
of the three dams. A higher level Markov Chain may be constructed for the entire network to 
show the transitions among different BN cases/scenarios as shown in Fig.64 for the BN of Fig. 
60. In Fig. 64, the combination of states of the state variables of the BN (i.e. scenario/state for 
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the entire network) changes at every time step. In other words, at every time step, there is a 
different situation that the entire network experiences. Markov Chain represents the transitions 
among different situations/scenarios (i.e. Markov states) for the entire network. In the next time 
step, the entire network may remain in the same scenario (Markov state), or make a transition to 
another scenario (Markov state). 
 
 
Fig.64: Higher level Markov Chain for the three reservoirs BN, MCSSBN second approach  
 
 
 
5.6 MCSSBN First Approach for Two Series Reservoirs  
In this section, the first approach of MCSSBN, i.e. low level BNs, high level Markov Chains, 
and higher level BN, is applied to a system of two series reservoirs of independent inflows. In 
order to apply the MCSSBN concept with this approach, the following steps are followed: 
1- The two reservoir system is decomposed to three sub-systems (sub-networks), the first 
reservoir sub-system, the second reservoir sub-system, and the system failure sub-system, 
as shown in Fig.65 
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Fig.65: BN of two series reservoirs of independent inflows decomposed to three sub-networks 
 
2- The system is simulated according to the system constraints (minimum and maximum 
reservoir capacities) and with randomly generated data for inflows and the states of the 
spillway gates over a period of 4000 seasons. 
3- While simulating each dam, it is obvious that the dam failure may happen at different 
states of inflows and reservoir levels. So, combinations of these states are taken into 
consideration.  
4- In this simulation, inflow of the first dam is supposed to have three different states (low, 
intermediate, and high), and reservoir level of the first dam is also having three different 
states (low, intermediate, and high). Combination of states means, for example, to have a 
combination of high inflow with intermediate reservoir level with a failed gate at the spill 
event. 
5- While defining the states of the first dam in the simulation stage, we may have five 
combinations of states (i.e. scenarios) of interest for the first dam. These five scenarios, 
which are all counting for the failure probability of the first dam, are defined as follows 
in Table 13:  
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 Inflow Reservoir Level Gates 
Scenario 1 Low Low Failed to open 
Scenario 2 Intermediate Intermediate Failed to open 
Scenario 3 High High Failed to open 
Scenario 4 Intermediate High Failed to open 
Scenario 5 High Intermediate Failed to open 
Table 13: Scenarios of the first dam reservoir 
6- For these combinations of states (scenarios), a Markovian Transition Probability Matrix 
(TPM) should be constructed for the first dam scenarios, and steady state probability 
distribution, of possible scenarios of interest, should also be estimated. In real world, 
TPM can be concluded from the operation of the dam, or from its exact simulation. It is 
also possible to mimic the possible scenarios by randomly generating the Markov TPM 
for the first dam with five Markovian states. Fig.66 shows an example of a five state 
Markov Chain for the scenarios of interest of the first dam. Fig.67 also shows a randomly 
generated Markov Chain for the five scenarios of interest of the first dam. 
7- The steady state probability distribution of the five different states of Dam1 (Dam1 
scenarios, or combinations of states) is estimated from simulation and fed into the BN 
representation of the first dam. This accounts for the steady state probabilities of 
occurrence of each of the five scenarios for the first dam. 
8- For the second dam, the same procedure is followed to simulate the dam, and to estimate 
or randomly generate the Transition Probability Matrix for its possible scenarios of 
interest. But, this dam will contain seven scenarios (combinations of states) of interest, as 
the inflow of this dam depends also on the outflow of the first dam, which may add two 
more states of interest with the increased inflow rate. Fig.68 shows an example of a seven 
state Markov Chain for the scenarios of interest of the second dam. Fig.69 also shows a 
randomly generated Markov Chain for the seven scenarios of interest of the second dam. 
9- At this point, the simulation results of both dams and the steady state probability 
distributions of the scenarios of interest (combinations of states) of both dams are ready 
to be fed into the higher level simplified BN shown in Fig.70 and Fig.71 to start 
predicting system failure.  
10- The simulation results, and steady state probability distribution of Markovian states 
(estimated from simulation) are the main sources of quantifying the basic and conditional 
probability tables of the higher level BN shown in Fig.71, see Table 14 for basic and 
conditional probability tables of the higher level BN. Quantification is about determining 
the probabilities of occurrence of the states (scenarios) at which the first dam fails, the 
probabilities of occurrence of the states (scenarios) at which the second dam fails, and the 
probabilities of occurrence of the states (scenarios) at which both dams fail. 
11- According to the simulation procedure that was followed, and the randomly generated 
Markov Chain Probability Matrices, the probability of system failure estimated from 
the higher level BN is 0.42%. This probability value is different than what was estimated 
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from the SSBN approach because of the use of randomly generated Markov Transition 
Probability Matrices. These randomly generated data add another source of uncertainty 
that affects the final results. If more data is available about probability distribution and 
actual transitions among states, instead of the randomly generated Markov Chains, more 
accurate results will be obtained from the MCSSBN. The use of randomly generated 
Markov Chains here mimics the dependence on logic inference and/or expert judgement 
that may affect the results by adding sources of uncertainty that may lead to 
overestimates or underestimates. 
12- Till this point, a low level BN was represented and decomposed to sub-networks [Fig.65]. 
The decomposed sub-networks are simulated; a high level Markov chain is constructed 
for every decomposed sub-network to represent different scenarios of interest 
(combinations of states) [Fig.66 and Fig.68]. A higher level BN is represented for the 
entire system and fed from simulation of both dams, and Markov Chains (which should 
also be estimated from simulation) [Fig.70 and Fig.71]. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.66: An example of a Markov Chain for a five scenario BN sub-network of the first reservoir 
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Fig.67: Randomly generated Markov Chain for the five scenario BN sub-network of the first reservoir 
 
 
 
Fig.68: An example of a Markov Chain for a seven scenario BN sub-network of the second reservoir 
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Fig.69: Randomly generated Markov Chain for the seven scenario BN sub-network of the second reservoir 
 
 
Fig.70: Higher level BN for two reservoir system with three sub-networks 
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13- In the higher level BN in Fig.71 and with the evidence that the system has failed, the 
states of both dams that are more contributing to the system failure can be identified. 
Knowing the main contributors to the system failure, and going back to the simulation 
and state definition stage, will let the decision maker know more information about the 
contributors to system failure. In Fig.72, it can be seen that, with the evidence of system 
failure, and according to the randomly generated transition probability matrices, the main 
contributors to system failure are STATE 3 (high inflow, and high reservoir level) in the 
first dam of more than 38% probability, and STATE 7 (very high inflow, and high 
reservoir level) in the second dam of more than 38% probability. 
14- If any new data are available and the system is required to be updated, the sub-network of 
the dam that was affected by the change will be re-simulated, not the entire network. This 
will allow for building a new TPM for the dam (sub-network) having updated data, and 
getting all updated probabilistic results from its simulation. Then, the new probabilistic 
data is fed to the higher level BN for updated prediction of system failure. It is up to the 
decision makers, according to their expertise, to re-simulate the system sub-networks 
every season, every year, or even every month, to have more updated data and more 
accurate and reliable prediction results. 
 
Fig.71: Higher level BN for two reservoir system in Hugin Lite 
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Table 14: Basic and Conditional Probability Tables for the higher level BN for two dam reservoirs 
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Fig.72: The higher level BN given the evidence that system failure took place 
 
15- To compare the MCSSBN and SSBN results while using probability estimates from 
exact simulations, the steady state probability distributions of the different scenarios of 
interest of Dam1 and Dam2 are estimated from the simulation stage, and used to quantify 
the BN probability tables. It is found that the system failure probability under the 
same operational conditions is about 1.21%, which is almost half what was obtained in 
the SSBN case. The main difference is that only the scenarios (combinations of states) of 
interest are used in the BN representation of MCSSBN, which makes a downsizing for 
the results to be within the scenarios of interest taken by the decision maker. It is up to 
the decision maker to include as much scenarios of interest as possible to study and 
analyze the system failure. Increasing the number of scenarios of interest will result in 
more accurate estimates, and approaching the same results of SSBN. The distinction of 
the MCSSBN over the SSBN is having the ability to predict the system failure with 
different operation scenarios using transition probability matrices. 
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5.7 MCSSBN Second Approach for Two Series Reservoirs 
In this section, the second approach of MCSSBN, i.e. low level Markov Chains, high level BNs, 
and higher level Markov Chain, is applied to a system of two series reservoirs of independent 
inflows shown in Fig.73. 
 
Fig.73: BN of two series reservoirs of independent inflows 
 
In this approach, the following steps are followed to apply the MCSSBN concept: 
1- The two reservoir system is decomposed to three sub-systems, the first reservoir sub-
system, the second reservoir sub-system, and the system failure sub-system. See Fig.65 
2- The system is simulated according to the system constraints (minimum and maximum 
reservoir capacities) and with randomly generated data for inflows and the states of the 
spillway gates over a period of 4000 seasons. 
3- While simulating each dam, it is obvious that the dam failure may happen at different 
states of inflows and reservoir levels.  
4- In this simulation, inflow of the first dam is supposed to have three different states (low, 
intermediate, and high), and reservoir level of the first dam also has three different states 
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(low, intermediate, and high). While for the second dam, the inflow is supposed to have 
four states (low, intermediate, high, and very high), and its reservoir level is of three 
states (low, intermediate, and high). The fourth state of the inflow comes from the fact 
that the inflow of the second dam is affected by the releases of the first dam (because 
they are connected in series in this case). 
5- In this approach, instead of having combinations of states (i.e. scenarios) for each dam 
like the first approach, the node of every state variable will have its own lower level 
Markovian states and chain. The state variables in this case are the inflow rate of the first 
dam, the reservoir level of the first dam, the inflow rate of the second dam, and the 
reservoir level of the second dam. 
6- For every state variable, a Markovian Transition Probability Matrix (TPM) should be 
constructed. In real world, TPM can be estimated from the operation of the dam, or from 
its exact simulation. The Markov TPM may also be randomly generated for each of the 
four state variable nodes. See Fig.74, Fig.75, Fig.76, and Fig.77 for randomly generated 
Markov Chains for the inflow for the first dam, the inflow of the second dam, reservoir 
level of the first dam, and reservoir level of the second dam, respectively.  
 
 
Fig.74: Randomly generated Markov Chain for the three state inflow of the first dam 
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Fig.75: Randomly generated Markov Chain for the four state inflow of the second dam 
 
 
 
 
Fig.76: Randomly generated Markov Chain for the three state reservoir level (storage) of the first dam 
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Fig.77: Randomly generated Markov Chain for the three state reservoir level (storage) of the second dam 
 
 
7- The steady state probability distributions of the different states of the four state variables 
are estimated from simulation in order to be fed into the BN representation of the two 
reservoir system. The Markov transition probability matrices may also be obtained for the 
states of all four state variables. 
8- At this point, the simulation results of both dams and the steady state probability 
distributions of the four state variables in the system are ready to be fed to the BN of the 
system, shown in Fig.73, to start predicting the system failure.  
9- The low level Markov Chains of the state variables (obtained from simulation), along 
with the simulation results, are the main sources of quantifying the basic and conditional 
probability tables of the BN of the system shown in Table 15, which is considered a high 
level BN in this approach (as it contains lower level Markov Chains). Quantification is 
about determining the probabilities of occurrence of the states at which the first dam fails, 
the probabilities of occurrence of the states at which the second dam fails, and the 
probabilities of occurrence of the states at which both dams fail. 
10- According to the simulation procedure that was followed, and the randomly generated 
Markov Chain Probability Matrices, the probability of system failure estimated from 
the high level BN is 0.26% as shown in Fig.78. This probability estimate is different than 
what was estimated from the SSBN approach because of the use of randomly generated 
Markov Transition Probability Matrices. These randomly generated data add another 
source of uncertainty that affects the final results. If more data is available about 
probability distribution and actual transitions among states, instead of the randomly 
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generated Markov Chains, more accurate results will be obtained from the MCSSBN. 
The use of randomly generated Markov Chains here mimics the dependence on logic 
inference and/or expert judgement that may affect the system results by adding sources of 
uncertainty that may lead to overestimates or underestimates. 
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Table 15: BPTs and CPTs of MCSSBN second approach for two series dam reservoirs of independent inflows 
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Fig.78: BN with failure probabilities of a system of two series independent reservoirs using MCSSBN second 
approach 
11- Till this point, low level Markov Chains were represented, while a high level BN, which 
is decomposed to sub-networks shown in Fig.65, is simulated. Having the evidence that 
system has failed, and by using the Bayesian inference, the main contributors to system 
failure can be identified. Knowing the main contributors to system failure, and going 
back to the simulation and state definition stage, will let the decision maker know more 
information about the contributors to system failure. In Fig.79, it can be seen that, with 
the evidence of system failure, and according to randomly generated transition 
probability matrices, the main contributors to system failure are STATE 3 of the inflow 
of the first dam (high inflow rate), STATE 3 of the reservoir level of the first dam (high 
reservoir level), STATE 4 of the inflow of the second dam (very high inflow rate), and 
STATE 3 of the reservoir level of the second dam (high reservoir level). 
12- At every time step, the high level BN is used to predict the system failure during different 
combinations of states (scenarios) for the entire network, not for every dam like in the 
first approach, depending on the transition probabilities among states of the state 
variables. For example, in Fig.80, with the evidence that the first dam has an intermediate 
inflow, while its reservoir has a high level storage, and this happens when the second 
dam has a very high inflow, while its reservoir level is at low storage, the posterior 
probability of system failure, given this combination of evidences, is estimated to be 
0.14%. 
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Fig.79: Main contributors to system failure of a system of two series reservoirs using MCSSBN second 
approach 
 
 
 
Fig.80: Posterior probability of system failure given some evidences in a system of two series reservoirs using 
MCSSBN second approach 
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13- Now, the entire system can be represented with a higher level Markov Chain that shows 
the dynamic scenarios for different combinations of states for the entire system network 
in different time steps. Many combinations of states for the four state variables can be 
defined. These combinations will result in different states of excess water over reservoir 
capacity (spill or no spill) for both dams, along with the randomly generated states for 
spillway gates. Thus, the system failure, depending on Dam1 failure and Dam2 failure, 
will have different probabilities for different combinations of states. Fig.81 shows that the 
entire network can be represented as one scenario (combinations of states). This means 
that dynamic scenarios; or combinations of states, for the whole system network can be 
used to construct a new higher level Markov Chain for different scenarios at different 
time periods according to the operation of all system components. Fig.82 shows a higher 
level Markov Chain constructed for the scenarios of the entire network. At every time 
step, the entire network will experience a scenario (i.e. combination of states or a Markov 
state). In the next time step, the entire network may remain in the same situation/scenario, 
or experience a transition to another situation/scenario (i.e. Markov state) through 
transition probabilities. 
 
 
Fig.81: Higher level scenario (combination of states) for the entire network 
14- If any new data is available and the system is required to be updated, the sub-network of 
the dam that was affected by the change will be re-simulated, not the entire network. This 
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will allow for building new TPMs for the state variables that have updated data, along 
with getting all updated probabilistic results from simulation. Then, the new probabilistic 
data is fed into the high level BN for updated prediction of system failure. It is up to the 
decision makers, according to their expertise, to re-simulate the system sub-networks 
every season, every year, or even every month, to have more updated data and more 
accurate and reliable prediction results. 
 
Fig.82: An example of higher level Markov Chain showing dynamic scenarios (combinations of states) for the entire 
network 
15- To compare the MCSSBN and SSBN results while using probability estimates from 
exact simulations, the steady state probability distributions of the different states of the 
four state variables are estimated from the simulation, and used to quantify the BN 
probability tables. It is found that the system failure probability under the same 
operational conditions is about 2.5%, which is close or similar to what was obtained in 
the SSBN stage. The main difference is that the states’ discretization used in MCSSBN 
includes more states for the inflow and the reservoir level nodes for both dams, which 
makes the results more accurate and converging to the simulation results. The distinction 
of the MCSSBN over the SSBN is having the ability to predict the system failure with 
different operation scenarios using transition probability matrices.  
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5.8 Summary 
Cyclic/acyclic representation may facilitate the prediction process for the system during its 
operation. The transition probabilities among the Markovian states will facilitate the 
determination of the new state of the system in order to predict the probability of failure – in this 
research – under the new conditions, which is supposed to save more time and effort. If there is a 
global change for all - or most of – system variables, re-simulating the entire system will be 
important to probabilistically update the system. The decompositional approach – decomposing 
the system into sub-systems – will then be useful for simulation. MCSSBN concept has been 
explained in details, with possible approaches that can be used to apply the concept to most of 
the engineering applications. This concept is showing potential in updating the network with 
different scenarios, which may be taken into consideration for failure prediction. MCSSBN 
concept was applied, in this chapter, to systems of series dam reservoirs of independent inflows. 
The first and second approaches of MCSSBN were used to apply the concept, and to compare 
the probabilistic results with exact simulations and SSBN results, conducted in the previous 
chapter. The following Table 16 compares the probability of system failure for a system of two 
dam reservoirs connected in series and having independent inflows using different methods, i.e. 
simulation, SSBN using only two states per state variable, SSBN with three to four states per 
variable, and MCSSBN with three to four states per variable in three cases, MCSSBN first 
approach with scenarios of interest (five for the first dam and seven for the second dam), 
MCSSBN first approach with all possible scenarios for dam 1 and dam 2, and MCSSBN second 
approach. It is expected that increasing the number of states per variable in the states’ 
discretization stage will allow for converging to the simulation results.  
 
Method Probability of System Failure  
Simulation 2.7% 
SSBN (two states/variable) 2.4% 
SSBN (3-4 states/variable) 2.5% 
 
MCSSBN 1
st
 approach 
1.21% (scenarios of interest) 
2.5% (all scenarios) 
MCSSBN 2
nd
 approach 2.5% 
Table 16: Comparing probability of system failure using different methods: simulation, SSBN, and MCSSBN 
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Both MCSSBN approaches are distinctive in representing system dynamics acquiring cyclic 
representation within the acyclic BN graph. However, the MCSSBN first approach helps the 
decision makers when certain possible scenarios, of the network sub-systems, are of interest. 
Experts, according to their experience, may choose to analyze the system with some scenarios of 
interest that are most probable to happen. The first approach is also distinctive in overcoming the 
obstacle of BN of being directed graph. If new marginal data is available for any intermediate 
system node, there is a problem in updating the BN in both directions (bottom-top, and top-
bottom). In the MCSSBN first approach, the sub-network, of which the update belongs to, is re-
simulated with the new marginal evidence in order to get probabilistic estimates for the 
combinations of states (scenarios) of the sub-network, not for the system nodes. So, the 
aggregation of system nodes into sub-networks in the higher level BN representation overcomes 
this problem. The second approach of MCSSBN is more distinctive in the cases that data for 
state variables and system components are estimated in the lower levels. However, the MCSSBN 
second approach is expected to be complicated in very large complex systems in which the 
Markov Chain representation will be for a huge number of system variables. Moreover, updating 
the high level BN is challenging in this approach when new marginal data is available for 
intermediate nodes. Accordingly, this approach may be more efficient for future forecasting and 
determination of different scenarios, but not for decision making. 
It can be concluded that supporting the BN with both simulation and Markov Chains makes the 
Bayesian analysis more mature for complex engineering networks. MCSSBN is a higher level 
concept for the decomposition based system analysis. 
In the next chapter, a real-world case study of Mountain Chute Dam, operated by Ontario Power 
Generation (OPG), is represented. As the data available for this dam are limited, it is shown how 
elicited logic inference and expert judgement can be used to quantify the system’s BN for failure 
analysis purposes.  
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CHAPTER 6 
A Real-World Case Study: Mountain Chute Dam 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with a real-world case study of Mountain Chute Dam in Ontario. In this 
system, a number of system variables, nodes, and interactions among system components is 
introduced. Such a system is considered to be complex according to the number of components 
that it includes, and the complex interrelations among these components. Estimating failure 
probability of this system may be challenging using simulation, especially that this system has 
very limited data available, which is an obstacle in probabilistic failure analysis of the system. 
Accordingly, any proposed methodology that relies on simulation like SSBN and MCSSBN 
methods to simulate system decompositions is challenging when data is scarce. Using logically 
inferred data and eliciting information from experts may assist in quantifying the BN of the 
system. This may facilitate the prediction of system failure and identifying the main contributors 
to system failure that may be taken care of in the future. The results from these two information 
sources are compared. Using these sources of information may also help in estimating some 
scenarios of operation for the system under study which may help in identifying the main 
contributors to system failure in different scenarios/situations. 
 
6.2 BN of Mountain Chute 
In section 4.3.2, Mountain Chute Dam and Generating Station are briefly explained. Mountain 
Chute Dam is a part of Madawaska River System of Dams, and has four main structures: main 
concrete dam of 55m high having a power generating station, a weir (Mackie creek weir), and 
two earthen block dams (North dam and White Fish Draw dam). System components were 
illustrated in order to build the BN for this dam, which is shown is Fig.37a in section 4.3.2. 
However, the BN of Mountain Chute is modified in this section to give more details on the 
interdependencies among system components and nodes. The new constructed BN for Mountain 
Chute dam and generating station is represented as follows in Fig.83 (see Appendix 3 for a larger 
scale figure). The nodes in this BN represent: rain/precipitation, inflow, flood severity, 
earthquakes/seismic events, ice loading, efficiency of the weir, water pressure, geology and rock 
type, spill event, electromechanical equipment including hydropower turbines, head gates, 
sliding of the main dam, stability of the earthen dams, seepage in the earthen dams, drainage in 
the main dam, sluice gates of the main dam, overtopping of the main dam, capacity adequacy of 
the sluice way, generated electric power, vegetation control around the earthen dams,  animal 
burrows control around the earthen dams, main dam failure, and earthen dams failure. 
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Fig.83: BN of Mountain Chute dam and generating station 
 
To better understand this BN, it can be analysed as follows: 
1- This BN consists of 24 nodes (events, components, or variables, explained next), and 
combining such multiple factors is the major advantage of the proposed BN based 
method. 
2- The main purpose of this BN is predicting the probability of failure of the main dam 
from overtopping, seepage, or sliding. Moreover, it determines the probability of 
failure of the earthen block dams, controlling the reservoir of Mountain Chute, 
resulting from the threats of seepage or sliding. The posterior capability of the BN 
may also allow for identifying the main contributors to any evidence in the network. 
3- The basic events are rain, ice loading limits, earthquakes, geological and rock 
stability, vegetation control of earthen dams, and control of animal burrows in earthen 
dams (as the main dam is concrete). 
4- The amount of rain affects the inflow to the Mountain Chute Dam. The inflow is 
considered a flood if it exceeded certain limits. This flood may be severe or of less 
severity. 
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5- Flood severity is also affected by the seismic actions and earthquakes. 
6- The flood, with certain severity level, is controlled by Mackie Creek Weir. 
Controlling the inflow is to reduce the river flow rate and prevent severe floods from 
reaching the dam reservoir. The weir may be efficient or not, depending on the flood 
severity. 
7- After passing the weir, the water is blocked by two earthen block dams, and the main 
concrete dam with its generating station, and ready to be controlled by the dam head 
gates. This means there is water pressure behind the dams that may affect their 
stability. 
8- The geological and rock stability for the structure of the three dams should be 
considered as it affects the sliding of the dams. Sliding is one of the causes of dam 
breach failure. 
9- Ice loading, water pressure, and flood severity are connected to the electromechanical 
equipment (including turbines). For example, the ice loading is affecting the failure of 
the mechanical equipment, and with a severe flood and high water pressure, this 
could result in a failure in operating the mechanical components, which leads to dam 
operation failure. 
10- For the electric power generation, the head gates are opened to let the water flow 
through the penstock to generate electricity from hydropower turbines. If the head 
gates failed to open, this is considered a major factor of failure of the main dam, 
especially, if the water pressure is high in the upstream side of the dam, and this may 
affect the dam stability. And for sure, this will affect the amount of power generated 
by the turbines. 
11- The flood severity, the weir efficiency in controlling the inflow to the reservoir, and 
the water pressure, are all affecting the probability to have spill in the main dam. The 
spill is the amount of water that exceeds the reservoir maximum capacity limit. This 
amount should be released from the upstream side to the downstream side through the 
spillway (sluiceway) gates, or an overtopping failure will take place. 
12- The amount of water spill is also related to the capacity of sluiceway, which may not 
be adequate for that amount of water to be discharged, and the condition of the sluice 
gate (open, or failed to open due to electromechanical failure). If there is a 
requirement to spill while there is no way for the water to be released from behind the 
main dam because of the inadequate capacity of the sluiceway, or because the sluice 
gate failed to open, there is an increasing probability (risk) of overtopping failure. 
13- For the main dam, severe floods with increased water pressure increases the 
possibility to have seepage in the body of the main dam. If the seepage is not 
controlled and monitored through a drain system with a drain inspection tunnel, this 
could result in an increasing risk that reduces the remaining life time of the dam. 
Seepage may also result in dam breaching failure. 
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14- For the earthen dams in Mountain Chute, seepage may take place because of 
uncontrolled vegetation and animal burrows and holes in the vicinity of the dams. 
Seepage is an increasing risk for seepage piping and dam breach failure.  
 
6.3 Quantifying the BN Using Available Data and Logic Inference 
In case only limited data are available for nodes/variables of the network, and running 
simulations is complicated for such networks, the data available along with expert judgement and 
logic inference may be used for quantifying the basic and conditional probability tables (BPTs 
and CPTs) of the BN. This section focuses on using the logic inference in quantifying the BN 
and predicting the probability of failure of Mountain Chute dam. And the next section focuses on 
improving the results using expert judgement. 
According to the data available from Ontario Power Generation (OPG), who are the dam 
operators for Mountain Chute Dam and Generating Station, the following probabilistic 
information are estimated: 
 Over a range of 84 years in the area of Mountain Chute Dam (even before construction), 
the rain depth can be classified as low (less than 60 mm), or high (more than 60 mm) 
with the following probabilities: 
P(rain depth = low < 60 mm) = 429/1204 
P(rain depth = high > 60 mm) = 775/1204 
These data are concluded from monthly data over 84 years, and it can be useful in 
determining the probability of having severe flood, or flood with less severity. It is 
important to mention that low and high rain depths are assumed discretized states to help 
quantifying the BN of the system. For more accurate results, more discretized states can 
be assumed for this node. 
 Mountain Chute has two hydro power turbines (units 1 & 2), with capacity (rating) of 75 
MVA each. For each turbine, the electric output (in MW) is assumed to be LOW if it is 
less than 30 MW, INTERMEDIATE if it is less than 60 MW, and HIGH electric output if 
higher than or equal 60 MW. According to OPG analysis for the relation between 
different head levels and the electric output from each turbine depending on the discharge 
in the penstock of each unit, the following probabilistic information were estimated for 
all different possibilities: 
P(low electric output)= 360/1006 
P(intermediate electric output)= 360/1006 
P(high electric output)= 286/1006 
P(low elec. output | low head) =  120 /317 
P(Intermediate elec. output | low head) =  120 /317 
P(high elec. output | low head) =   77 /317 
P(low elec. output | intermediate head) =  120 /335 
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P(intermediate elec. output | intermediate head) = 120 /335 
P(High elec. output | intermediate head) =  95 /335 
P(Low elec. output | high head) =  120 /354 
P(intermediate elec. output | high head) =  120 /354 
P(high elec. output | high head) =  114 /354 
 
The maximum discharge per turbine was found to be about 220.8 CMS. This value is the 
maximum discharge that each penstock can withstand. The three states of electric output 
and water head levels (i.e. low, intermediate, and high) are assumed discretized states to 
help quantifying the BN of the system. For more accurate results, more discretized states 
can be assumed for this node. 
 The efficiency of Hydro Power turbines (unit 1 & 2) is 50 %. This means that unit 1 is 
available for 50% of the time while unit 2 is out (for forced outage, scheduled outage, 
sudden outage, maintenance, or any other reason), and vice versa. So, it is considered that 
only one turbine is operating at any time.  
 
6.3.1 BN Input Data and Results 
In this section, the BN of Mountain Chute Dam is quantified using the limited data available, 
logically inferred data, and assumed data. The data available are limited to the data that was 
provided by OPG and discussed in section 6.3. The logically inferred data are inferred according 
to the understanding of the system components discussed in section 6.2.  
The following Basic Probability Tables (BPTs) and Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) 
shown in Table 17 are considered for determining the states of each node of the BN, where the 
probabilistic quantification depends on the data available, logic inferencing, and assumed data. 
Probabilistic data in these tables represents an estimated 100 years operation of Mountain Chute 
Dam.  
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Table 17: BPTs and CPTs of the BN of Mountain Chute dam 
 
Quantification of the above tables, according to available data, and logic inference, is explained 
as follows: 
 Rain/Precipitation is either LOW or HIGH state. According to the available data of 
rain depth, LOW is about 0.36 probability, while HIGH is about 0.64 probability.  
 For earthquakes/seismic events, it is supposed that the dam is built in an area with 
limited seismic activity. So, the probability to have severe earthquakes is limited. 
 Ice loading could be considered as NOT SAFE only during the winter season, which 
counts for about 5 months per year. For the rest of the year, ice loading is not taken 
into consideration. 
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 Inflow states may be high, intermediate, or low depending on the rain/precipitation. 
Depending on logic inference, if the rain depth is low, the inflow is assumed to be 
low with 0.9 probability, and intermediate by 0.1, while if the rain depth is high, the 
inflow is assumed to be 0.75 probable to be high, 0.2 probable to be intermediate, and 
0.05 low. 
 Mackie Creek Weir is assumed to be efficient for 70% of the time in controlling the 
flood flow rate (logically inferred). 
 If Mackie Creek Weir is not efficient in controlling the flood, there is an increased 
probability to have higher water pressure. 
 For Geology and rock type stability, it is logically inferred that the dam is already 
constructed in a geologically stable area. Thus, the probability of having stable 
geological formation is assumed to be 0.7. 
 The probability of having excess water more than the reservoir capacity (i.e. spill) 
increases with severe floods and lack of efficiency of the weir to control the flood 
flow rate, which will also affect the water pressure (low, normal, or high). If the weir 
is not efficient during a severe flood, resulting in an increased water pressure, the 
probability to have excess water would be 100%.  The spill probability decreases with 
less severe floods, increased efficiency of the weir, and less water pressure. 
 Failure of electromechanical equipment of the main concrete dam is affected by the 
non-safe ice loading limits, severe floods, and high water pressures.  
 The head gates are assumed to operate for 50% of the time it is required to operate, 
and fail to operate for the other 50% of the time. Thus, the probability of failure 
(failed to open) of the head gates is taken to be 0.5 (this is an assumption because the 
data of maintenance/outage schedules is not available). 
 Water pressure and stability of geological and rock formations affect the stability of 
the three dams (main concrete dam, and the two block dams). 
 It is concluded from the dam’s data that the sluiceway capacity is not adequate for the 
peak outflow of the maximum design flood (Probable Maximum Flood, PMF). Thus, 
the probability to have inadequate sluiceway capacity (i.e. discharge capacity 
adequacy node) is assumed to be 0.8 (logically inferred). 
 The state of the sluice gates to be opened or closed (failed to open) depends on the 
state of the electromechanical equipment. If the electromechanical equipment has 
failure, it means that the sluice gates fail. 
 The electric power generation depends on the state of the penstock head gates (open 
or failed to open). The hydropower turbines may also experience outage for different 
reasons during that time, which means that no electric output from the turbines can be 
generated. So, there is low or no electric power generation if the head gates of the 
penstock failed to open, or the turbines – which are electromechanical equipment – 
experience failure to operate because of forced or scheduled outages. 
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 The overtopping failure is assumed to take place in two events: 1- If there is excess 
water more than the reservoir capacity and the sluice gates failed to open (closed), 
even if the sluiceway discharge capacity is adequate for releasing the spill, 2- If there 
is excess water more than the reservoir capacity and the sluiceway discharge capacity 
is not adequate for releasing the spill, even if the sluice gates are opened. 
 Seepage/leakage in the main dam depends on the water pressure and the flood 
severity. It is logically inferred that the dam is under a monitoring and inspection 
system that ensures no more than 0.2 probability to have leakage in the dam body 
with the highest water pressure and the most severe flood. Seepage/leakage is 
considered to be a risk of failure as it reduces the remaining service life of the dam. 
 Main dam failure considers the failure of any part of the main dam sub-system. Thus, 
overtopping failure, instability/sliding of the main dam, leakage/seepage in the main 
dam body, failure in operating head gates, or any failure in electromechanical 
equipment, are considered cases for main dam failure. This means that any failure 
which makes the main dam unable to operate properly as designed, or fail to do one 
of its operations, is considered a failure. 
 For the two earthen block dams, the vegetation and animal burrows are assumed not 
to be efficiently controlled by a 0.7 probability (0.3 probability of being controlled), 
which is an assumption because data about monitoring and maintenance schedules are 
not available. Inefficient control of vegetation and animal burrows/holes in the 
vicinity of the block dams may increase the probability of seepage piping in both of 
them. 
 Earthen dams’ failure considers the instability of any of the two dams, or existence of 
seepage piping in any of the dams. 
 System failure happens if the main dam fails, or earthen dams fail, or both fail. 
 
When the network is compiled using Bayesian inference on Hugin Lite software, while using the 
limited data available and logic inference to quantify the probability tables of the BN, it can be 
seen in Fig.84 that, in the life time of 100 years, the probability of the main dam failure is about 
77%, and the earthen dams fail with a probability of about 68%. These probabilities are 
considered very high, which means that quantifying the network with logically inferred data may 
not be accurate for prediction results that should help the decision maker while taking decisions. 
It is obvious that logically inferred data is considered a source of uncertainty in predicting the 
system failure, as it contains limited knowledge which needs to be improved by other data 
sources, i.e. expert engineering judgement. 
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Fig.84: BN of Mountain Chute dam after compilation on Hugin Lite 
 
From another perspective, it can be seen from the BN in Fig.85 that – given the evidence that the 
main dam has failed - the main contributors to the Main Dam Failure are: inadequate discharge 
capacity of the sluiceway of 81% probability, electromechanical equipment failure of 39% 
probability, head gates failure of about 65% probability, non-safe ice loading of 46.6% 
probability, 48.9% probability of high inflow, 64.7% probability of high rain/precipitation, about 
39% probability of sluice gate failure, and 36% probability of high water pressure. 
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Fig.85: BN of Mountain Chute given the evidence that main dam failed 
 
 
If these main contributors to the main dam failure are controlled to be within normal/safe 
operating conditions, the evidence can be set in the Bayesian equations to calculate the updated 
posterior probability for the main dam failure given these evidences. The same procedure can 
also be applied to the earthen dams. In Fig.86, it is shown that while setting the evidence to have 
most of the network nodes operating at normal/safe operating conditions, the probability of 
failure of the main dam falls to 5.7% probability of failure, and zero probability of failure of the 
earthen block dams with the efficient inspection, monitoring, and control of both of them.  
This means that with the proper inspection, monitoring, control, and maintenance of the dam 
system, the probability of failure can be kept at lower limits (i.e. 5.7 % and 0%), even if the 
whole dam system is at risk (i.e. 77%, and 68%). 
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Fig.86: BN of Mountain Chute given the evidence of normal/safe operating conditions 
 
6.4 Expert Judgement for Quantifying the BN of Mountain Chute Dam 
On October 11
th
, 2018, a site visit was made to Mountain Chute Dam and Generating Station to 
meet Dr. Dehai Zhao, Technical (Civil) Production Supervisor, Plant Engineering Services - 
Eastern Operations, Ontario Power Generation. Andrea Verzobio, an International Visiting 
Graduate Student to University of Waterloo, and PhD student in the Department of Civil and 
Environmental Engineering at University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, was also helping in 
defining a methodology for elicitation of required data for such complex networks through 
engineering expert judgement. Dr. Zhao was the expert who provided some information 
regarding dam operation. This information was beneficial in updating basic and conditional 
probabilities of the BN. It is important to note that all the expert judgement data used to quantify 
the BN, in this section, are assumed to be for 100 years of operation of Mountain Chute dam. 
Fig.87 and Fig.88 are site pictures to show Mountain Chute main dam and its sluice way, 
respectively, while Fig.89, Fig.90, and Fig.91 show a drainage collecting point in the main dam, 
vegetation control around the main dam, and one of the earthen block dams, respectively. 
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Fig.87: Mountain Chute Dam and Generating Station (sluiceway and sluice gates to the left) 
 
 
Fig.88: Side view of the sluiceway and sluice gates of Mountain Chute dam 
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Fig.89: Collecting point of drainage in the main dam body 
 
 
 
Fig.90: Controlled vegetation around the main concrete dam 
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Fig.91: One of the earthen block dams (behind the trees) 
The aim is to propose a methodology for populating BNs in the case where the topology of the 
BN has already been defined, i.e. starting from a graphical model with all the variables 
described. In this case, the elicitation process is then required to extract and quantify the 
subjective judgments about the uncertain quantities, which are mainly the conditional 
probabilities that represent the interrelationships among connected nodes. In the literature, there 
are various protocols for probability elicitation; the methodology used here is based mainly on 
the one that seems the most suitable, i.e. the SRI (Stanford Research Institute) model, [108], 
[109], and [110]. 
The process for eliciting expert judgment is composed by seven stages: motivating the experts 
with the aim of the elicitation process, structuring the uncertain quantities in an unambiguous 
way, conditioning the expert’s judgement to avoid cognitive biases, encoding the probability 
distributions, verifying the consistency of the elicited distributions, aggregating probabilities 
from different experts, and discretizing continuous probability distributions. To conduct an 
elicitation process, at least two characters are necessary: a subject, i.e. the expert, and an analyst, 
i.e. the interviewer. The first one provides expertise, i.e. “a person who has substantive 
knowledge about the events whose uncertainty is to be assessed” [108], while the second one is 
who take responsibility for designing and developing the process and the evaluation procedures. 
Starting from this protocol and according to the specific requirements of a BN, a four-stage 
structured methodology was developed to support the elicitation meaningfully. Each stage is 
presented in details by defining each phase of the process and presenting the roles of the key 
personnel along with highlighting all the potential biases, as follows: 
 Stage 1: To start, the analysts have to study carefully the project and the proposed BN, to 
understand which kind of expertise is required. It is fundamental to ensure coverage of all the 
different perspectives of the problem, so more than one expert is usually necessary. So, the 
analysts should identify the essential and desired characteristics of experts and build up 
147 
 
profiles of experts who may be able to answer these questions. For the number of required 
experts, it is variable and depends on the variability of expertise per domain. From a 
theoretical perspective, adding as many experts as possible would seem beneficial; however, 
too many experts can be problematic too, depending on the type of elicitation process chosen.  
 Stage 2: Individual interviews between the analysts and the selected experts are conducted. 
The initial part of the interview has two purposes; to introduce the expert to the encoding task 
as well as identifying and addressing motivational biases, such as management and expert 
bias. Management bias is where an expert provides goals rather than judgments (e.g. the dam 
will not fail), and expert bias is where an expert becomes overly confident.  During this 
initial part of the interview, the BN should be explained, indicating the uncertain variables 
that will be elicited and explaining how this process can be useful towards the resolution of 
the overall problem. The second part of this stage focuses on structuring the variables. Each 
quantity of interest that will be quantified needs to be specified so that a measurement scale 
can be determined. Even if the topology of the BN has already been defined, it is 
fundamental to review with the experts the definitions of the variables and their states, in 
order to structure the uncertain quantities in an unambiguous and meaningful way, before 
starting the encoding phase. Each variable must have a clear definition that will be 
understood without any possibility of misunderstanding by the expert. Depending on the 
experience of the expert, it may be appropriate to disaggregate the variable into more 
elemental variables. This can be very useful in the case of the BN, because each node might 
depend on several aspects and it can be easier for the expert to evaluate these secondary 
probabilities. This technique also allows the analyst to combat motivational biases and to 
reduce some cognitive biases by increasing the level of details.  
 Stage 3: Information which is relevant to estimating uncertainties is discussed in this stage to 
minimize cognitive biases by conditioning the expert’s judgments [111]. In particular, biases 
such as anchoring, i.e. when the evaluation is conditioned by an initial assessment, and 
availability, i.e. when the evaluation is based on the ease of which relevant instances come to 
mind, have to be investigated. Thus, the interviewers should ask some specific questions to 
test the experts. In addition, probability training should be provided to calibrate the experts, 
where a brief review of basic probability concepts may be helpful, beside some training 
questions which can help the experts to become familiar with the elicitation process itself. 
Experts should be trained on problems relevant to the questions on which they will be 
providing judgement. Different training questions are necessary for instance in the cases of a 
frequent event or a very rare event. When the training is completed, the encoding stage 
commences. During the interview, the same question can be asked in various ways, to find 
potential inconsistencies. 
 Stage 4: This final stage starts by verifying the consistency of the elicited probabilities. First 
of all, the analysts should verify that each expert has provided a reflection of their true 
beliefs. If the results are not satisfactory, the previous stage should be repeated. In the case 
that the same conditional probabilities have been elicited from different experts, the analysts 
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should then develop an aggregation technique to obtain one final result; see [112] for a 
performance-based approach or [113] for a behavioral based approach. Once each elicited 
probability has been verified and aggregated, the analysts should solve the overall BN to 
achieve the conclusive results. 
 
Following the above mentioned stages, the following data and information have been provided 
by the expert of Mountain Chute Dam: 
 Vegetation is controlled and monitored around the main dam, and both of the earthen 
block dams. Trees are cut regularly according to a designed schedule. See Fig.90. 
 Animal holes and burrows, of the earthen dams, are also monitored and maintained 
regularly. 
 Both earthen dams have elevation more than the main concrete dam; thus, there is no 
high risk of overtopping in both of them. Overtopping is considered a risk for only the 
main concrete dam.  
 There are collecting points for the drainage water in the main dam body. All the drainage 
is discharged to the drainage inspection tunnel in order to monitor the amount of water 
drainage before being released to the tail race of the main dam. See Fig.89. 
 Water pressure on the main concrete dam is also monitored, and if exceeded certain 
limits, the gates (head gates and sluice gates) are used to release water to get the water 
pressure back to its acceptable limits.  
 The ice loading affecting the hoists of sluice gates and head gates is controlled by using 
heaters. If the heaters failed for any reason, there is another mechanism called “water 
bubbler” that prevents ice from accumulating on the mechanical parts of the gates. 
 The sluiceway capacity was also a matter that has been discussed with the expert. 
However the sluiceway capacity is inadequate for the maximum design flood, there is a 
weather monitoring plan that allows the dam operators to take decisions within 48 hours 
before any flood hits the dam. This plan depends on releasing the water by operating all 
the gates (sluice gates, head gates, and all service gates). So, there is a limited risk of 
overtopping. 
 For the stability of the main dam, horizontal and vertical movements are also monitored 
in all dams of the Madawaska river system, including Mountain Chute. No movements 
were reported since the beginning of operation of the dam. 
 Since dams are considered to be Water Mountains, constructing any dam may change the 
seismic activity in the area around the dam. While performing an experiment for ice 
accumulation in the reservoir and its effect on the main dam, Mountain Chute dam 
operators made sure that the dam is designed to withstand up to 1.45 Ib/ft of earthquake 
effect. Since the dam didn’t experience any destructive or severe earthquake, this value is 
not representable for such seismic actions. So, there is still limited probability of facing a 
destructive earthquake that the dam can’t withstand. 
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BPTs and CPTs of the proposed BN of Mountain Chute dam are updated using data elicited from 
expert engineering judgement, which are 18 probability estimates. This judgement considers 
minimum risks to take place and claims that all dam components are working properly and 
within the safe and normal operating conditions. Accordingly, it can be seen from the BN in 
Fig.92  that the failure probability of the main dam falls to 1.33%, and the failure probability of 
the earthen dams falls to 1.28% over 100 years of operation. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.92: BN of Mountain Chute dam using expert engineering judgement for quantification 
 
 
By setting the evidence that the main dam failure is 100%, the main contributors to main dam 
failure can be identified from Fig.93 as high rain/precipitation, high inflow, sluice gate failure, 
and leakage of water in the main dam body. 
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Fig.93: Contribution in main dam failure of Mountain Chute dam when using expert judgement 
 
If sluice gate failure, for example, is considered one of the main contributors in the failure with 
almost 25% probability, it is required to do more causal analysis in the sluice gate component. 
Sluice gate itself can be represented as a sub-BN having sub-components as shown in Fig.94. 
This means that every component in the BN can be represented with a lower level sub-BN that 
can be analyzed, according to available data, logic inference, and expert judgement, and may be 
with simulation, in order to find the probability of failure of the higher level component, which is 
the sluice gate failure in this case. If the sluice gate component/node is 
decomposed/disaggregated to its sub-BN and sub-components, it can be seen in Fig.94 that if a 
tornado took place in the area of Mountain Chute dam, it may affect the generation of electricity 
coming from turbines by affecting the transmission lines. Any disturbance in the electricity 
generation will affect the operation of the sluice gates, which are electrically supplied by this 
source. As a backup, there is a diesel generator that is placed near the sluice gates to supply 
heaters and the on-site control board of the sluice gates with electricity in the case of any 
emergency. If tornado took place, there is a higher risk that this diesel generator is blown away, 
and thus, sluice gates may lose all kinds of electric supply to allow their operation. In the 
meanwhile, the remote operation of the sluice gates by the control station may have trouble in 
connectivity that blocks the control station from operating the gates remotely. If any mechanical 
problem happens at this time, there is a higher probability of failure of the gates, and they may 
not operate/open at the required time in order to release certain amounts of water in case any 
flood took place. BPTs and CPTs of this new sub-BN of the sluice gates can be built and 
151 
 
quantified with available data, expert judgement, logic inference, or from simulation, in order to 
predict the probability of failure of the sluice gates. Once the predicted probability is available, 
this probability can be used to quantify the sluice gate node in the higher level BN, i.e. in Fig.83.  
 
 
Fig.94: Sluice Gate node decomposed to its sub-BN and sub-components 
 
6.5 Summary, Comments, and Recommendations 
In this chapter, it can be shown that there is a significant difference in the failure probabilities 
when the BN is quantified by expert judgement than the case that uses logic inference in 
quantifying the BN; once again showing the importance of adequate data collection and their 
availability for analysis. Adding expert engineering judgement resulted in more specific 
estimates for the safe operation of the dam. The two cases of using logic inference (in section 
6.3) and using expert judgement (in section 6.4) can be considered as two different scenarios that 
may be helpful for the decision maker. The worst case scenario may be the one that uses 
logically inferred data, and the safe operating scenario is the one that uses data from expert 
judgment.  
It is obvious that there is a need for a Dam Safety Program that defines different scenarios of 
dam operation in order to help decision makers and dam operators. The dam safety program 
should define all the interrelationships and mathematical models that relate different dam 
components, which will be helpful to monitor, inspect, operate, and predict the states of these 
components. It will also be helpful in designing maintenance schedules and maintenance actions 
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until the end-of-life of the dam, and defines the need of rehabilitation or decommissioning of the 
dam. 
 
In conclusion, there is a need to quantify the Bayesian Network more accurately with reducing 
the uncertainty measures arising from limited knowledge and/or any false data. Detailed 
simulation may be the solution. Simulation Supported Bayesian Network (SSBN) and Markov 
Chain Simulation Supported Bayesian Network (MCSSBN) may be two more accurate ways of 
quantifying the BN that enables entering available data from one side, and randomly generating 
data within certain ranges from the other side. MCSSBN allows for updating the network with 
new available data more smoothly, especially when having cyclic nature in the network. If 
simulation is to be performed for Mountain Chute Dam, the decompositional approach, i.e. 
decomposing the system to smaller sub-networks, should be applied to the system’s BN as 
shown in Fig.95. The same procedures for SSBN and MCSSBN that were followed in the two 
reservoir system may also be applied to this network. However, this network is more complex as 
there are many variables to be included in the network, and the relational (conditional) 
mathematical equations and models are not easy to obtain.  
 
 
Fig.95: BN of Mountain Chute decomposed to four sub-networks 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Future Work 
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7.1 Conclusions 
Failure analysis of complex systems having a huge number of interacting system components is 
challenging, especially while having probabilistic events that affect the systems performance. A 
probabilistic multifactor representation that represents different types of factors (i.e. technical 
and non-technical) and events may be helpful in performing failure analysis of complex systems. 
In this thesis, it can be concluded that the engineering complex systems have many ways to be 
represented, however, BNs have shown advantages in representing such systems in terms of 
defining the interrelationships among system components. The quantification of BNs depends on 
different sources of data like logic inference, expert engineering judgement, empirical 
mathematical models, historical and operational data, and/or detailed simulation. The aim of this 
thesis is to facilitate the process of predicting the probability of failure of complex systems, like 
Nuclear Waste Management (NWM), or Safety of Hydropower Dams (SHPD), using BN 
probabilistic representation. The posterior capability of the BN may also be helpful in identifying 
the main contributing components to system failure. This may be useful in the design, operation, 
or decision making stages. 
In this thesis, the different factors affecting the failures of NWM and SHPD systems are 
reviewed. The BN of NWM problem is then represented and quantified according to available 
data and logically inferred data. The diagnostic capability of the BN has been used to know the 
main contributors to system failure. As the NWM is still a blue print and not yet a real-world 
application, any new data when available during design and site selection processes will be 
helpful in updating the probabilistic estimates of failure. On the contrary, hydropower dams are 
pre-existing structures operating for decades, and they are prone to failure according to large 
number of different factors and system variables.  
For the SHPD problem, a real-world case study of Mountain Chute dam is explained, and the 
system is represented by a BN while using different ways of quantification, i.e. logic inference, 
and expert judgement. In this case study, data are limited and not fully available for this complex 
engineering system. The importance of finding a new procedure to easily quantify the BN 
representation using simulation became obvious to overcome the uncertain data sources (i.e. 
logic inference, or expert judgement).  
Two BN based methodologies, i.e. SSBN and MCSSBN, are developed for that purpose. Both 
methodologies rely on the decompositional approach of decomposing the complex network, 
represented by BN, into less complex sub-networks to be simulated separately. This 
decomposition helps in avoiding the complications that may arise when dealing with exhaustive 
simulation of large complex networks. 
A simple two dam reservoir system was used to demonstrate the SSBN and MCSSBN methods.  
For SSBN, simulating decomposed sub-systems of the entire system is used as a quantification 
source for the BN. Using the two dam reservoir system of different configurations, the SSBN 
results are shown to be close to the simulation results. However, there is a difference between the 
results in both cases because of the states’ discretization that was defined for the different BN 
states. It is also shown that increasing the number of states for every BN node lead to 
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convergence to the simulation results. The steady state estimates of the SSBN can be used to 
predict the probability of system failure and diagnose the main contributors to system failure by 
using the posterior capabilities of BN. 
For MCSSBN, Markov Chains are integrated with both simulation and BNs to acquire cyclic 
property for the BN that is limited to only acyclic representation. Markov Chains are used to 
define combinations of states (i.e. scenarios) for the sub-systems or for the entire system that 
helps the decision maker in predicting the probability of system failure. Moreover, the system 
can be updated more easily if any updated data becomes available for any system node. The 
system analysis is proposed to be more dynamic while integrating the SSBN with Markov 
Chains. MCSSBN method has been demonstrated using two different approaches on the two dam 
reservoir system. Each of the two approaches has some potential and some limitations.  
For considering the feedbacks, in simulation, feedback is introduced and simulation deals with 
continuous variables. When the probability estimates are obtained from simulation and fed into 
the BN, the variables lose their time stamp, as there is no time stamp in probability, and the BN 
is a probabilistic representation. So, in BN, there is no time stamp and feedback can’t be 
introduced as normally considered in detailed simulations of systems. In order to overcome that 
limitation, MCSSBN that uses SSBN and Markov Chain integration is proposed to use Markov 
transition probabilities to reflect any feedback from different situations, scenarios, or operational 
conditions to the system failure analysis that is required to be considered. From another point of 
view, in SSBN and MCSSBN, the BN is supported by simulation which inherits the feedbacks 
among system components. The simulation is the main source for probability estimates in SSBN 
and MCSSBN. So, when the probabilities are estimated from simulation, they already have the 
effect of feedbacks while being fed into the BN representation. This means that BN encapsulates 
most of the features of the simulation including feedback in the case of SSBN and MCSSBN 
methods. In addition, BN facilitates representing systems scenarios according to different 
evidences.   
 
 
7.2 Recommendations 
This thesis gives the following recommendations for operators and decision makers of complex 
engineering systems: 
 A simplified probabilistic representation using BN is very competitive when dealing with 
complex networks. BN has many advantages over the other probabilistic representation 
techniques, i.e. sequence diagrams and dependability analysis techniques. 
 In order for the BN to be mature for such complex networks, a safety program for any 
complex network should be available. Safety programs define the interrelationships 
among system components, the mathematical models that relate different variables and 
the different operational scenarios for the system at different times within the life time 
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period of the system. The safety program will be useful in setting criteria for all variables 
in the system, their lower and upper bounds, and their risk situations. This will be useful 
in updating the BN of the system when any new data becomes available, but with certain 
limitations.  
 SSBN methodology is recommended to be used for probabilistic analysis of complex 
systems in which acyclic nature of BN representation is not an obstacle. In other words, if 
the system is static and minimal changes and updates in data take place, SSBN is 
expected to have a huge contribution in probabilistic analysis. If any change or update 
took place in the system, simulation should be re-performed for the sub-network having 
the change, if the change is local, or for the entire network, if the change is global. This 
will take more time and effort to estimate results during any risky situation. 
 MCSSBN methodology is recommended to be used for dynamic system analysis. In such 
cases, transitions among system components may be cyclic and not acyclic. Different 
scenarios, i.e. combination of states, are defined for the sub-networks or for the entire 
network. The probability estimates from simulation are the corner stone in this concept. 
System simulations can be performed for updating the system states/scenarios according 
to different events or situations, e.g. climate change and change in weather conditions. 
Markov Chains can then be used to predict the most probable events to happen in the next 
time period through the transition probability matrices.  
 
7.3 Limitations 
The following limitations are associated with the proposed methodologies: 
 Like any other approach, data availability is a challenge for quantifying the BN 
representation of systems 
 Acyclic limitation of the BN. Although BNs are restricted to account for just acyclic 
dependencies, this feature could be an advantage from another point of view making 
them much faster to solve class of problems in which cyclic relationships are not 
important, especially when such relationships have been included in probabilistic 
information. 
 BN representation of systems is problem-dependent and there is no generic 
representation applicable in different systems as every system has its own influential 
factors and cause and effect relationships.  
 In the SSBN approach, there is no unique way of system decomposition, and the number 
of decomposed sub-systems and their boundary conditions depend on the 
interrelationships among system components, data availability and computational 
resources.  
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7.4 Future Work  
Depending on the methodologies explained in this thesis, there is potential to do the following 
tasks in the near future: 
 Optimization of different scenarios in case of MCSSBN, 
 Using fuzzy logic in BN states’ definition, 
 Using expert judgement to have a global mathematical modelling for conditional 
relations among different system variables, 
 Setting criteria for a Dam Safety Program that can be used for dams in Madawaska River 
System. 
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Appendix 1:  
 
Input data for the two reservoir case study used in this thesis: 
 
 
 
Minimum storage capacity of 
each reservoir 
 
 
2 m
3 
 
Maximum storage capacity of 
each reservoir 
 
 
3 m
3 
 
Average inflow 
 
 
0.5 – 1.5 m3/season, uniformly distributed 
 
 
Designed outflow 
 
 
Mean of the inflow in each year (over 4 
seasons) 
 
 
Spillway gate failure 
 
 
Randomly generated value of 0 (failure) or 1 
(success) according to certain gate operation 
management. For the results presented in this 
thesis, the gates are managed to operate for 
50% of time it is required to operate, and fail 
for 50% of time it is required to operate. 
Other gate management policies will result in 
different estimates and numerical results. 
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Appendix 2:  
GoldSim simulation for a system of two dam reservoirs 
 
Two dams in series having dependent inflows 
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Two dams in series having independent inflows 
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Two dams in parallel having dependent inflows 
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Two dams in parallel having independent inflows 
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Appendix 3:  
BN of Mountain Chute dam and generating station 
 
